Intergenerational redistributive effects due to the financing formula of investments in transport infrastructure : a microeconomic analysis by Peñalver Rojo, Domingo
 
 
Intergenerational redistributive 
effects due to the financing 
formula of investments in 
transport infrastructure. 
 A microeconomic analysis  
 
Domingo Peñalver Rojo  
 
ADVERTIMENT La consulta d’aquesta tesi queda condicionada a l’acceptació de les següents 
condicions d'ús: La difusió d’aquesta tesi per mitjà del r e p o s i t o r i i n s t i t u c i o n a l 
UPCommons       (http://upcommons.upc.edu/tesis)      i      el      repositori      cooperatiu      TDX   
( h t t p : / / w w w . t d x . c a t / ) ha estat autoritzada pels titulars dels drets de propietat intel·lectual 
únicament per a usos privats  emmarcats en activitats d’investigació i docència. No s’autoritza 
la seva reproducció amb finalitats de lucre ni la seva difusió i posada a disposició des d’un lloc 
aliè al servei UPCommons o TDX. No s’autoritza la presentació del seu contingut en una finestra  
o marc aliè a UPCommons (framing). Aquesta reserva de drets afecta tant al resum de presentació 
de la tesi com als seus continguts. En la utilització o cita de parts de la tesi és obligat indicar el nom 
de la persona autora. 
 
 
ADVERTENCIA La consulta de esta tesis queda condicionada a la aceptación de las siguientes 
condiciones de uso: La difusión de esta tesis por medio del repositorio institucional UPCommons 
(http://upcommons.upc.edu/tesis) y el repositorio cooperativo TDR (http://www.tdx.cat/?locale- 
attribute=es) ha sido autorizada por los titulares de los derechos de propiedad intelectual 
únicamente para usos privados enmarcados en actividades de investigación y docencia. No  
se autoriza su reproducción con finalidades de lucro ni su difusión y puesta a disposición desde  
un sitio ajeno al servicio UPCommons No se autoriza la presentación de su contenido en una 
ventana o marco ajeno a UPCommons (framing). Esta reserva de derechos afecta tanto al 
resumen de presentación de la tesis como a sus  contenidos. En la utilización o cita de partes     
de la tesis  es obligado  indicar  el nombre de la    persona autora. 
 
 
WARNING On having consulted this thesis you’re accepting the following use conditions: 
Spreading this thesis by the i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e p o s i t o r y UPCommons 
(http://upcommons.upc.edu/tesis) and the cooperative repository TDX (http://www.tdx.cat/?locale- 
attribute=en) has been authorized by the titular of the intellectual property rights only for private 
uses placed in investigation and teaching activities. Reproduction with lucrative aims is not 
authorized neither its spreading nor availability from a site foreign to the UPCommons service. 
Introducing its content in a window or frame foreign to the UPCommons service is not authorized 
(framing). These rights affect to the presentation summary of the thesis as well as to its contents. 
In the using or citation of parts of the thesis it’s obliged to indicate the name of the author. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
-Tesi per compendi de publicacions- 
 
INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS DUE TO 
THE FINANCING FORMULA OF INVESTMENTS IN 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE. A MICROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
Author:  
Domingo Peñalver Rojo 
 
PhD Supervisor: 
Dr. Mateu Turró Calvet 
 
Programa de Doctorat en Enginyeria i Infraestructura del Transport 
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya – BarcelonaTech 
 
Barcelona, March 2019 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS DUE TO 
THE FINANCING FORMULA OF INVESTMENTS IN 
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE. A MICROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Autor: 
Domingo Peñalver Rojo 
 
Director de la tesi: 
Dr. Mateu Turró Calvet 
 
Memoria presentada per optar 
al titol de Doctor Enginyer de Camins, Canals i Ports 
 
Programa de Doctorat en Enginyeria i Infraestructura del Transport 
Departament d’Enginyeria Civil i Ambiental 
E.T.S. d’Enginyers de Camins, Canals i Ports de Barcelona (ETSECCPB) 
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya – BarcelonaTech 
 
Barcelona, March 2019 
 
 
  
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family, wife, son and daughter.  
They have been next to me all the time 
  
  
 
 
    
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(…) same experiences make of the sequence of life cycles a generational cycle, irrevocably 
binding each generation to those that gave it life and to those for whose life it is responsible. 
Thus, reconciling lifelong generativity(*) and stagnation involves the elder in a review of his or 
her own years of active responsibility for nurturing the next generations, and also in an 
integration of earlier-life experiences of caring and of self-concern in relation to previous 
generations. 
Erikson, Erik. H., Joan M. Erikson and Helen Q. Kivnick . Vital involvement in the old age.   
WW Norton  & Company, 1994. 
_____________ 
(*) The concept of generativity refers to the individuals’ interest to guide and ensure the well-being of next 
generations and, ultimately, to leave a legacy that will survive us.  
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Abstract 
Investments in major transport infrastructure projects involve a significant mobilisation of 
economic resources both for construction and operation. In these projects, to assess the 
efficiency of the resources used, decision-makers usually use cost-benefit analysis (CBA). This 
key element of welfare economics is carried out taking into account the effects for society as a 
whole. Social welfare is thus measured independently of who are the components of society 
receiving the benefits or suffering the costs. However, besides the best use of resources, which 
should be always ensured, transport projects often have other objectives. These objectives, which 
are ideally defined by the political programs of elected decision-makers, often involve 
redistributive effects. Favouring the economic development of less advanced regions is, for 
instance, an argument that is used to justify territorial biases in investment. 
Practitioners have increasingly tried to identify redistributive effects to both create awareness of 
their existence and to quantify them in order to incorporate them rigorously in project appraisal. 
Intergenerational redistributive effects due to the financial scheme adopted for the project are a 
kind of redistributive effects that has neither been properly highlighted nor researched until now. 
The actual payments to cover the costs of projects unfolding over long timespans depend on the 
financing formula chosen and affect taxpayers and/or users of different generations. When 
transport investments are directly covered by the annual budgets of public administrations, they 
are paid by the taxpayers of the construction period but benefit users that will live in decades 
ahead. However, if the project is financed through loans, their payment schedule will define a 
very different financial time-profile. Relating the payments profile with the benefits produced by 
the project, which occur over its life cycle, can indicate the fairness of the distribution of 
expenditure and benefits across the successive generations affected by the project.  
At microeconomic level, intergenerational impacts have been discussed, often with insufficient 
rigor, in relation to environmental sustainability and mostly regarding the appropriate discount 
rate to be applied in CBA. However, the financial structuring of the project could have a much 
stronger impact on a project’s legacy. The issue of the long-term implications of financial 
decisions is illustrated, at a broader macroeconomic level, by the problems of public debt 
confronted by many countries. 
In this work the redistributive effects of transport investment projects are analysed, though the 
major contribution is the development of the “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model” 
(IREM). This microeconomic model allows performing an analysis of intergenerational impact 
for both major project of transport infrastructure and integrated investment programmes that is 
useful to obtain indicators of their utility for the successive (overlapped) generations concerned. 
Decision makers and financiers may use the IREM’s outputs when proposing a financial 
montage for a project and deciding the participation of private stakeholders and the contribution 
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of users in it. They also can use the IREM’s indicators as insights to establish the most 
convenient financial montage to carry out a project. 
In synthesis, what is presented, developed and tested is a tool to characterise the 
intergenerational impacts from major transport investment. These effects should be included in 
the wide concept of project sustainability but have, until now, been disregarded in spite of their 
importance for decision makers and financiers. 
 
Keywords: intergenerational redistributive effects; intergenerational impact analysis; IREM; 
CBA; white elephant; public-private partnerships; project finance; value for money 
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1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Major transport infrastructure projects mobilise a great amount of economic resources during 
very large timespans that may extend well beyond a service live of 50-75 years. As a 
consequence, they generate significant social, territorial and environmental effects that concern 
multiple generations. The socioeconomic evaluation of these projects through cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) is a widespread and consolidated practice in many countries and is used by 
major International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to appraise projects presented to them for 
financial support (Turró, 2010). There is a proliferation of guides and manuals on how to carry 
out CBAs for major investments (WB, 1997; ADB, 1997; ABTE, 1999; BID, 2006; Turró, 2004; 
DG Regio-EU, 2015).  They are not always consistent, but they systematically apply the basic 
principles of CBA, among them that present benefits (i.e. resource consumption) are considered 
more valuable than future one (Pigou, 1920; Ramsey, 1928; Harrod, 1948). Indeed, to compare 
the costs and benefits for society occurring throughout the project’s economic life cycle, they 
must be properly quantified and monetised and then discounted using precisely the rate that 
supposedly reflects the value loss for society of consuming later. The results of the CBA are 
presented by means of synthetic indicators, such as the net present value (NPV), showing the 
total of the discounted net benefits, the internal rate of return of the investment or the ratio 
between the discounted benefits and costs. 
The outcomes from the standard socioeconomic CBA give therefore an indication of the capacity 
of the project to generate net benefits, in terms of resources, for the society of the time when the 
decision must be taken. A substantial problem in the use of CBA indicators as a main decision-
making tool is that, in some cases, there are important effects that cannot be properly quantified 
and/or monetised or are controversial. Environmental impacts, for instance, are given economic 
values that are increasingly precise (Cavill et al., 2008; Vandermeulen et al., 2011), but some of 
them, such as those for greenhouse gases emissions, are far from obtaining consensual 
monetisation. Certain impacts, such as landscape effects, are particularly hard to convert into 
money. Other effects of infrastructure projects, such as the incidence on economic development, 
are also difficult to incorporate in the CBA. Some mechanisms to do it, such as using shadow 
values for labour, to enhance the job creation potential of the project, are sometimes applied, but 
the incorporation of the potential effects of a transport infrastructure on the economy is far from 
being a standard practice. The really relevant effects of a project that are difficult to include in 
the CBA may be taken into consideration through a multicriteria analysis or simply by 
comparing the project’s NPV with these effects to see if they are, at least, within the order of 
magnitude that would ensure a positive NPV1. 
The CBA does not provide, however, information about the effects of the project on the various 
social groups, or stakeholders, that will benefit from, or in some cases, be harmed by, the 
investment. If a project has to fulfil the Pareto-efficiency condition, besides being 
socioeconomically profitable, all individuals should obtain benefits, even those that are a priori 
adversely affected, which must necessarily be compensated (de Rus, 2009). However, in 
practice, this condition is rarely complied with. Most transport projects effects are not distributed 
homogeneously across the territory, the various social groups or over time. The unequal 
distribution of costs often means that the negative impacts for certain stakeholders are left 
without a proper compensation. Whilst such effects do not affect the overall efficiency of the 
project measured by the CBA, it is obvious that Paretian efficiency is not ensured. Onwards, 
                                                   
1 If the effects are negative, they should be inferior to the positive NPV of the project and, alternatively, when 
positive, they should be considered at least sufficient to raise a negative NPV to zero. 
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those differential impacts resulting from an unequal distribution of the socioeconomic benefits 
and costs of the project are referred to as “redistribution effects”. 
The environmental redistribution effects generated by infrastructure construction and by 
transport services, which affect different geographic areas and social groups, have been widely 
analysed. The development of specific procedures that allow their identification and mitigation, 
such as the strategic environmental assessment (SEA) or the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) − (Lee & Wood, 1978; Jörissen & Coenen, 1992; Arce & Gullón, 2000; Glasson et al., 
2013)− is a good proof of this. Furthermore, at present, environmental sustainability is a clear 
political objective of the European Union (EU) and of most countries, including many less 
developed ones. When investment projects aim at obtaining financial support (funding) from the 
EU or financing from IFIs or other international institutions promoting social and economic 
development, the analysis of their environmental aspects is always a main requirement (Turró, 
2010).  
Territorial spillover effects, induced by changes in regional accessibility, are linked to the 
multiple equilibria affecting the conditions of economic growth and are difficult to foresee and 
quantify. Their long-term implications are obvious and, alongside some environmental impacts, 
they should be incorporated into any concept of intergenerational redistributive effects. The 
effects over future generations stemming from the project’s financing formula, which usually 
involves delayed payments, have not been properly identified until now in spite of being evident. 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the redistribution effects of the mechanism 
adopted to finance major transport infrastructure projects and to propose ways of 
incorporating these effects in the decision-making process. 
 
2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS  
This thesis is the result of a compendium of papers published in SCI’s peer-reviewed journals of 
international scope. The major contributions of those scientific articles to the literature are: 
1) Classification, for first time, of the redistribution effects arising from major investments 
in transport infrastructure. Redistribution effects, which should be considered alongside 
the socioeconomic and financial assessment, are seldom reflected in a systematic way in 
the decisions on major infrastructure investments. The proposed classification should 
facilitate a more consistent incorporation of these effects in the decision-making process.   
2) Development of the Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model (IREM) architecture. 
This microeconomic model provides a set of indicators allowing to perform an analysis 
of the intergenerational impact of major projects of transport infrastructure.  
3) As IREM is based on a survey-based definition of the generation concept, it has been 
necessary to design an ad-hoc utility function that represents the dynamic of society’s 
preferences within each generation in relation to the main features and effects of major 
infrastructure projects. This function provides a mathematical representation of the 
generational concept, which has been key to the practical application of IREM to a set of 
transport-infrastructure projects already commissioned. 
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4) Development of a projects intergenerational rating scale that allows to label a project in 
terms of fairness/unfairness2. This scale may be to evaluate: a) if certain generations are 
paying (or expected to pay) more than the net benefits they receive; b) whether present or 
future generations will be favoured and the strength of this trend; and c) whether 
particular generations will end up being greatly benefited/harmed due to the project 
financing model. 
5) IREM has been applied to a set of projects of different typologies. The results indicate 
that this microeconomic tool is suited to perform a proper analysis of intergenerational 
redistributive effects.  The IREM indicators offer valuable insights to identify those 
projects that would represent a clearly unfair treatment of future generations, in spite of 
showing an acceptable socioeconomic return for the current society. 
6) The outcomes obtained during this research provide strong arguments in favour of: 
∼ including the assessment of the fairness of the redistribution of the project effects 
across the generations concerned in the decision-making process to major projects 
of transport infrastructure with the aim of identifying those projects that would 
represent a clearly unfair treatment of future generations, in spite of showing an 
acceptable socioeconomic return for the current society.  
∼ including in the Value for Money analysis of public-private partnerships (PPPs), 
besides the standard efficiency and financial considerations, an analysis of the 
intergenerational effects of the different procurement options and to compare 
these effects with those of the purely public financing alternative 
Indeed, a major finding of this research is that the negative impact from an unbalanced 
distribution of the project’s socioeconomic net benefits in relation to the financial provisions has 
the potential to reduce the well-being of future generations, being users and/or taxpayers. 
Although the long-term effects of the financing formula of a specific project are evidently 
embedded in the global macroeconomic context, (i.e. public deficit and debt), the results of the 
thesis indicate that it is important, within the decision-making process, to generate awareness of 
its intergenerational implications. The selection of the most suitable option to finance a major 
infrastructure project should include the consideration of the fairness of the distribution of costs 
and benefits among different generations.  
 
3. PUBLICATIONS FROM THIS THESIS 
The present doctoral thesis is the result of a compendium of scientific papers published in 
indexed international journals falling in the framework either transport economics or project 
management and decision-making processes: 
A. Papers published in international SCI journals:  
- Penyalver, D. & Turró, M. (2017). Assessing the fairness of a project financing 
formula on successive generations. International Journal of Transport Economics, 
44(1), pp.153-176. https://doi.org/10.19272/201706701008  
 
                                                   
2 The “fair/unfair” concept refers to moral obligations towards future generations (Rawls, 1972). 
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- Penyalver, D., Turró, M. & Zavala-Rojas, D. (2018). Intergenerational perception of 
the utility of major transport investments. Research in Transportation Economics, 70, 
pp.97-111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2017.11.001  
 
- Penyalver, D. & Turró, M. (2018). A classification for the redistributive effects of 
investments in transport infrastructure. International Journal of Transport Economics, 
45(4), pp.689-726. https://doi.org/10.19272/201806704008 
 
- Penyalver, D., Turró, M. & Williamson, J.B  (2019). Measuring the value for money 
of transport infrastructure procurement; an intergenerational approach.  
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 119, pp.238-254. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2018.11.013 
 
- Turró, M. & Penyalver, D.  (2019). Hunting white elephants on the road. A practical 
procedure to detect harmful projects of transport infrastructure. Research in 
Transportation Economics (in press). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2019.03.001 
 
4. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Once the main background of decision-making processes for major investment in transport 
infrastructure has been introduced and the objectives and contributions of the thesis are 
described, the remainder of this thesis is structured according to Figure I-1. 
In particular, Section II addresses the theoretical economic-framework and the main decision-
making instruments used by governments promoting investments in transport infrastructure and 
provides a classification of the redistributive effects of major investments projects in transport 
infrastructure. This section matches with the paper entitled: “A Classification for the 
Redistributive Effects of Investments in Transport Infrastructure”. 
Section III develops in detail the IREM model, which is a comprehensive microeconomic 
approach that allows establishing the importance of the intergenerational redistributive effects. 
This section matches with the paper entitled: “Assessing the Fairness of a Project Financing 
Formula on Successive Generations”. 
Section IV describes the field work (surveys) and the methodological process followed to gather 
the insights required to establish, with a degree of suitable objectivity, the importance that 
individuals give to both the socioeconomic benefits obtained from transport infrastructure 
projects and the financial burden that they end up enduring. The results obtained from this work 
are indispensable to define the concept of “annual generation”, a core element within IREM. 
This section matches with the content of the paper entitled: “An Assessment of the Catalonia 
Population's Time Perception about the Utility of Major Transport Investments”. 
Section V proposes a procedure for rating projects from the intergenerational perspective that is 
useful to avoid harmful transport-infrastructure projects (white elephants). To show the 
usefulness of such approach, IREM is applied to a set of motorway projects carried out in 
Andalusia (Spain). This section matches with the content of the paper entitled: “Hunting White 
Elephants on the Road. A Practical Procedure to Detect Wasteful Projects of Transport 
Infrastructure”. 
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Figure I-1. General overview of the thesis contents 
  
 
Section VI highlights the importance of looking closely at the intergenerational effects of the 
adopted financing mechanism to ensure its fairness and convenience. This section matches with 
the content of the paper entitled: “Measuring the Value for Money of Transport Infrastructure 
Procurement; An Intergenerational Approach”. 
Section VII offers an interpretation of the main findings from this research and delivers 
conclusions. Finally, a set of new lines of research are suggested to be developed in the future.  
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SECTION II. A CLASSIFICATION FOR THE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF 
INVESTMENTS IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE  
Penyalver, D. & Turró, M., 2018 
Abstract 
The efficiency of major transport projects in terms of resources ought to be always a critical 
factor in decision-making. The socio-economic profitability of transport investment projects is 
unevenly distributed among their stakeholders, usually following pre-defined political 
objectives. This paper classifies the differential impacts of such projects (redistributive effects), 
including territorial, social and environmental impacts, to facilitate decision-making and 
proposes to include in this process the intergenerational seldom taken into account in the 
economic and financial assessment of major infrastructure investments. The classification 
proposed will facilitate giving to each redistributive effect a proper weight in a systematic multi-
criteria analysis.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the branch of Economics dealing with economic efficiency and social welfare 
considers society as an abstract and compact body (Bonnafous & Masson, 2003). In the classic 
formulation of welfare economics, public actions (plans, programs and projects) are evaluated, in 
principle, regardless of which individuals are taking advantage of them and which ones are 
suffering their consequences (Harberger, 1971). From a collective point of view, an investment 
will always be justified if the project allows a future consumption large enough to compensate 
for the postponement of immediate consumption of the resources required to carry out the 
project. Major infrastructures, due to their impact on society, are always either proposed or 
regulated by the public sector, which is typically an administration or a public agency, that is 
referred here as the government promoting the investment (GPI). The GPI is expected to ensure 
that society’s resources are used efficiently and is ultimately responsible to determine whether to 
make the investment and under what conditions. 
Efficiency for the whole of society is, thus, in theory, the driver of GPI’s decisions. Such 
efficiency is traditionally measured using cost-benefit analysis (CBA1) (Thomopoulos et al., 
2009; Meunier et al., 2013), which, based on the estimation of the costs and benefits of an action, 
such as an investment, over the time period that is considered relevant, monetises them and, 
using a social discount rate (SDR), produces quantitative indicators of its profitability. In 
principle, an investment will always be justified if the economic net present value (ENPV) of the 
project is positive or the internal rate of return (IRR) is higher than the SDR (Weisbrod, 2015; 
Boardman et al., 2017).  
There are many issues in CBA, such as forecasts, monetisation and even about the right SDR 
that will not be raised here unless required. The focus of this article is on a major hindrance of 
CBA for proper decision-making, which is its difficulty to measure the differential impact of the 
project on the various stakeholders participating in it. In general, when a large transport 
investment is undertaken, some groups (in principle, the users of the project) will benefit 
noticeably from its effects while others (e.g. those affected by externalities and the taxpayers, 
when there are public subsidies) bear costs without being fairly compensated for them (de Rus, 
2009). In order to ensure Pareto efficiency, so none of these agents is adversely affected or, if so, 
is properly compensated by the beneficiaries, it is important to identify the redistributive effects 
associated with the project. In a democratic environment in which both social fairness and the 
reduction of wealth inequality are usually pursued, it is difficult to justify that public decisions 
be only guided by the overall-efficiency principle (Khraibani et al., 2016).  
Considerations related to efficiency on the one hand, and those from fairness, welfare and social 
and political peace on the other, are relevant for the decision-making process (Galindo, 1963). 
Traditionally, transport infrastructure investment addresses equity2 issues, although not always 
                                                   
1 CBA is the main instrument used by decision makers in the appraisal of transport investment projects, though the 
analytical framework varies somewhat from one country to another as there is no universal agreement on the extent 
to which costs and benefits should be disaggregated, which effects should be included in the analysis and how they 
should be monetised (OECD, 2002). 
2 Discussions about equity touch upon deep philosophical issues regarding fundamental values including society’s 
moral obligations to others (Scanlon, 1998) and the question of which social improvement criteria should be 
preferred is unresolved (Feldman & Serrano, 2006). These discussions may be channelled through three 
fundamental theories: one based on a principle of “equal treatment”, which holds that all individuals should get the 
same benefits of a service, another based on the “utilitarianism principle”, which aims to maximise the overall 
welfare of society as a whole – this implies accepting that distribution of benefits among individuals is optimal and 
that they are indifferent to the way benefits are distributed (Bonnafous & Masson, 2003) –, and finally one based on 
the “Rawls criterion”, which holds that society’s “justice & fairness” is maximized when the project is selected to 
ensure that it is the best for the worst-off persons (Rawls, 1972; Rawls, 1974). 
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explicitly (Litman, 1996; Viegas, 2001; Raux et al., 2006). For example, investment initiatives 
seeking to fill a gap in mobility and accessibility between population groups typically pursue 
certain redistributive effects of social character (Blumenberg, 2002; Hine & Grieco, 2003; 
Karen, 2006; Martens, 2006; Hine, 2008). However, such objectives are rarely stated in the 
decision-making process and, therefore, seldom ranked alongside efficiency, possibly because 
they depend on complex interrelationships and, thus, are subject to uncertainty. 
Equity analyses may be performed using different dimensions with the aim of providing 
evidence to the public in general concerning the fairness in the physical distribution of goods, 
accessibility for people, affordability of all types of services and distribution of other gains 
(Litman, 1996; Viegas, 2001; Raux et al., 2006; Beyazit, 2011; Trannoy, 2011). Horizontal3 
equity analyses may be useful to assess if there are transfers among different groups of 
individuals with similar characteristics. Vertical4 equity analyses put the spotlight on how the 
effects of a project are distributed among groups of individuals of a different sort. Equity would 
imply that those in a worse situation (for example, individuals with lower per capita income or 
those who live in an area with poor accessibility) receive more public resources than those who 
are in a more privileged position.  
How to integrate equity considerations (redistribution objectives) in the decision-making process 
in general and, in particular, in the efficiency analysis is still a major subject of discussion. 
Transport infrastructure projects are, nevertheless, possibly the most interesting to discuss in this 
endeavour as they can contribute both to overall growth and to the redistribution of the project 
benefits (OECD, 2002; ITF, 2018). Accessibility improvements generate reorganisation 
phenomena of the socioeconomic fabric with evident territorial and social implications. The 
environmental effects of the construction, maintenance and use of transport infrastructure are 
quite clearly distributed among local, regional and global scales. Finally, by the magnitude of the 
investments and their long lifecycle, it is relevant to assess the fairness of the distribution of their 
effects on the many generations affected. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 identifies and classifies the different redistributive 
effects that are more often generated by major transport infrastructure projects and how they are 
incorporated into the decision-making process. Section 3 provides arguments concerning the 
convenience of incorporating, in a transparent way, these effects in the decision-making process 
and some ideas on how to do it. Finally, Section 4 offers general conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS. REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION 
Major transport infrastructure investments entail a diversity of redistribution effects, both 
positive and negative, that may be relevant in the decision-making process. Until now, 
academics and practitioners have mostly focused on forecasting/ascertaining the effects of these 
projects on particular population groups, territories or generations. The wider redistribution 
issues stemming from the differential impacts of major investments have not been properly 
addressed. For example, in the field of real estate valuation, some researchers have provided 
evidence indicating that, overall, enhancing accessibility conditions through new transport 
infrastructure increases real estate values5. The expected increase is often incorporated in the 
                                                   
3 Horizontal equity refers to the equal treatment of equals (Mooney & Jan, 1997). 
4 Vertical equity refers to the unequal, but equitable, treatment of unequals (Mooney & Jan, 1997). 
5 The outcomes of some studies, for instance in locations near new stations (Hess & Almeida, 2007; Mulley, 2014; 
Higgins & Kanaroglou, 2018), support this argument.   
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CBA as a benefit. However, it could be argued that, in a context of perfect competition and 
stable demand, such change would imply a (probably marginal) reduction in the real estate 
values in the rest of the city. This kind of redistributive effects in the territory have passed 
mostly unnoticed to local decision makers6. This situation, as will be seen, is common for all 
redistribution effects. 
A systematic and thorough review7 of the literature on transport project appraisal has led to the 
conclusion that a proper identification and classification of redistribution effects has never been 
attempted and could be a genuine contribution to the decision-making process on major projects. 
The first level of redistribution effects that seems logical to analyse are those internal to the 
project. Costs and benefits included in the efficiency measures included in the CBA are normally 
taken as global figures representing the resources that are consumed (for instance, construction 
costs) or produced (for instance travel time savings). But these resources affect society through 
the agents directly involved in the project (the GPI, investors, constructors, operators, different 
users, etc.). A proper forecasting exercise, which is an essential component of the CBA, will 
identify the various stakeholders involved in the project and establish the expected effects on 
them, even though, as already said, they are eventually added up in the CBA. It seems thus 
reasonable to use this background information to better understand the economic and financial 
effects of the project, at least on its key stakeholders, to check if their distribution is reasonable.  
A second level for the redistribution analysis is the identification and estimation of the 
differential effects that are usually not included in the CBA because they are difficult to 
monetise. These effects are generally more related to equity than to economic profitability. 
Indeed, many social, environmental, and spatial effects resulting from investments in transport 
infrastructure, which are increasingly mentioned in the decision-making process, are not even 
measured and seldom analysed with a certain rigour. They are, however, the aim of specific 
policies seeking to develop the poorest regions, help social groups with less resources, reduce 
environmental impacts, etc. On the other hand, the most credited redistribution effects, which 
may be classified into three broad categories: territorial, social and environmental8 will only be 
observable in the long range9.   
At the European level, these policy-based effects are pursued by specific EU programmes and by 
institutions, such as the European Investment Bank, created to financially support them. Most 
EU subsidies are devoted to the economic development of eligible countries and regions10 or to 
specific sectors, such as agriculture. Additionally, both EU environmental legislation and sector 
policies, particularly in transport and energy, have a clear bias in favour of “clean” solutions. 
Finally, it is possible to identify a third level where the redistributive effects take an even 
broader perspective. These are the intergenerational redistributive effects, i.e. the differential 
impact that a project has on the generations being affected by the project during its life cycle. 
This third category gathers some aspects linked to the previous levels, such as the effects on 
                                                   
6 Where decisions are made at state or regional level, local decision makers are very concerned with the potential 
redistribution of economic activity, but less concerned if these gains are made at the expense of other jurisdictions 
(ITF, 2017; Bermejo & Hoyos, 2016). 
7 For more details, see Appendix A enclosed. 
8 Other EU policies, for instance supporting research and innovation or better education, are left out of this first 
classification because they have less relevance for transport infrastructure. 
9 Some effects may be included in the CBA through induced traffic over time, for instance, but future users are not 
identified as separate beneficiaries in the CBA. 
10 Some countries are eligible to grants from the Cohesion Fund and “convergence” regions (mostly those with GDP 
per capita below 75% of EU average) to ERDF (European Regional Development Fund). 
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climate change, but it includes a specific redistributive effect due to the variability, across the 
different generations affected by the project, of the financing gap between what they will pay 
and the benefits they will obtain. This effect has not been addressed so far in the literature but 
deserves special attention. 
 
2.1. REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS AMONG PROJECT-LINKED STAKEHOLDERS  
The process of preparation, construction and operation of a transport infrastructure entails 
economic and financial flows for a multitude of stakeholders directly involved in the project, 
including the various levels of government. However, conventional CBA merges effects (costs 
and benefits) according to standard typologies, without showing how project effects are 
distributed among concerned stakeholders (ITF, 2017). Both in terms of costs (preparation, 
construction, maintenance, operation, etc.) and benefits (for different types of users and other 
beneficiaries) or externalities (positive or negative) it is necessary to know how they are going to 
be produced and who is going to be affected throughout the life cycle of the project to quantify 
and monetise them.  
The Stakeholders/Effects Matrix (Turró, 2004) represents a significant methodological advance 
in the identification of the transfers amongst the various agents participating in the project (cf. 
Figure II-1). The information needed to build the SE Matrix should be obtainable from the 
preparatory studies needed to carry out the CBA. Every significant relationship between a 
specific effect and a particular agent (in principle, those effects and agents appearing in the 
matrix11 –cells with grey background in Figure II-1–) should be reflected in terms of net present 
values (NPV) of the specific effect on the agent in the corresponding cell. In each cell there 
should be the financial NPV (FNPV), when the effect has a market value adequately reflecting 
the socioeconomic value12 (i.e. used in the CBA), or this financial value accompanied by the 
NPV of the difference of this value and the socioeconomic value adopted in the CBA). When 
this is not the case, the matrix should have a split cell with, on one section, the financial value 
and, on the other, the NPV of the difference between this amount and the socioeconomic value 
adopted in the CBA. For example, if a shadow value for labour is adopted, the real amount to be 
paid to workers, i.e. the real financial flow, will be seen in one section of the cell alongside, in 
the other section, the amount (usually a percentage of the real payments) that represents the 
social benefit of additional job creation (presented as a cost reduction in the CBA). It must be 
stressed that the total financial flows among the different agents should be nil as they represent 
pure cash transfers (fares, tolls, taxes and payments to builders, operators, etc.). The sums of the 
values in the columns of the SE Matrix indicate the financial and socioeconomic effects for each 
agent. The totals for the rows should show the values calculated in the CBA for the specific 
effect, which should be zero for cash transfers. An example on the application of the S/E Matrix 
to a toll motorway is shown in Appendix B. 
                                                   
11 Figure II-1 shows, with grey background, the cells that are usually relevant in a rail project. 
12 The total financial flows of an effect among the different agents (row totals) should be nil as they represent pure 
cash transfers (fares, tolls, taxes and payments to builders, operators, etc.). 
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Figure II-1. Stakeholders/Effects Matrix for a railway project (example)  
  
Source: RAILPAG, (Turró, 2004) 
In projects of a certain complexity in which the distribution of the costs and benefits among the 
agents involved is critical, the redistributive effects among project-linked stakeholders may have 
strong political and social connotations. The effects of a particular pricing policy, for example, 
on users, service operators, various administrations and, therefore, groups of taxpayers, are better 
observed in the synthetic presentation of the S/E Matrix. In these cases, their knowledge, 
alongside the typical CBA global indicators, can contribute to an improved decision-making 
process as the results could be used to improve both the financing and the management of the 
project.  
 
2.2. THE SOCIAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS  
There exists an open debate about the social effects linked to certain transport infrastructure 
investments. Quite often public subsidies are necessary to build, maintain and operate these 
projects. This may be reasonable in terms of efficiency13 but subsidies represent a transfer of 
resources from the whole society to users and have effects on income distribution. If the 
subsidised project will mainly favour users with high income14, the social impact can be 
considered regressive. On the other hand, most public transport investments in urban areas 
would be progressive, as they would benefit more the social strata with lower revenues.  
                                                   
13 Reducing the generalised user costs entails effects (demand growth) that have to be included into the CBA. 
14 An issue that has been raised, for instance in Spain, due to the large (excessive?) expansion of the high-speed rail 
network. 
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Where there are market or information imperfections there is potential for government action to 
improve the living conditions of citizens. Governments are expected to act, in particular, when 
market failures entail the inefficient allocation of resources from the Pareto perspective, i.e. 
when some groups turn out to be adversely affected (Townsend et al., 1988), or simply when 
free market keeps some members of society with unacceptably low levels of quality of life 
(according to the accepted rules of wealth distribution) or when there are unused resources 
(Stiglitz, 1997). Otherwise, equity issues may arise, especially for underprivileged groups 
lacking access to certain goods and services.  
The use of shadow values, also called social or regulatory values, is a method widely used for 
the inclusion of equity goals of social character within the CBA (DG-Regio, 2015). In principle, 
the resources mobilised by a project are monetised, when there exists a market for them, by 
using the price resulting from the law of supply and demand. This price is often difficult to 
forecast and can vary according to the region and/or the economic situation. However, the 
existence of market distortions or the application of certain policies by decision-makers may 
recommend the adoption of shadow values, calculated using real prices corrected to better reflect 
the usefulness of resources for the whole society. Shadow values, which may be higher or lower 
than the corresponding market price, are often used, in the social field, in relation to the 
reduction of unemployment and poverty and with the promotion of equal opportunities (Harris & 
Kende-Robb, 2008; World Bank, 2013; Ferreira & Peragine, 2015). Of particular interest for 
transport infrastructure is the use of social values of time (Turró, 1979; Banister & Berechman, 
2001; Mackie et al., 2001; de Rus & Nombela, 2007). Using them instead of behavioural values 
(those explaining traveller choices), which are assimilated to market values, means that those 
users with low values of time (i.e. in general those with lower income levels) are getting a higher 
valuation for their time savings than their own judgement. This means that, using single values 
of time, a rather common practice, means that the CBA incorporates a positive equity bias. 
An alternative to the shadow values technique, very controversial, is to recur, into the CBA 
itself, to the use of certain weighting criteria with the aim of taking into account, implicitly, the 
preferences of the decision-maker at the moment of accounting the social costs and/or benefits 
identified in the CBA (Harberger, 1978; Layard, 1980; Gannon & Liu, 1997; Cowell & 
Gardiner, 1999; Johansson-Stenman, 2005; Johnstone & Serret, 2006). Another possibility, 
which is the most widespread practice, is to complement the CBA with a multi-criteria decision 
approach (OECD, 2002). The set of weights is explicitly established in the multi-criteria 
analysis, reflecting the importance that the decision-maker assigns to the different social aspects. 
This method entails the double challenge of having to properly link weights and objectives, 
which sometimes are contradictory, and to produce, at the end, an outcome that can be easily 
interpreted by the decision-maker (Turró, 2015). 
Investment decisions should be justified ex ante, taking into account, on the one hand, the net 
socioeconomic benefits and costs that can be expected by the different social groups affected by 
the project15, and on the other hand, the financial balances of the project (for instance, the 
stakeholders that will have positive and negative FNPVs, as the total cash flows should be zero). 
Assessing the potential effects of an infrastructure investment on the various social groups 
affected is a big challenge, but is an essential step in order to incorporate them in a balanced way 
in the decision-making process. In practice, the profitability principle tends to get priority over 
the equity principle (Bonnafous & Masson, 2003), which may lead decision makers to reject 
projects that, however, entail redistributive effects for the targeted social groups that could be 
valuable enough in monetary terms as to offset the negative ENPV obtained in the CBA.  
                                                   
15 This first level of redistribution, internal to the project itself, which can be analysed from the Stakeholders/Effect 
Matrix, has been discussed in the previous section. 
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2.3. THE TERRITORIAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS  
Investment is supposed to be a driver of economic development. Public investment is used, in 
particular, to support wealth creation in certain areas following specific objectives, such as 
reducing the spread of wealth among regions or promoting certain locations (e.g. the capital of 
the country, border zones for political reasons). Focusing investment in such places invariably 
means that it introduces a bias against the areas not benefitting from similar support: it has a 
redistribution effect on the territory. Regional policy has substantial weight in most political 
programmes. In the EU the objective of convergence between countries and/or regions is an 
essential counterbalance to the creation of the Single Market and absorbs a substantial part of the 
EU budget (Turró, 1999). Governments see investments to improve accessibility conditions16 as 
a powerful vector of regional policies due to these redistributive effects. 
Traditionally, classical macroeconomic studies have pursued the quantification of the effects of 
accessibility improvements in terms of growth of the income per capita, by analysing the 
influence of the investment through variables such as capital stock, employment and productivity 
(Bruinsma et al., 1996; Stough et al., 2002; Nixon et al., 2018), as well as other factors that 
depend on technological progress, which is, in the long-term, the ultimate engine of economic 
growth (Román, 2001; Narváez et al., 2008; Vieira, 2008). Recently, economic models based on 
spatial analysis, such as the LUTI (land-use transport interaction) or the SCGE (spatial 
computable general equilibrium approach) have included indicators of territorial accessibility17 
within their analysis. This allows simulating the indirect economic impacts (wider impacts) of 
different options of infrastructure development under several socioeconomic and transport 
scenarios (ITF, 2017). New lines of research are, in addition, making progress by comparing 
areas that are ‘treated’ by a transport improvement with areas that are similar but ‘untreated’ 
(Redding & Turner, 2014). In any case, economic development is increasingly pursued, at least 
in the EU, through integrated investments for which transport is only one, albeit relevant, aspect. 
This makes discrimination of the sole effects of connectivity improvements quite difficult to 
identify. 
In spite of the many caveats that can be raised, it seems obvious that, when travel times get 
shorter thanks to transport improvements, generalised mobility costs are reduced and social and 
commercial relationships are favoured. This might disperse the existing economic activity by 
encouraging capital towards areas benefitting from the market extension (Forkenbrock & Foster, 
1990; Ferrer, 1992; Berechman, 1995; Banister & Edwards, 1995). The favourable atmosphere 
thus created generates jobs in these areas, especially for those with low-income levels (Kain, 
1968), with potential negative effects on employment in areas with lower productivity. The 
development of transport networks, through this mechanism, generates global efficiency 
following the relocation of economic activities.  
Although transport infrastructure is seen as a catalyst for the development of the poorest regions, 
the real impact will depend on the capacity of the region to take advantage of the new 
                                                   
16 Accessibility initiatives may be classified in three broad categories according to the project’s scope (ITF, 2018): 
1) marginal projects, which have small and local impacts on thus are irrelevant to make the decision-to-build.; 2) 
non-marginal and non-transformative projects, if there are sources of market failure (e.g., imperfect competition or 
agglomeration externalities) making the project’s wider effects to be important for the decision-making process.; 
and 3) transformative projects, which implies accessibility changes causing wider impacts for regional economy that 
are significantly different with the project in place that without. For the purpose of this paper, accessibility 
improvements refer to cases 2) and/or 3). 
17 The quality of the most widely used accessibility indicators is questionable (for instance, the definition of the 
reference area, such as the national or regional territory). See an interesting synthesis in Litman, (2011) and the 
arguments behind the proposal of the ICON connectivity indicator (Ulied, 1995). The accessibility indicators used 
by ESPON, (2017) show the trend towards measuring access to concrete services. 
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possibilities offered by the increased accessibility. When there is a latent endogenous potential 
that can be unfolded, direct or indirect (e.g. tourism) exports could become wealth generators. 
However, without certain complementary assets (other infrastructure, local capital and 
entrepreneurship, etc.), the new conditions may induce imports and end up having a negative 
effect on the local economy. So, the sense and the distribution of the effects of improved 
transport infrastructure on the regional development are not clear and surely not evenly 
distributed along the areas affected, because this depend on their zones of influence and both the 
characteristics of its access points and the initial competitive-situation of the populations affected 
(Fariña et al., 2000).  
The economic science has not yet found a proper formula to estimate the location and magnitude 
of the impacts linked to changes in accessibility (Oosterhaven & Elhorst, 2004). Measuring 
actual traffic is the most concrete and foolproof gauge of the actual benefits of a transport project 
(Ansar et al., 2016). It could be argued that “the more users, the more value is derived by those 
users” through network externalities (Röller & Waverman, 2001), and in the case that direct 
productivity effects are found to be weak (or not found) the macro-studies are able to defend 
indirect benefits through spillover effects (Ansar et al., 2016). However, where wider positive 
impacts exist, they could be offset by negative impacts in other regions (Vickerman, 2017). At 
the microeconomic level, network impacts are even more difficult to identify. In traditional 
CBA, a working assumption is that the user benefits reflect all the benefits of transport in the 
case of perfect competition (Boardman et al., 2017; ITF, 2017), which implies that, beyond the 
value of benefits calculated in CBA, which include, for instance, those of induced traffic, there is 
not additional value to be gained in the economy from the wider impacts resulting from new 
transport infrastructure investment (OECD, 2002; Beuthe, 2002; Mackie et al., 2011). But what 
can actually be observed is that the efficiency benefits included in the CBA often generate 
effects on the economic system –non-transport benefits or development benefits– that are not 
incorporated in the standard efficiency calculations (ITF, 2018). These additional benefits may 
be especially important in certain areas located next to new transport infrastructure (Hess & 
Almeida, 2007; Mulley, 2014; Venables, 2015; Higgins & Kanaroglou, 2018). If such 
externalities (development effects) are important to make the decision-to-build, they should be 
properly identified and distinguished from “efficiency benefits” to avoid double counting 
(OECD, 2002; ITF, 2017). 
Under the assumption of the development effects of accessibility improvements, it is logical that 
investments in transport infrastructure be used to pursue objectives of spatial equity18 (Rietveld, 
1989; Banister & Berechman, 2001; Oosterhaven & Knaap, 2003; Hensher et al., 2012; Myung-
Jin, 2012). Such objectives indicate that regional policy designers are fully aware of the 
territorial redistributive effects of transport investments, which have traditionally been used to 
reduce disparities among regions (ITF, 2018) on the base that public investment in infrastructure 
is an exogenous cost-reducing technological input into the economy (Krugman, 1991; Holtz-
Eakin & Lovely, 1996; Glaeser & Kohlhase, 2004). There is, nevertheless, an increasing body of 
knowledge about the potential of such actions to trigger territorial and social inequalities19 if 
public administrations do not take appropriate measures concerning other aspects, including on 
education, the labour market, urban development and social housing, etc. (van Dijk, 2016; ITF, 
2018).  
 
                                                   
18 Spatial equity studies seek to establish whether or not all individuals may access the basic services provided in a 
territory and if they have freedom of movement within it. 
19 Accessibility conditions are often central for spatial bifurcation (segregation phenomena) between income groups 
(Atkinson, 2006) 
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Table II-1. Typologies of the territorial redistributive effects stemming from transport infrastructure investment 
TERRITORIAL 
REDISTRIBUTIVE 
EFFECT 
TRIGGER  
FACTOR DESCRIPTION 
SH
O
R
T 
TE
R
M
 
Industrial  
competitiveness  
(exports) effects 
Logistic costs reduction 
Only sub-territories with high productivity levels or 
very low production costs may expand quickly their 
exports following lower transport costs. 
Direct socioeconomic 
impacts of the main 
investment 
Direct economic impacts 
of project construction 
It will depend on the location of the economic agents 
directly involved in the construction. Workforce and 
materials used in the project may come or not from 
the region. The actual redistribution effects (site jobs, 
services to the construction companies, etc.) will 
depend on how much the different sub-territories get 
from the investment. 
M
ED
IU
M
 T
ER
M
 
Reorganisation/relocation 
of socioeconomic activity 
due to displacement and 
generation of new 
activities 
Accessibility 
improvements 
Transport costs reduction may entail positive impacts 
through market extension and scale economies. This 
should attract complementary investments and 
consequent productivity improvements and second-
degree effects on employment and wealth generation. 
It will, however, have negative effects through the 
destruction of non-competitive industries. The final 
impact will depend on the ability of the endogenous 
industrial fabric of each sub-territory to take 
advantage of the new opportunities, which will 
depend on availability of capital, qualified labour, etc. 
Tourism flows 
redistribution (20) 
 
Reduction in transport 
costs and improved 
travel conditions 
Attracting tourists will depend on both the 
accessibility conditions and the tourism potential 
(landscape, cultural heritage, etc., but also tourism 
infrastructure) of each sub-territory. Often, 
complementary investment will be needed to benefit 
from the project. 
LO
N
G
 
TE
R
M
 
Wider economic  
benefits 
Second level of 
economic spillovers 
(externalities) stemming 
from the project  
Long-term effects of creative destruction (elimination 
of non-competitive activities and creation of new 
ones where there is a competitive advantage). 
Incentives to improve capacities (education), to retain 
talent, to innovate, etc.  
Source: Author 
Table II-1 presents a set of typologies identifying the most relevant territorial redistributive 
effects that respond to the moment when the redistribution effects will probably be perceived in 
the territory. They arise from the impact of the project on the equilibria explaining the specific 
social and economic development situation of a particular region (Puga, 2002; Combes & 
Lafourcade, 2005; Teixeira, 2006; Ulltveit-Moe, 2007). This impact will essentially depend on 
the location, in relation to the project, of the economic agents in the geographical area, on its 
organisation/governance, as well as on the structural determinants of regional productivity21 
(ITF, 2018). The macroeconomic measures that are typically used to obtain metrics on the 
expected economic impact on the local economy, such as the value of the infrastructure assets 
lying within the local area or job creation, are clearly poor indicators of potential growth22, but 
                                                   
20  It can be argued that “tourism redistribution” should be considered in Table II-1 as part of the 
‘reorganisation/relocation of socioeconomic activity’. However, tourism investments are quicker to appear, as they 
tend to be relatively smaller and do not require the same know-how of industrial ventures or more sophisticated 
services. Showing tourism effects separately facilitates their identification for further analysis. 
21 In general, the factors that determine labour productivity can be divided up in three broad categories: knowledge-
based capital, physical capital and human capital (ITF, 2018). The effects of a transport infrastructure project mostly 
affect the second category, but indirectly affect the other two. 
22  To give an example of this, see the impact of a high-speed rail line crossing a less developed area between two 
main cities and no station in it (as there is not sufficient demand). The infrastructure only produces negative 
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the identification of better regional development indicators falls beyond the objectives of this 
paper.  
In principle, the project’s territorial redistributive effects should be only considered as positive if 
they imply a positive net-balance in terms of resources (ENPV>0) for the region for which the 
analysis is performed. Even so, in major transport projects there is inevitable a confluence of 
different levels of government, each one possibly with particular objectives of political and 
economic character that could even be in conflict. Improved accessibility conditions could even 
be considered negative by some administrations (in general, local ones) if they do not favour 
socioeconomic activity in their territory. The point is whether the changes due to new 
accessibility conditions imply an improvement of the competitive position of every sub-territory, 
or whether some of them will clearly benefit from the project but at the expense of others (due to 
relocation phenomena). In terms of territorial redistribution effects, it could even be interesting 
to analyse if the project could involve a certain degree of reorganisation of the activity of the 
social and economic agents within the sub-territory itself.  
The spatial effects of a transport infrastructure project may, therefore, be important and affect 
different areas over time in substantially distinctive ways. Given the close relationship between 
decision-makers (politicians) and the territory, as elections are held according to administrative 
boundaries, territorial redistributive effects are surely of major importance in the investment 
decision process. The definition of clear indicators for the expected economic development 
effects of transport infrastructure projects should therefore improve the quality and fairness of 
the process. 
 
2.4. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS 
The environmental impacts of transport affect people and nature, in general, in a multiplicity of 
forms and, as a consequence, they are unevenly distributed. The most obvious and better-known 
formulation of environmental redistribution is linked to the territorial scope of the impacts. Some 
of the impacts, such as land occupation or nuisances during construction, are linked to the 
infrastructure; they are essentially local and, at least for those produced by the works, quite time-
bounded. Most of the heaviest impacts of transport projects are generated, however, by the 
activity that takes place on this infrastructure during a long operation period. Some of them, such 
as acoustic pollution (noise) or barrier effects are clearly local, but other impacts, including air 
pollution, have a diversity of spatial footprints. Measurement and territorialisation of 
environmental impacts is complex and their valuation particularly difficult23. A clear example of 
this difficulty may be found in greenhouse emissions, which have global effects but clearly 
different implications for certain world areas24 . So, depending on the geographical area 
concerned by the environmental impact of the project, it is possible to classify the environmental 
redistributive effects as: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
externalities, whilst most job creation (consultants, producers of sleepers, tracks, electrification and signalling 
systems, rolling stock, etc.) takes place elsewhere. Only a few (small) local construction and service companies will 
really generate jobs and mostly during the relatively short construction period. However, decision makers will argue 
the interest of the project on the assets and jobs generated… 
23 Some of the more common references for environmental values used in transport CBAs, such as INFRAS, (2014) 
or ExternE (2005), are being questioned by new studies on the long-term health effects of the different pollutants 
(Mueller et al., 2016; RCPCH, 2016).  
24 Coastal areas, for instance, may be extremely affected. On the other hand, a recent IMF study (Parry et al., 2018) 
shows the different impact that taxes on CO2 production (considered the most effective way of achieving the Paris 
agreements) would have in different countries. But the potential use of the tax revenues to compensate affected 
people has not been addressed… 
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− Local: Mainly those produced by the degradation of both the pre-existing comfort 
conditions of the population and the quality of the natural environment near the transport 
infrastructure. Transport infrastructure is essentially linear, producing a “barrier effect” 
that may impede the movements of many species and, as a consequence, restrict their 
spatial distribution, with biodiversity impacts. The barrier effect obviously affects also 
human populations that suffer from restrictions to their movements. Besides the 
environmental effects of the transport infrastructure itself (land occupation, landscape 
impact, waste generation, etc.), a transport infrastructure may result in land use changes, 
with a derived environmental impact. On the other hand, construction works typically 
generate environmental problems for local inhabitants as they produce inconveniences, 
including noise, vibrations, dust and air pollution. After commissioning, the operation of 
the project generates sustained impacts for the local population (noise, vibrations, air 
pollution25 but also safety hazards) that may represent major health problem, especially in 
dense areas of big metropolises and for the elderly and the children.  
 
− Regional: Here are considered the broadest repercussions of the project on ecosystems 
and the consequences of the impact on biodiversity degradation and on their ability to 
produce resources. Most regional effects are produced by the operation of the transport 
infrastructure through more diffuse air pollution (O3, NOx, SOx...) having an indirect 
impact on human health and on nature. The acidification of soil and water through acid 
rain and other biophysical effects (e.g. smog) damaging crops and properties are having a 
variety of effects that depend on the characteristics of the region. 
 
−  Global: Those caused by the direct contribution of transport projects to climate change. 
Fossil fuel consumption during construction works but, in particular during operation, 
directly (most automobiles) and indirectly (combustion-based electricity generation), is 
producing greenhouse gases. Once in the atmosphere, these emissions contribute to 
global warming. Some transport emissions also contribute to ozone layer depletion, 
although with much less intensity than those of other sectors, so carbon emissions 
associated to each project may thus be used as a measure of the global effects of a 
transport investment. 
Environmental effects of investments in transport infrastructure are, thus, unequally distributed 
over the territory. This unequal distribution is often related to social characteristics such as 
income, social status, employment and education, but also non-economic aspects such as gender, 
age or ethnicity (WHO, 2010). As a consequence, the environmental damages (costs) may have 
both territorial and social redistribution effects. On the other hand, some environmental will be 
virtually instantaneous, such as noise, whilst others, such as CO2 emissions, might last 
indefinitely, with difficult to predict consequences. Certain environmental externalities have, 
therefore, an intergenerational redistribution nature.  
In the calculation process of socioeconomic profitability, the externalities identified in the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) are monetised and incorporated to the CBA as annuities, 
which are discounted using an “appropriate” discount rate (Henderson & Bateman, 1995; HM 
Treasury, 2003; Evans & Sezer, 2004; Leleur et al., 2007; Meunier et al., 2013). However, it is 
not evident that typical social discount rates (SDRs) used in CBA or even the discounting 
mechanism itself are appropriate to deal with long-term environmental impacts as, under 
exponential discounting, the costs and benefits accruing to generations in the distant future 
                                                   
25 In the European Union, environmental quality standards (EU Environmental Noise Directive 2002/49/EC and EU 
Air Quality Directive 2008/50 EC) appear to have been useful to enforce local governments to have pollution 
problems under control. 
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appear relatively unimportant in present value terms (Arrow et al., 2013). Other environmental 
effects, such as the contribution to climate change of the traffic emissions stemming from the 
project, which may imply heavy redistribution issues in the future, may be introduced in the 
economic evaluation through the use of shadow values for CO2 emissions (Pearce & Nash, 
1981; Jorge-Calderón & Johansson, 2017). These values may be designed to avoid the SDR 
effects or even to increase over the project cycle, but this assumes giving values to future 
impacts that are very difficult to foresee26. 
The permanent environmental effects (biodiversity degradation, global warming impact, etc.) 
have raised questions on intergenerational27 equity (Groom et al., 2005; Lowe, 2008; van Wee, 
2012; Priemus & van Wee, 2017; Rasch & Köhne, 2017), in line with Rawls’ concept of “equity 
as justice”. Indeed, distant generations could end up enduring much of these delayed 
environmental effects while gaining minimal benefits from the activities, including transport, 
that are contributing to their production (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008). As a consequence, from 
the perspective of the sustainable development, it is necessary to consider, besides the 
environmental externalities identified in the EIA, which tend to focus on the direct impacts of the 
transport infrastructure, those spatial and intergenerational effects resulting from the expected 
activity generated by the project28.  
 
2.5. THE INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS  
Social welfare depends, in part, on the ability of governments to obtain affordable funds from the 
financial markets. The availability of these funds allows GPIs to carry out their policies earlier 
and more efficiently provided that the benefits obtained from the fast implementation of the 
project, as generator of long-term wealth, outweigh the costs for society of committing future 
financial flows to the project. The funding pledge entails that additional public debt will be 
raised, if the project is fully public, or that the budgets of the GPI and eventually other 
administrations will have to include the payments envisaged in a PPP29. It is obvious that 
financing represents a critical aspect in the design and implementation of a major project. It is 
also obvious that it is a complex exercise that must balance actual payment commitments with 
expected revenues that may depend on outcomes, such as user fees, that are quite difficult to 
foresee. It is thus an exercise that must be adapted to the long-term character of transport 
infrastructure and show a certain degree of flexibility to cope with forecasting errors. Both 
aspects are essential to ensure the financial sustainability of the project, i.e. the capacity to deal 
with reasonable risks without having a major stakeholder unable to comply with its financial 
commitments.  
                                                   
26 Besides, as a CBA requires defining the social frame for which the analysis is executed (often coinciding with the 
GPI’s citizens), this implies valuing how global impacts happening outside the remit of the concerned “society” are 
incorporated as resources in the CBA. 
27 Intergenerational equity typically refers to achieve a fair, ethical balance of costs and benefits between present 
and future generations (Rawls, 1972; Daniels, 1988; Barnes & Lord, 2017). In the environmental context, topics on 
intergenerational issues include global warming, climate change, exhaustible resources and diversity of species 
(United Nations, 1987). In a socioeconomic context, intergenerational issues refer to age-related expenses 
(Thompson, 2003; Williamson & Rhodes, 2011) infrastructure provision and/or fiscal equity (McCrae & Aiken, 
2000). In the context of major projects procurement, it essentially refers to country debt or the taxes that will need to 
be paid by future generations to meet the costs of present investment (Jim & Love, 2011). 
28 The CBA should incorporate, in its annuities, the monetised environmental impacts of the project, but this is not 
done systematically and the impact of long-term outcomes is severely mitigated by the use of the SDR. 
29 A PPP that generates income for the public sector, for instance through concession fees, should not entail 
postponements due to budgetary constraints. 
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Transport infrastructure is typically carried out by the public sector, which means that it is the 
taxpayer who foots the bill. This often implies to have recourse to external sources of funds, 
usually through credit institutions, to complement and extend the money that the GPI assigns in 
its annual budgets to cover the instalments –usually made during the construction period– to pay 
those agents, mostly private, executing the project (Vickerman, 2004). Financing instruments, 
such as specific bond issues or loans, allow spreading the actual financial burden on taxpayers 
over many years, but it is worth noting that they have a clear impact in terms of public debt and 
may represent a certain opportunity cost30 for society. Recent research suggests that debt-
financed overinvestment contributes to underperformance and instability in the economy because 
poor project-level outcomes translate into substantial macroeconomic risks (Ansar et al., 2016; 
ITF, 2018). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in general, and long-term concessions in 
particular, have been presented as a solution to public investment constraints. They may be so 
when no public contributions are foreseen –international accounting rules are very restrictive in 
this sense– but, in any case, irrespective of the financing mechanism used, infrastructure projects 
must be properly justified. 
The justification is provided by the beneficiaries of the project. The users and, generally, the 
society “of each moment”, which can be referred as a generation31, perceive these benefits. On 
the other hand, the same users, through payment for its use, and the taxpayers that contribute to 
the project instalments in the budget are those who actually pay the investment. These benefits 
and the financial flows may or may not be aligned. Whilst some (annual) generations may 
benefit more than their financial contributions, others may end up bearing the financial burden 
without receiving sufficient net benefits in return. This would imply redistributive effects among 
the generations affected by the project (Penyalver & Turró, 2017) and could be substantial 
depending on the financing formula finally adopted. Checking on such differential impacts and, 
in particular, the tendency to benefit or adversely affect future generations should be included as 
a factor in decision-making, especially when deciding the financial structure to be adopted for 
the project (Turró & Penyalver, 2019). 
So far, however, the relation between short-term and long-term impacts is considered mostly 
through the discount rate and, in some cases, in relation to environmental effects32. Discount 
rates are a key element in the calculations of CBA criteria (i.e. net present value) as the higher 
the value the greater the importance given to the present at the expense of the future. This 
distortion is even more pronounced when the economic rate of return (ERR) is used33 as the 
main reference of the project’s convenience for society. Discount rates severely affect public 
policy and investment decisions and their use and values are obviously not free of some 
controversy (HM Treasury, 2003; Meunier et al., 2013). On the other hand, it is not evident at all 
how its formulation may reflect certain aspects of the individuals’ economic-behaviour, in 
particular those regarding long-term or intertemporal preferences. The fairness towards “our 
                                                   
30 This cost is more evident in highly indebted countries, where debt restrictions entail a serious handicap for any 
GPI to develop “productive investments”, meaning investments enhancing long-term growth. In the EU, for 
instance, national governments must comply with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), created with the 
aim to keep public debt sustainable. 
31 Since Mannheim’s “The problem of generations” (1923), the concept of “generation” or “social generation” has 
been used in the sense of “cohort”, which refers to people within a delineated population who experience the same 
significant event within a given period of time (Pilcher, 1994). But the concept of “annual generation”, which refers 
to the group of individuals affected by the effects of a major transport infrastructure project over time, is more 
explicit, as defines the number of years (or timespan) included in the (social) generation and allows representing the 
individuals’ preferences on such effects through a survey-based weighting curve (Penyalver et al., 2018). 
32 Separate discount rates for these effects are sometimes used. The values of greenhouse gases take into account 
their long-term impact and represent an indirect way of considering intergenerational issues. 
33 The better the projects (i.e. the higher the ERR), the lesser are the long-term effects in the results. 
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children”, an ecologist mantra, is often used to justify politically certain projects that are 
probably inefficient. From the review of appraisal guidelines and the analysis of a number of 
practical cases, it can be argued that, in spite of the emphasis that many politicians place in the 
wellbeing of future generations, the procedures presently used in major transport project 
appraisal are not including any adequate measure of their intergenerational implications (Turró 
& Penyalver, 2019).  
This inadequacy is even more striking when the financial analysis is included in the process. The 
socioeconomic CBA is supposed to monetise the costs and the benefits incurred each year in 
terms of resources. However, while the benefits are mostly perceived by those belonging to the 
society of the year in question, the costs in resources foregone during a specific year are quite 
often the object of financial transfers. In particular, the resources foregone due to the 
construction works entail payments by the GPI to the construction companies often using loans 
that are repaid over a long period. This “money transfers” are not relevant for the socioeconomic 
CBA because they are assumed to occur within the same society. But this is a false premise 
because the members of society change over the years (ISR, 2017). When these transfers are 
important the hypothesis behind the CBA does not hold and it is reasonable to check if these 
transfers represent substantial intergenerational effects34.  
The above arguments justify the convenience of performing a proper assessment on the 
intergenerational impact that the “money transfers” stemming from the project’s financing 
formula entail for the whole of society over the project lifecycle (Penyalver & Turró, 2017). The 
efficiency criterion should be always the main concern of decision makers, but the analysis of 
the intergenerational impact is particularly relevant for major transport infrastructure projects 
due to the amount of funds involved as well as their long life cycle. The effects of the financing 
formula of a specific project for the public sector are obviously embedded in the global 
macroeconomic context35 and it could be argued that the effects of the total public debt are those 
really relevant for future generations. But the implications of the marginal increase in public debt 
brought about by a project are not our concern here. What is important within the decision-
making process for a major project is to generate awareness of all the implications that are 
relevant for society and, if possible, to provide indicators allowing a proper assessment of the 
implications.  
 
3. INCORPORATING REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS IN DECISION-MAKING 
As stated, the theoretical decision-making process of the public sector for transport infrastructure 
provision should always be justified, at least theoretically, on basis of the socioeconomic 
efficiency of the investment, usually assessed from the CBA outputs. However, the “global” 
analysis of costs and benefits does not always lead to the most adequate solutions, as the 
population expects decision-makers to take into account certain objectives that transcend CBA. 
In this sense, it seems adequate that such objectives, quite often related to equity and thus to 
redistribution, which typically is not part of the CBA exercise, be made explicit and, if they obey 
to a democratically decided programme, be incorporated in the overall decision-making process 
(cf. Figure II-2).  
                                                   
34 An efficient intergenerational allocation would depend on the resources available to each generation (Padilla, 
2001). 
35 The limits on public deficit and debt imposed to the national governments of the Eurozone constitute a severe 
constraint on investments. The benefits and costs of these limitations would deserve a proper analysis, including in 
terms of intergenerational fairness. 
Section II. A classification for the redistributive effects of investments in transport infrastructure 
 
Penyalver, D. (2019) - 24 - 
 
Figure II-2. Decision-making process for major transport infrastructure projects 
 
Source: Author 
Most public policies defend indeed a bias in favour of a certain area, social group or specific 
agents (Henisz & Zelner, 2006), such as public companies, even though the equity goal itself is 
often vague (Martens et al., 2012). In some instances, redistribution effects seem to be the only 
real argument for certain investments (Turró & Penyalver, 2019). Accordingly, redistribution 
effects must be clarified to ensure policy compliance and fairness, as equity considerations may 
potentially be used as a pure qualitative argument to justify investment decisions that may be 
controversial from the traditional economic perspective (Manaugh & El-Geneidy, 2012). How to 
incorporate redistributive effects in the decision-making process is actually an open question 
(Khraibani et al., 2016), though, in any case, the biases they introduce should be measured and 
put in perspective. In this sense, their identification according to the classification here proposed 
(cf. Table II-2) should facilitate their inclusion in a more transparent decision-making process. 
The typologies defined here are expected to cover most of the redistributive effects generated by 
transport investment that could be openly considered by decision-makers, though certain direct 
effects identified in a first count might thereafter generate other impacts (second-order effects) as 
they are often subject to complex interrelationships. In Spain, for instance, the national 
government is building a high-speed railway network (AVE) with the stated purpose of 
connecting every province capital of the country with Madrid in less than four hours36. It is clear 
that the political objective of territorial redistribution –in this case to support a strong 
centralisation process– would have a parallel, secondary effect, at the regional level as the high-
speed railway (HSR) system essentially serves the main cities along the HSR lines and much less 
the other urban and rural areas (Givoni, 2006; Albalate & Bel, 2012). Without discussing here 
the obvious inefficiencies of the “plan”, there are clear winners (e.g. certain construction 
companies) and losers (e.g. domestic airlines) among the stakeholders in these projects, and also 
social redistributive effects, as HSR users are mostly from the higher income groups (Albalate & 
Bel, 2012). Furthermore, HSR projects could entice environmental redistributive effects. They 
make medium-distance transportation more environmentally friendly37 while the impacts on 
landscape and the barrier effect are mostly suffered by rural populations that have few 
opportunities to take advantage of the high-speed services (Albalate & Bel, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
36 This target was declared by Jose Maria Aznar in the programme for his second term of office as president of the 
Spanish government that was presented to the Parliament (April 25th, 2000). 
37 High-speed rail is predominantly electric powered, which means virtually zero emissions from the HSR along the 
line and at the stations, typically located at the centre of main cities (Givoni, 2006). Besides, as power plants are 
typically located away from densely populated areas, emissions from HSR operations occur far away from cities.  
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Table II-2. Identification of the redistributive effects of major transport infrastructure projects 
DESCRIPTION KEY ELEMENT  TO IDENTIFY IT AGENTS CONCERNED 
C
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T
E
R
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T
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E
 R
E
D
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T
R
IB
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T
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E
 E
FF
E
C
T
: 
IN
T
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R
N
A
L
: 
A
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ST
A
K
E
H
O
L
D
E
R
S Those due to the sharing of 
costs and benefits linked to the 
project that are taken into 
account globally in the CBA, 
but which affect differently the 
various agents involved in the 
project. 
Classification of the 
agents directly 
involved in the project. 
Stakeholders/Effects 
Matrix. 
The SE Matrix should include all relevant 
agents in the project: various types of users, 
operators, public administrations, 
construction companies, land owners, etc. If 
there are major imbalances amongst them, 
they should be highlighted. 
SO
C
IA
L
 Those occurring as a result of 
how the benefits and costs are 
distributed amongst the 
relevant social groups. 
Distinction among 
social groups, both 
positively and 
negatively affected by 
the project. 
Certain social categories or market 
segments may be affected differently by the 
project. They are usually defined by social 
characteristics: household income level, 
gender, age, vulnerability (unemployed, 
marginalized, etc.), but could include other 
grouping factors (Nymbies, health 
condition, etc.) 
T
E
R
R
IT
O
R
IA
L
 
Those that have clear 
differential affections to certain 
areas, both physical or 
economic. Social and 
environmental impacts are 
often territorial, but the focus 
here is on local effects that are 
not included there and on the 
biases introduced on economic 
activity due to the changes in 
accessibility conditions. 
Delimitation of the 
territorial reference 
unit, which depends on 
the project scope and 
on administrative 
boundaries. Identifying 
the factors that 
determine the 
endogenous 
development potential 
of the territorial unit. 
In principle, all citizens and economic 
activity within the territorial units. 
Traditional macroeconomic indicators 
(GDP/capita, productivity, employment, 
productive sectors distribution, etc.) may be 
used to assess the impacts of the project. 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T
A
L
 
Those due to environmental 
impacts showing clearly 
differential effects on specific 
groups of people or areas. 
Distinction of the 
environmental effects 
of the project in 
function of their local, 
regional or global 
repercussion. 
On a local scale, the area next to the 
transport infrastructure in which noise, 
vibrations and other proximity impacts are 
concentrated. On a regional scale, the area 
suffering from diffuse effects, notably from 
air pollution. On a global scale, the effects 
caused by the contribution of transport 
projects to greenhouse gases emissions. 
IN
T
E
R
G
E
N
E
R
A
-
T
IO
N
A
L
 
Those arising if the actual 
payments over time envisaged 
by the financing of the project 
are not aligned with the net 
socio-economic benefits that 
the society "of each moment" 
receives. 
Annuities of the net 
socioeconomic 
benefits. Financing 
formula linked to the 
life cycle of the 
project. The IREM 
model can provide 
indicators. 
Users and taxpayers belonging to “annual 
generations” who end up paying for the 
project. They may be linked to specific 
areas or social groups. 
Source: Author 
The most widespread practice to incorporate redistribution effects (and possibly other policy 
objectives) alongside efficiency in the decision-making process is to complement the CBA with 
some form of multi-criteria analysis through a set of weights explicitly established (Beira et al., 
2012; Weisbrod, 2015; ITF, 2017), which should reflect the importance that the decision-makers 
assign to efficiency and to the other criteria. These other criteria are, in general, more difficult to 
justify38 so, ideally, the weighted combination of the redistributive effects that are typically 
matched to policy objectives –in principle, those of territorial, social and environmental nature– 
should be valuable enough, in monetary terms, as to offset the negative ENPV obtained in the 
                                                   
38 They could be purely political (i.e. election-driven), to support some macroeconomic policies or even responding 
to spurious interests. In most cases such criteria would not be made explicit in a multi-criteria analysis. 
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CBA or, if the ENPV is positive, their combination (overall negative) should not be considered 
sufficient to outweigh the estimated efficiency of the project. A main challenge of this procedure 
is, of course, to avoid double counting, in particular when the CBA includes positive 
externalities, such as environmental impacts or other indirect effects that could be replicated in 
the relevant redistribution analysis. For example, the increase in land value locally as a 
consequence of accessibility enhancements is a typical (indirect) effect included in the CBA. 
Assuming the existence of a perfect market, such increase would lead, in turn, to a decrease in 
the real estate value elsewhere. This means that, in the long run, some territorial redistributive 
effects that are seldom included in the CBA will take place, at least explicitly39. In this case, an 
experienced analyst should offer a clear picture, easy to interpret, of the redistribution issues 
stemming from the project, which should allow to value, also in monetary terms, the measures 
that will be necessary to counteract/offset such differential impacts and, if necessary, other 
(negative) impacts of second order that may be envisaged40 from the redistribution effects 
identified in a first count. 
The CBA, on the other hand, rarely pays the required attention to the final financing formula of 
the project. It is clear, though, that the participation of the private sector, for instance through a 
public-private partnership, has obvious implications on costs, demand and other aspects that 
should be considered in the ex-ante appraisal (Vining & Boardman, 2008; Vinning & Weimber, 
2015). In this sense, strong biases, which can be identified in the project’s SE Matrix, might have 
a significant impact on the technical definition of the project, on its profitability and doubtless on 
its financial sustainability (Turró & Penyalver, 2019). Besides this consideration on the financing 
structure, which is based on a “present” view of the socioeconomic and financial flows, the 
intergenerational effects related to the time when project costs are actually paid, according to the 
adopted financing formula, deserve special attention because, in projects with long technical life, 
there is always a potential unbalance between the project’s socioeconomic net benefits, 
identified in the CBA, and the financial contribution (Ascher & Krupp, 2010), through user 
payments and/or taxes. The Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model or IREM (Penyalver 
& Turró, 2017) may be useful in these cases to provide insights on whether the financial 
structuring is fair for the (overlapping) annual generations affected by the project along its 
lifecycle (Turró & Penyalver, 2019). As future generations cannot directly influence the policies 
being chosen today, equity considerations require paying attention to potential intergenerational 
redistribution effects when making the decision to build. 
In short, investment decisions are quite often driven by other considerations than efficiency 
(OECD, 2002; Winston, 2006; Henisz & Zelner, 2006), which may be reasonable or not, but 
should, in any case, not lead to the GPI to engage in projects that could be inefficient, financially 
unsustainable or that could endanger the capacity of future generations to cope with their 
financial implications. In this sense, the identification of the project’s redistributive effects may 
be useful to both generate awareness and interest concerning the wider impacts of major 
investments beyond the expected socioeconomic profitability. 
 
                                                   
39 Some practitioners could argue that the monetary value for the increase in land value used in the CBA is made 
taking into account such phenomenon (redistribution issues) implicitly. Although such argument is weak, in any 
case, the “net” land value envisaged for the CBA should be justified explicitly, in principle, from the analysis and 
the economic valuation of the actions needed to counteract the negative impacts of the project on the real estate 
market elsewhere. 
40 Following the former example, strong territorial redistributive effects resulting in significant land value uplifts 
next to the infrastructure could potentially expel some groups of individuals (in principle, those with less resources) 
towards more deprived areas, usually with poorer connectivity conditions to the public transport network. An 
indirect social redistribution effect might be expected. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Major projects of transport infrastructure have a great political visibility because they mobilise a 
huge amount of economic resources over the years and have significant social, territorial and 
environmental effects and concern multiple generations. Usually, the CBA method is used to 
evaluate the socioeconomic profitability of these projects. Nonetheless, from the CBA’s 
outcomes it is not possible to obtain information about which social groups will benefit from the 
investment and which others will bear its costs. The CBA does not offer a proper 
acknowledgement of winners and losers whilst it is clear that any major project entails clear 
redistribution effects. 
At the microeconomic level the investments in transport infrastructure projects should only be 
promoted when backed by a rigorous CBA ensuring sufficient added value for the overall 
society. Even so, if the redistribution effects are strong, they may generate serious opposition by 
those sectors/groups negatively affected. In this sense, the S/E Matrix has proven to be useful to 
identify, among the various agents involved, who benefits the most from the project and who is 
negatively affected by it. The analysis of this type of redistributive effects may offer valuable 
insights on the political and social connotations that, in particular in the transport sector, are 
critical for the investment decision.  
Besides the differential impacts on stakeholders, those of territorial, social and environmental 
nature should also be identified, in this case by means of a thorough analysis of redistribution 
effects. These effects are often pursued by the GPI as part of pre-determined political objectives 
that are very often interlinked, so a major challenge for project analysts will be to avoid double 
counting. Their challenge will be to assess if their combination would be strong enough to 
change the sign of the socioeconomic efficiency (i.e. ENPV) of the project. The comparison of 
the redistribution effects with the economic value of the project, in money terms, should provide 
the decision-maker with a solid indicator of its real interest. 
The financial structuring linked to the investments that the society “of each moment” requires 
also has its importance. One of the elements of which depends on social welfare is the ability of 
governments to obtain funds to carry out their policies, especially the most indebted States, 
where much of the wealth generated each year is devoted to the repayment of public debt. At the 
macroeconomic level, it is extremely important to keep under control the balance between, on 
the one hand, the effort made by population when economic resources are set aside from current 
consumption to support this debt, and on the other hand, the profit that society will get in the 
future from borrowed resources. At microeconomic level, the intergenerational redistributive 
effects from investment in major transport infrastructure project are a specific redistributive 
effect due to the variability, across the different generations affected by the project, of the 
financing gap between what they will pay and the benefits they will obtain. However, 
intergenerational transfers are often neglected as it is assumed that the resources consumed and 
generated across the project’s lifespan will concern to individuals belonging to the decision-
makers’ generation.  
Leaving aside the repercussion of redistributive effects on the overall efficiency, the impact of 
their intensity and sense should be taken into consideration. The classification proposed in this 
paper will facilitate giving to each redistributive effect a proper weight within the decision-
making process, which will thus be able to incorporate equity purposes in a more systematic 
way. It will also be useful to detect when there is a risk that the potential repercussions of the 
redistributive effects differ or contravene the mandate of policy-makers and is therefore 
necessary to take prevention or mitigating measures.  
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6. APPENDIX A: LITERATURE REVIEW CONCERNING THE REDISTRIBUTION 
EFFECTS OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS 
The efficiency benefits stemming from major transport infrastructure investments are unevenly 
distributed among the project’s stakeholders. Besides, they entail a diversity of redistributive 
effects of territorial, social and/or environmental nature that are indeed relevant for decision 
makers. Academics and practitioners have made attempts to identify and forecast them over the 
years on the basis that the project’s redistributive effects may be used to reduce disparities 
among particular population groups, territories or generations. The use of investments as a policy 
instrument indicates that the redistribution of benefits can be substantial. A quick search using 
Google Scholar confirms the importance of redistribution effects in relation to transport 
infrastructure (cf. Table II-A1). 
Table II-A1. Results from keyword research using Google Scholar (period 1900-2018) 
Key term (*) Refining words (**) Number of studies(***) 
redistribution transport infrastructure 42,600 
redistribution transport infrastructure investment 24,900 
spatial redistribution transport infrastructure investment 1,320 
social redistribution  transport infrastructure 1,260 
social redistribution transport infrastructure investment 1,200 
spatial redistribution  transport infrastructure 1,870 
redistribution effects transport infrastructure 1,290 
redistribution effects transport infrastructure investment 1,110 
territorial redistribution transport infrastructure 424 
territorial redistribution transport infrastructure investment 335 
intergenerational redistribution transport infrastructure 181 
environmental redistribution transport infrastructure 6 
environmental redistribution transport infrastructure investment 2 
classification redistribution effects --- 0 
redistributive effects transport infrastructure 2,900 
redistributive effects transport infrastructure investment 2,640 
intergenerational redistributive effects transport infrastructure 12 
spatial redistributive effects transport infrastructure 9 
territorial redistributive effects transport infrastructure 4 
social redistributive effects transport infrastructure 2 
environmental redistributive effects transport infrastructure 0 
classification redistributive effects --- 0 
(*) Words with quotation marks around in the search 
(**) Words without quotation marks around in the search 
(***) Journal articles, conference papers, chapters in books, etc.  
Source: Author 
The table shows the outputs obtained during the search using a mandatory word and refining 
words. They indicate the index-linked documents of Google Scholar in which the key term was 
found at least one time. The outputs provided by Google Scholar do not offer information, 
however, on whether the main term of the search is actually “key” in the study, as would be the 
hypothetical case if an author would have attempted to identify/classify (for the first time) the 
different redistribution effects of infrastructure investment. Should this had been the case, the 
term/s “redistribution/redistributive effects” would had appeared explicitly as “keyword”. 
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On the other hand, it is worthwhile noting that if the key term used in the search encompasses 
not only the word “redistribution/redistributive effects” but also the word 
“classification/territorial/social/environmental/intergenerational” the number of studies found in 
Google Scholar fall to a few of them or there are no matches (cf. Table II-A1).  
The results obtained from the use of the former key terms with some of the main academic 
databases (WOS, CCC, DIIDW, KJD, MEDLINE, RSCI, SCIELO, etc.) also confirm that no 
author (excluded the authors of this paper) has included the mandatory words shown in Table A-
1 as “keyword” in any disseminated work. This would confirm the hypothesis that no other 
author has ever made attempt to classify the redistributive effects of transport infrastructure. This 
hypothesis has been also confirmed through the review of both the pieces of literature related to 
transport economics shown in Section 5 of this paper (bibliographic references) and other pieces 
found through Google Scholar using “redistributive effects” as key term plus “transport 
infrastructure” as refining words (cf. Table II-A2). 
Table II-A2. Main pieces of academic literature dealing with the redistribution effects of transport infrastructure  
Document of reference number of cites 
Botham, R.W. (1980). The regional development effects of road investment. Transportation Planning and Technology, 
6(2), 97-108. 60 
Howe, J. (1981). Income Distribution and Employment Programme: The Impact of Rural Roads on Poverty 
Alleviation: a Review of the Literature (Vol. 106). International Labour Office. 29 
Cervero, R. (1981). Efficiency and equity impacts of current transit fare policies (No. 799). 34 
Starrs, M., & Perrins, C. (1989). The markets for public transport: the poor and the transport disadvantaged. Transport 
Reviews, 9(1), 59-74. 20 
Rietveld, P. (1989). Infrastructure and regional development. The Annals of Regional Science, 23(4), 255-274. 229 
Lemelin, C. (1992). Short-term redistributive effects of public financing of university education in Quebec. Canadian 
Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques, 176-188. 19 
Broome, J., 1992. Counting the costs of global warming. Cambridge: White Horse Press. 573 
Quinet, E. (1994). The social costs of transport: evaluation and links with internalisation policies. Internalising the 
social costs of transport, 31-76. 94 
Bénabou, R. (1994). Human capital, inequality, and growth: A local perspective. European Economic Review, 38(3-4), 
pp.817-26. 164 
Rietveld, P. (1994). Spatial economic impacts of transport infrastructure supply. Transportation Research Part A: 
Policy and Practice, 28(4), 329-341. 139 
De la Fuente, A. & Vives, X. (1995). Infrastructure and education as instruments of regional policy: evidence from 
Spain. Economic policy, 10(20), 11-51. 441 
Verhoef, E., Nijkamp, P., & Rietveld, P. (1995). Second-best regulation of road transport externalities. Journal of 
transport economics and policy, 147-167. 122 
Arrow, K.J., Cline, W.R., Maler, K.G., Munasinghe, M., Squitieri, R., Stiglitz, J.E., 1996. Intertemporal equity, 
discounting and economic efficiency. Cambridge University Press, (pp. 125-44) 667 
Head, K. & Ries, J. (1996). Inter-city competition for foreign investment: static and dynamic effects of China's 
incentive areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 40(1), 38-60. 539 
Vickerman, R. (1997). High-speed rail in Europe: experience and issues for future development. The annals of regional 
science, 31(1), 21-38. 385 
Doménech, R., Maudes, A., & Varela, J. (2000). Fiscal flows in Europe: the redistributive effects of the EU budget. 
Review of World Economics, 136(4), 631-656. 45 
Banister, D. & Berechman, Y. (2001). Transport investment and the promotion of economic growth. Journal of 
transport geography, 9(3), 209-218. 542 
De la Fuente, A., & Doménech, R. (2001). The redistributive effects of the EU budget: an analysis and proposal for 
reform. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(2), 307-330. 95 
Démurger, S. (2001). Infrastructure development and economic growth: an explanation for regional disparities in 
China?. Journal of Comparative economics, 29(1), 95-117. 1083 
Preston, J. (2001). Integrating transport with socio-economic activity–a research agenda for the new millennium. 
Journal of Transport Geography, 9(1), 13-24. 101 
Feitelson, E. (2002). Introducing environmental equity dimensions into the sustainable transport discourse: issues and 
pitfalls. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 7(2), 99-118. 105 
Asensio, J., Matas, A., & Raymond, J.L. (2003). Redistributive effects of subsidies to urban public transport in Spain. 
Transport Reviews, 23(4), 433-452. 37 
(Table continues next page…) 
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Table II-A2. Main pieces of academic literature dealing with the redistributive effects of transport infrastructure 
Paper reference cites 
Asensio, J., Matas, A. & Raymond, J.L. (2003). Petrol expenditure and redistributive effects of its taxation in Spain. 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 37(1), 49-69. 41 
Banister, D., & Berechman, J. (2003). Transport investment and economic development. Routledge. 722 
Calderón, C. & Servén, L. (2004). The effects of infrastructure development on growth and income distribution. The 
World Bank. 1000 
Coombs, G. & Dollery, B. (2004). The Ageing of Australia: Fiscal Sustainability, Intergenerational Equity and Inter-
temporal Fiscal Balance. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 39(4), 459-470. 12 
Geurs, K.T. & Van Wee, B. (2004). Accessibility evaluation of land-use and transport strategies: review and research 
directions. Journal of Transport geography, 12(2), 127-140. 1496 
Holl, A. (2004). Manufacturing location and impacts of road transport infrastructure: empirical evidence from Spain. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34(3), 341-363. 317 
Matas, A. (2004). Demand and revenue implications of an integrated public transport policy: the case of Madrid. 
Transport Reviews, 24(2), 195-217. 97 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. & Fratesi, U. (2004). Between development and social policies: the impact of European Structural 
Funds in Objective 1 regions. Regional Studies, 38(1), 97-113. 573 
Castells, A. & Solé-Ollé, A. (2005). The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The role of equity, efficiency 
and political factors. European Economic Review, 49(5), 1165-1205. 208 
Musterd, S. (2005). Social and ethnic segregation in Europe: levels, causes, and effects. Journal of Urban Affairs, 
27(3), pp.331-48. 536 
Kemmerling, A. & Stephan, A. (2008). The politico-economic determinants and productivity effects of regional 
transport investment in Europe. EIB papers, 13(2), 36-60. 33 
López, E., Gutiérrez, J. & Gómez, G. (2008). Measuring regional cohesion effects of large-scale transport 
infrastructure investments: an accessibility approach. European Planning Studies, 16(2), 277-301. 173 
Martínez-Vázquez, J. (2008). The Impact of Budgets on the Poor: Tax and Expenditure Benefit Incidence Analysis. In 
Public Finance for Poverty Reduction. Blanca Moreno-Dodson & Quentin Wodon. The Word Bank.  49 
Geurs, K. T., Boon, W. & Van Wee, B. (2009). Social impacts of transport: literature review and the state of the 
practice of transport appraisal in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Transport reviews, 29(1), 69-90. 143 
Cervero, R. & Kang, C.D. (2011). Bus rapid transit impacts on land uses and land values in Seoul, Korea. Transport 
Policy, 18(1), 102-116. 251 
Lakshmanan, T.R. (2011). The broader economic consequences of transport infrastructure investments. Journal of 
Transport Geography, 19(1), 1-12. 217 
Cassiers, T. & Kesteloot, C. (2012). Socio-spatial inequalities and social cohesion in European cities. Urban Studies, 
49(9), pp.1909-1924. 115 
Jun, M.J. (2012). Redistributive effects of bus rapid transit (BRT) on development patterns and property values in 
Seoul, Korea. Transport Policy, 19(1), 85-92. 42 
Martens, K., Golub, A. & Robinson, G. (2012). A justice-theoretic approach to the distribution of transportation 
benefits: Implications for transportation planning practice in the United States. Transportation Research Part A: Policy 
and Practice, 46(4), 684-695. 
132 
Rietveld, P. & Bruinsma, F. (2012). Is transport infrastructure effective?: Transport infrastructure and accessibility: 
impacts on the space economy. Springer Science & Business Media. 395 
Sterner, T. (2012). Distributional effects of taxing transport fuel. Energy Policy, 41, 75-83. 93 
Viguié, V. & Hallegatte, S. (2012). Trade-offs and synergies in urban climate policies. Nature Climate Change, 2(5), 
334. 105 
Foth, N., Manaugh, K. & El-Geneidy, A.M. (2013). Towards equitable transit: examining transit accessibility and 
social need in Toronto, Canada 1996-2006. Journal of Transport Geography, 29, pp.1-10. 135 
Foxley, A., Aninat, E. & Arellano, J.P. (2013). Redistributive effects of government programmes: The Chilean case. 
Elsevier. 66 
Li, Y. & DaCosta, M.N. (2013). Transportation and income inequality in China: 1978–2007. Transportation Research 
Part A: Policy and Practice, 55, 56-71. 19 
Berri, A., Lyk-Jensen, S.V., Mulalic, I. & Zachariadis, T. (2014). Household transport consumption inequalities and 
redistributive effects of taxes: a repeated cross-sectional evaluation for France, Denmark and Cyprus. Transport Policy, 
36, 206-216. 
10 
Condeço-Melhorado, A., Tillema, T., de Jong, T. & Koopal, R. (2014). Distributive effects of new highway 
infrastructure in the Netherlands: The role of network effects and spatial spillovers. Journal of Transport Geography 34, 
pp. 96-105  
8 
Geroliminis, N., Zheng, N. & Ampountolas, K. (2014). A three-dimensional macroscopic fundamental diagram for 
mixed bi-modal urban networks. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 42, pp. 168-181 40 
Condeço-Melhorado, A., Zofío, J.L. & Christidis, P. (2017). Drivers of changes in Spanish accessibility for the 1960–
2010 period. European Transport Research Review, 9(2), 19. 2 
Knaap, T. & Oosterhaven, J. (2017). Spatial economic impacts of transport infrastructure investments. In Transport 
Projects, Programmes and Policies (pp. 87-105). Routledge. 102 
Source: Google Scholar 
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In short, it can be argued that a proper identification/classification of the redistributive effects 
stemming from major investments in transport infrastructure has never been attempted, 
according to both the analysis performed through the main academic databases and a thorough 
review of the literature on transport project appraisal. Thus, the identification and classification 
of the differential impacts of major transport infrastructure projects (redistribution effects), 
including territorial, social, environmental and intergenerational impacts may be considered as a 
new and genuine contribution of this doctoral thesis. 
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7. APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY WITH S/E MATRIX 
This appendix presents the case study of a shadow-toll motorway to illustrate the use of the 
Stakeholders/Effects Matrix to analyse the redistributive effects among project-linked 
stakeholders. 
The project concerns the construction of 30 km of a dual 2-lane motorway. The GPI is a regional 
government that will develop the project through a long-term concession based on shadow-toll 
payments by means of a DBFMO41 contract. The concessionaire is expected to receive a 
minimum concession fee yearly, determined from agreed demand forecasts, with the aim of 
ensuring that the project is financially sustainable for the private sector. Besides, if demand 
overcomes a certain threshold, the GPI will endure additional payments to compensate the 
concessionaire for the additional maintenance costs. Investment in the infrastructure to be 
covered by the concessionaire is estimated at €92 million exclusive of VAT. Most of the works 
(€59 million) will be carried out by the concessionaire’ main contractor. The construction works 
are expected to take place over a period of 3 years; the concession period covers this period plus 
23 years afterwards. At the end of the concession (26 years), the project is assumed to have a 
45% residual value. Both routine maintenance costs and renewals costs due to periodical heavy 
maintenance works are assumed to be the responsibility of the concessionaire.  
In the socioeconomic analysis, the adopted project economic cost is €85 million. The difference 
between the financial and the economic cost (€7 million) is due to the use of shadow prices for 
labour. The project’s benefits for users are mostly related to savings in terms of both travel time 
and automobile operating costs (fuel consumption, tyre wear, etc.) and to safety improvements. 
The project also entails positive impacts for users of the existing roads. The effects on non-users 
are environmental (noise, air pollution, greenhouse gases emissions and others), and other 
related to land values, economic development, etc.  
According to a classical Cost-Benefit Analysis, the investment is economically sound and the 
economic rate of return is quite high (ERR=13.8%) and robust (cf. Table II-B1). Travel time 
values and operating costs appear as important variables on the socioeconomic profitability of 
the project. The results of the calculations also reveal a satisfactory financial rate of return 
(FRR=9.6%) for the private investors. 
 
                                                   
41  A DBFMO contract implies for the private partner to design, build, finance, maintain and operate the 
infrastructure. Finally, at the end of the concession period, the concessionaire delivers the assets to the conceding 
GPI ensuring optimal conditions of use, but without the right to any compensation. 
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Table II-B1. Economic Evaluation of shadow-toll motorway (example) 
 
Source: Author 
 
7.1. RESULTS OF STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Table II-B2 shows a very simplified S/E Matrix42. The values in the rows are relevant to show 
who benefits the most from the project and who pays. In this case the Regional government is 
taking most of the burden whilst the National government is obtaining some net gain through tax 
revenues. Private investors (concessionaire) and construction companies appear as major 
beneficiaries of the project. Moreover, the table shows how some of the economic costs and 
benefits can only be partially reflected in financial cash flows, as it is the case of the shadow 
prices on labour.   
 
                                                   
42 In a real case it would be particularly important to analyse the effects on the existing road network and on the 
areas presently suffering from congestion. The S/E matrices may eventually become quite extensive. In general, the 
cells contain an economic and a financial component, unless the market and the economic value can be assumed to 
be the same. 
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Table II-B2. S/E Matrix of shadow-toll motorway (example) 
 
Source: Author 
As can be easily observed, users are the main beneficiaries of the project (ENPV=210 M€). 
Their benefits (travel time savings, operating costs and safety benefits) are high enough for the 
GPI to justify the project from the socioeconomic point of view. Actually, should the analysis 
exclude the external effects of the project in the CBA, the project ERR would still be high 
(12.5%). On the other hand the project has other beneficiaries, which are the property owners of 
land and/or real state within the area of influence of the project that will benefit from the 
increase of land value stemming from the project (ENPV=24 M€). It is worth noting here that 
such increase of land value is indeed an indirect effect of the project as it is expected that the 
motorway of the example will boost economic development locally in the long run (not included 
here; the increase in land value may cover this “additional” externality, which is also partially 
included through the induced traffic component in traffic forecasts). Besides, the project entails 
very modest environmental impacts of local, regional and global scope that, in monetary terms, 
mean a negative ENPV of some 4 M€, which could be separated in the S/E Matrix if necessary.  
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SECTION III. ASSESSING THE FAIRNESS OF A PROJECT FINANCING  
FORMULA ON SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS 
Penyalver, D. & Turró, M., 2017 
Abstract 
Major transport projects are appraised mostly through cost-benefit analysis. In practice, though, 
decision-making takes into account many other aspects that are more or less political. When 
properly defined, they may be introduced in the decision process through multi-criteria analysis. 
Most important among these aspects are redistributive effects, which are, typically, associated to 
territorial, social and environmental considerations. There are, however, some important 
redistribution effects that have never been properly analysed and quantified until now. They are 
related to the evolution, throughout the projects’ lifespan, of the costs and benefits of the project 
affecting successive (overlapped) generations, and of the financing structure adopted, which 
determines who the final payers will be: either users, through tolls or tariffs for the use of the 
project, and/or taxpayers. Relating the actual payment for the investment to the net benefits 
occurring to the users and citizens in general for each generation, it is possible to ascertain if 
there is a balanced intergenerational distribution of burdens and benefits over the whole project 
lifecycle. 
The “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model” (IREM), a model based on a survey-based 
definition of the “annual generation”, includes an ad-hoc analytical procedure for the 
establishment of indicators of these effects allowing their comparison among different projects. 
Such indicators could provide a valuable input into the decision making process and, in 
particular, in the adoption of a financing structure that represents an adequate share of the actual 
investment expenditure among those who will benefit from the project. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public administrations need to promote investments in transport infrastructure to provide an 
adequate welfare level to the population. These investments must be profitable in terms of 
resources, taking into account society as a whole along the whole lifespan of the asset. Most of 
these resources, both costs and benefits, can be monetised allowing the measurement of the 
efficiency of the project through cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Some objectives having a weight 
in decision making by elected officials are not, however, properly included in the efficiency 
measure, as they cannot be appropriately converted into money. Among these objectives, 
regional development, which pursues the economic and social convergence of less developed 
regions, is often the focus of multi-year projects that require large amounts of financial resources 
until implemented. These territorial redistributive effects are not, however, the only ones having 
an impact on decision making. Social, environmental and purely political objectives are more or 
less influential in the decision process and have been the subject of academic research. However, 
while certain redistributive aspects, such as the impact on regional development, have been the 
target of many theoretical and experimental analyses, the redistributive effects of major projects 
affecting different generations of citizen, although indirectly present in many decisions 
processes, have not been addressed until now. 
In most countries it is the taxpayer who pays for the construction, operation and maintenance of 
transport infrastructure (directly from the public budget or through public companies, such as 
railway infrastructure managers), although users are providing funds to the government through 
specific taxes, such as fuel taxes. In some countries, and for certain sections (tunnels, bridges) 
almost everywhere, users also pay tolls or fees for infrastructure use. Independently of the 
contribution of users, the funding of the investment, which often involves loans, can imply very 
different disbursements over time. The financing structure adopted for a new infrastructure can 
thus show strong variations and seriously affect the distribution of the benefits and particularly 
the burdens of the project. Without going deeply into the issue of how the transport sector is 
taxed, what is obvious is that the financing model adopted may have important differential 
effects on the various actors involved in the project and that these effects may vary considerably 
over time. It is also easy to understand that their impact on the society “of each moment” 
affected by the project could be quite different. The aim of this paper is to show the possibility of 
incorporating in the socioeconomic analysis of major investments a component indicating the 
effects of the financing formula of the project on the various overlapped generations of users and 
taxpayers affected. 
The effects of the financing formula of a specific project for the public sector are obviously 
embedded in the global macroeconomic context. Typically, the yearly budget1 of governments is 
mostly composed by tax income plus some public debt. So, it could be argued that the effects of 
the total public debt are those really relevant for future (genealogical) generations2. The 
implications of the marginal increase in public debt brought about by major projects are not, 
however, our concern here. New major projects are funded, traditionally, by means of some 
budgetary contributions and ad-hoc financial commitments that, in general, will only concern 
users and (mostly) taxpayers during the project’s lifespan. Accordingly, what we aim at 
analysing here is the relation between the socioeconomic effects of new investments, measured 
in term of resources, and the concomitant financial flows –and the equity implications– linked to 
                                                   
1  Governments’ yearly budget typically involves the forecast of the annual public expenditure, financial 
commitments from former investments and financial resources for scheduled new projects. Public debt in a year “i” 
will be compound by Treasury debt (bonds) and other specific financial liabilities from former investments (loans) 
funded via private banks, IFIs or project bonds. 
2 In fact, taxpayers have to cover, in any case, the legacy of the cumulated Treasury debt generated in the past by 
loans to old projects. 
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these projects on the “annual generations” of users and taxpayers during the life cycle of the 
project. What is important within the decision-making process for a major project is to generate 
awareness of all the implications that are relevant for society and, if possible, to provide 
indicators allowing their proper assessment. 
The “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model” (onwards, IREM) described below is a 
powerful tool that facilitates the analysis of whether, over time, the beneficiaries of investment 
(users and society of "every moment") contribute in a balance manner, through pay per use 
and/or taxes, to obtaining the benefits generated by the project or if there is a dissociation 
between these two flows. In synthesis, whether the time distribution of the net benefits and the 
financing contributions entail a significant redistribution between the overlapped generations 
affected by the project. With this objective a fourth-pronged index that measures the 
"intergenerational impacts" of investment is proposed, to inform the evaluator of the project, 
and finally to decision-makers, about the risk that the financing formula may induce significant 
intergenerational effects. 
 
2. MEASURING INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS 
The concept of “generation” (and, by extent, the concept of “intergenerational”) is used by most 
scientific papers with a genealogical meaning without a clear definition of its timespan. This lack 
of definition is evident both in key macroeconomic studies related to the analysis of consumption 
and of savings on economic growth (Ramsey, 1928; Solow, 1956; Samuelson, 1958; Phelps, 
1961; Weiss, 1980; Romer, 1986; Blanchard & Fischer, 1989; Romer, 1990; Romer & Chow, 
1996; Kotlikoff & Burns, 2005; Gahvari & Micheletto, 2014). A clear definition is also absent in 
microeconomic studies, which aim to obtain the social discount rate3, and in studies that aim to 
assess the implicit distribution in the CBA of the intergenerational preferences of society 
(Scaborough & Bennet, 2008; Scaborough, 2011). Despite this, certain microeconomic studies 
even have tried to differentiate between the intra-generational and the inter-generational effects 
of the projects (Eckstein, 1958; Marglin, 1963; Angelsen, 1991; Moore et al., 2004; Fernández-
Baca, 2011). For example, Moore et al. (2004) argue that, in a period of 50 years, two 
generations (our generation and that of our children) are typically overlapped, and therefore, 
considering a longer duration would unduly incorporate more distant future generations. For this 
reason they consider that, taking into account the period of time required for most public 
infrastructure projects to be fully depreciated, the reasonable length for a genealogical generation 
is 50 years. This seems clearly excessive for a discussion about intergenerational equity. 
Although it is evident that some identification exists both with ancestors and with distant 
descendants, the concept of generation has always focused on individuals who share some 
specific experiences and who are jointly valuing their contribution to society, and this requires 
much shorter time spans.  
From the microeconomic perspective the question is, however, whether the discount economic 
flows really reflects how people perceives the way that collective investments affect their 
intertemporal welfare, and if it generates awareness on the decision-makers on how the financing 
formula adopted by the Government Promoting the Investment (onwards, GPI) to pay for the 
                                                   
3 The theory of discounted utility is the most widely used framework for analysing economic decisions that have 
consequences in multiple time periods (intertemporal choices), such as infrastructure investment. When studying the 
mechanisms of decision-making it is clear that future outcomes are considered less important than immediate 
(present) outcomes (Soman et al., 2005). On the other hand, the most accepted discounted model assumes that 
intertemporal welfare function is a weighted sum of the flow of current and future utility and, in turn, that utility can 
be referred to as consumption or income (Arrow & Kurz, 1970; Arrow et al., 1995; Laibson, 2003; Gollier, 2011).  
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investment affects their constituencies. The relation between the socioeconomic effects of a 
project, measured in term of resources, and the concomitant financial flows –and their fairness 
implications– has not been properly specified and analysed until now. The CBA focuses on 
offering the (static) socioeconomic net value of the investment at the moment of assessing the 
project. It does so through the use of discount rate associated to the time preference of 
consumption of society (social value) or reflects the profitability that could be obtained from the 
economic resources spent in the project in the best alternative investment (social cost). Both 
values could be quite different (Feldstein, 1964; Arrow & Kurz, 1970; Angelsen, 1991; Laibson, 
2003; Souto, 2003; Arrow et al., 2004; Moore et al., 2004; Fernández-Baca, 2011; Gollier, 
2011), i.e. it is not possible to speak of a single appropriate discount rate4 (Stiglitz, 2013). In 
short, the discounting mechanism is not suitable to reflect the impact that the financing structure 
of a project will have on the beneficiaries and taxpayers from different generations.  
The IREM has been developed as a tool to respond to this issue and facilitate the analysis of 
whether there is a balanced distribution over time of the relation between what the beneficiaries 
of an investment (users and society of “each moment”) receive and their contribution through 
pay per use and/or taxes. The “intergenerational” term used in this model is a concept that 
enables taking into account the dynamic of the effects on people (users and taxpayers “of each 
moment”) of different project financing structures over time. The model shows the variability of 
the relation between the financial and socioeconomic effects of an investment in transport 
infrastructure over the years within the limits of the project’s lifespan. Therefore, this concept is 
strictly linked to the individuals yearly-affected by the project and, in addition, it nuances their 
traditional genealogical attributes according to other aspects representing how useful is a 
transport project for society belonging to any “annual generation”.  
A basic question for the analysis of intergenerational phenomena is, of course, to determine what 
is the most appropriate method to group the affected individuals so the model properly reflects 
the differential effects over identifiable and separate groups that are affected by the project over 
the years. This has been done through the definition of an “annual generation” (see point 4), 
which involves the critical assumption about the timespan covered by it and also how the 
individuals of years around the central year of the generation are included. These parameters can 
only be estimated through adequate surveys indicating the sensitivity of society to the effects of 
a major transport infrastructure.  
 
3. CHARACTERISTIC PROFILES OF A TRANSPORT INVESTMENT PROJECT 
Decision-makers typically use the CBA method to assess the efficiency of investments in terms 
of resources for society as a whole. Once socioeconomic costs and benefits have been quantified 
and monetized throughout the life cycle of the project (usually by annual periods), they both are 
compared each other in order to calculate the net benefits (benefits minus costs). The benefits for 
users may be evident, but those obtained by the community directly concerned by the investment 
or the positive externalities affecting society in general (global environmental effects, 
macroeconomic impacts, etc.) are more difficult to identify and value. Concerning costs, in 
addition to the resources consumed during construction, operation and maintenance of a new 
transport infrastructure, it is necessary to include both environmental (increased noise, pollution, 
etc.) and other possible social costs. It must be stressed here that neither the yearly net benefits 
nor the outcome of the CBA are affected by the transfers of resources between users and 
                                                   
4 In fact, even though some international organisations recommend about the discount rates to apply in CBA for 
different types of investments, most public authorities follow their own policy regarding the estimation and use of 
the discount rate (HM Treasury, 2003; Evans & Sezer, 2004; Meunier et al., 2013). 
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operators or between them and the government (fees, taxes, etc.), which are, on the other hand, 
critical for the financial structuring of the project. 
The financial implications of the project can be derived from the cash flows, which specify all 
expenses and incomes that affect the various stakeholders in the project. To ensure the overall 
financial sustainability of the project it is necessary that the cumulative income forecast for each 
agent, among which should be included subsidies and transfers from other actors (such as, for 
example, bank loans), always exceeds the cumulative costs (including the return of credits) they 
have to face. A precise estimation of the costs of construction, maintenance and operation over 
time of the transport infrastructure, on the one hand, and of the expected revenues from its 
exploitation and from other possible contributions of public budgets on the other, will allow us to 
establish the external financial needs of the project, which will usually be covered by loans. For 
each financing option, i.e. each combination of revenues, grants and loans, there will be a 
different distribution of the financing burden over time and between users and taxpayers. A 
critical factor in such a distribution is the budget contributions of the different governments 
involved in the project. European subsidies supporting “convergence" regions, for instance, have 
had an important impact on the financial structure of many transport infrastructure projects 
across Europe. 
Comparing the time profile of the net financial “cash flows corresponding to payments” (revenue 
payments minus outlays) and the time profile of the “flows of socioeconomic net benefits” over 
the project life cycle allows us to identify how the financing burden is shared each year between 
users and taxpayers and what is the gap between the amounts paid and the net benefits from the 
project (cf. Figure III-1). This comparison gives us information about the redistributive effects 
that occur due to the financing formula of the project and how they affect different generations 
of users and taxpayers. 
Figure III-1. Characteristic socioeconomic and financial time-profiles (obtained from a particular project) 
 
Source: Author 
From the time profile of the net socioeconomic benefits (Bi) and the time profile of the financing 
impact (FIi) it is possible to obtain, for each year, the difference between them (Di) across the 
project life cycle. The IREM model compares the cash flows from the financial analysis with the 
flow of socioeconomic benefits, thus their values must be in constant terms. 
Equation III-1. Difference between net benefits value and financing impact in year “i” 𝐷! = 𝐵! − 𝐹𝐼!   
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It must be stressed that FI is determined by the payment schedule and that payments are not 
necessarily made in the same year when the expenses originated. The profile shows, thus, the 
resources provided by each funding source (through the investment vehicle chosen by GPI). This 
includes tolls, fees, etc. levied on the various users and the funds devoted to the project coming 
from the public budgets either to reimburse the loans (principal and interests) assigned to the 
project or to pay for the investment, operation and maintenance costs not covered by the former 
loans (cf. Figure III-2). Private sector funds mobilised by the project, either as equity or loans, 
are not considered as such in the FI: since they may be assumed to have alternative options in 
the market with similar financial effects on society, they may be considered having a neutral 
effect in terms of intergenerational impact. What is clearly affecting the FI are the payments 
made by users and GPIs to the Project Developer5 (e.g. when there are shadow tolls) to the 
private partner in a PPP, throughout the operation phase of the project, that he will use to repay 
the loans, to recover the equity and for eventual profits. Financial flows not directly attributable 
to the project shall not be included. 
Figure III-2. Key sources of financing and links of cash in/out-flows to obtain the financing impact (FI) 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
                                                   
5 The investment vehicle chosen by the GPI to develop the project may be totally public, being managed by the 
Administration itself, a public Agency or Company, named here as a Public Vehicle of Investment (PIV), or totally 
or partially private (Special Purpose Vehicle of Investment or SPV) when carried out through a PPP (including a 
pure concession). 
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Figure III-2 shows how the investment vehicle chosen by the GPI to develop the project 
determines what payments have to be considered as a direct financing expenditure from the 
perspective of the users and taxpayers eventually paying for the investment, which is the GPI 
point of view. When the GPI finances a project directly or through a PIV without recourse to real 
tolls or other users payments, the FI for taxpayers will be determined by the cash out-flows in 
the annual budgets needed to pay for both construction and operation costs. Loans, project bonds 
and other possible financing instruments will only affect the GPI’s annual budget at the time 
when principal and interests will be paid. 
When the GPI carries out a project through a PPP, it is possible that the GPI receives money (a 
“concession fee”) from the concessionaire but often users are not expected to pay over the years 
for the totality of costs. In this case, the GPI will have to cover the required compensation (a 
“negative concession fee”) to the SPV through shadow tolls, availability payments, etc. or 
establish some kind of subsidy. The cash out-flows needed for these payments originate in the 
corresponding annual budgets and are thus supported by the taxpayers6. 
 
4. DEFINING THE GAP FOR EACH ANNUAL GENERATION 
Even if the difference between the net benefits and the financial contributions of users and non-
users of the project in each given year shows strong differences between two correlative years 
(for instance, before and after completion of the grace period of a loan), the simple difference 
does not provide a clear-enough indicator on how different generations will be affected.  As 
already mentioned, the first step to get a suitable indicator of intergenerational redistributive 
effects is to properly define the concept of "annual generation" (AGi) pivoting around year, i, of 
the life cycle of the project. 
Considering any year “i” in the life cycle of the project as the “central year” or pivotal moment 
associated to an annual generation “AGi”, from this mid position, the individuals (both users and 
taxpayers) who live in this year will fully obtain all the net benefits and bear the financing legacy 
of the investment (payments related to the project funding) of that year, but only a part of the 
effects occurring in preceding or following years. Most of the “i” year individuals have already 
been affected in the past by the project and will probably survive to be affected in future years. 
They will be, however, less numerous and bound by more uncertainties as they find themselves 
farthest from the pivotal year. It is also reasonable to assume, for the analysis of the 
intergenerational effects between overlapped generations, a similar principle to the one used in 
CBA, which uses discount rates. People of the central year of a future generation would prefer 
“real7” benefits in that year over uncertain ones, which means, that they will give less weight to 
costs and benefits that will occur either before or after the year in question. On both counts it is 
logical to apply some mitigation (attenuation of the year’s weight) and to do it in a more or less 
symmetrical way. This should not be the case, however, for generations living during the first 
years of the project, as its effects only start with payments and/or the commissioning of the 
transport infrastructure. 
                                                   
6 In both cases (PIV or SPV), any taxes (VAT or other) paid by users or the GPI, even if recovered by a public 
administration, will be considered as a financing expenditure within the year. This is arguable, but the discussion 
about taxes in CBA deserves a research that falls outside the present remit. 
7 “Real” refers here to benefits accrued with certainty in the year 
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So, once defined the annual generation’s timespan, it is possible to establish its profile, assuming 
a symmetrical and continuous form of percentage weights8 (wj) decreasing towards the more 
distant years. The (theoretical) graphic function resulting is the weighting curve shown in Figure 
III-3). 
Figure III-3. Weighting curve for each annual generation “AGi” 
 
Source: Author 
Having defined the profile of the intergenerational effects, it is possible to calculate a gap for 
each annual generation as the sum of the outcomes resulting of multiplying each  “Di” by its 
corresponding weighting coefficient9  “wj” for every year, j, included in the AGi (cf. Equation 
III-2).  
Equation III-2. GAP for an annual generation centred in year “i” 
𝐺𝐴𝑃! = 𝐷! · 𝑤!   ;   𝑤! = 1!!!!!!
!!!
!!!   
The “GAPi” provides a profile over the life cycle of the project that shows whether its financing 
formula leads to similar situations between generations or if important redistributive effects exist 
among them. But, as already mentioned, and as shown in Figure III-4, it is not logical to include 
the differences between costs and benefits occurring in years previous to the initiation of the 
project. In these years previous to the lifespan of the project there are no resources (generated or 
used) to consider. Therefore, the GAPi of the annual generations before the first “complete” one 
(i.e. when j=1 of this generation coincides with the first year of works), or “initial generations”, 
have to be calculated using a truncated weighting profile. This profile should be based on 
people’s identification with the nearest past with regards to the project. It would seem that the 
perception of a project could be strongly related to the construction period and its impact on 
employment and the short-term generation of economic activity. The profile could thus be 
dependant on the economic performance of the region at the time, but an average reasonable 
pattern could be established for all projects, as acceptable variations would have a relatively 
minor impact on intergenerational indicators. 
                                                   
8 Percentage weights correspond to people’s perception/preferences about the project’s utility either before or after 
the ‘central year’ of an annual generation. 
9 Theoretical weighting coefficients have been used for defining the shape of the curve (Figure III-3). 
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 Figure III-4. Generational assessment of the inter-annual differences between costs and benefits 
 
Source: Author 
At the other end of the project cycle, the problem may be solved simply by considering that the 
generational analysis will end “j” years later than the period of analysis adopted in the CBA 
(“I” years). For the last standard-annual generations (AGi=I), the calculation will end “j” years 
after the analysis period adopted. We can argue that the transport infrastructure will still be in 
operation after year “i=I” and the net benefits occurring afterwards can be extrapolated without 
distorting the intergenerational analysis. 
Figure III-5. Time Profile of Generational Gaps of the project (example) 
 
Source: Author 
From the gap of each “annual generation” it can be drawn up the “Time Profile of Generational 
Gaps” of the project (cf. Figure III-5), which is useful to determine whether the financing 
formula of a project implies substantial differences in the distribution of the gaps over its 
lifecycle and to easily check if certain generations are paying more than the net benefits they 
receive (GAPi<0). As negative gaps are perceived more strongly than positive ones (with the 
size of these positive effects being relatively irrelevant), a simple quantified indicator of the 
existence of a potential problem for decision makers seems sufficient for inclusion in the 
intergenerational analysis. The “Generational Unfairness Indicator” (GUI), which gives the 
percentage of the number of generations with negative gaps (NEGAP) over the total annual 
generations (N) considered (cf. Equation III-3). 
Equation III-3. Calculation of “Generational Unfairness Indicator” of the project 𝐺𝑈𝐼 = 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑁 · 100 
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5. THE MODEL OF THE INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS  
The IREM model proposes standardized indicators as a common baseline to compare the 
intergenerational effects of different projects and, in particular, the different options available to 
finance them. In order to do so, it is necessary to calculate, first, the average value of the 
different generational gaps obtained along the project lifespan ( 𝐺𝐴𝑃 ) and, next, the 
intergenerational gap (GAPintg-i) for each year according to Equations III-4 and III-5.  
Equation III-4. Calculation of the mean gap of the “GAPi” series 𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝐺𝐴𝑃!!!!!𝑁    
 
Equation III-5. Calculation of the “Intergenerational GAP” for each annual generation 𝐺𝐴𝑃!"#$!! = 𝐺𝐴𝑃! − 𝐺𝐴𝑃  
The variations over the life cycle of GAPintg-i indicate whether some annual generations are more 
or less affected by the financial model than others. However, as the impacts on society of future 
gaps are mitigated by the wealth growth of its members, which is usually measured through the 
GDP (gross domestic product), the above calculations have to be modified to take into account 
the reduced value of the gaps between expected net socioeconomic benefits and payments for 
generations10 to come. It is done as shown in Equation III-6, discounting from the GAPintg-i series 
the long-term annual growth of GDP/c following an exponential pattern similar to the social 
discount rate. The modified intergenerational GAP for each generation is represented as GAPX-i.  
Equation III-6. Calculation of “modified intergenerational GAP” for each annual generation 𝐺𝐴𝑃 !!! = 𝐺𝐴𝑃!"#$!!(1+ 𝑇𝐶!"#/!)(!!!) 
Figure III-6 shows the typical linear profiles of a given financing formula. The slope of the best-
fit line (positive or negative) indicates whether, globally, the proposed financing structure will 
tend to (relatively) benefit or harm future generations. The slope of the regression gives the 
strength of the gap in favour of future generations. 
Figure III-6. Characteristic time-profile of the intergenerational redistributive effects (example) 
 
Source: Author 
                                                   
10 By considering that it is established a weighting coefficient to calculate the GAP for each annual generation “i”, it 
could be argued that reducing now the value of the GAPintg-i by means of the GDP/c implies a double discounting. 
However, the weights for each year “j” within each generation defines, together with its time span, the relevance for 
society of the project’s effects. It is not related at all to reducing future GAP’s values because their transcendence 
will be mitigated by the society’s wealth growth.  
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The bigger the angle of the slope the highest will be the benefits for them. On the other hand, the 
distance of each “GAPX-i” with regards to the geometrical line resulting of the linear regression 
of the whole “intergenerational gap series” allows us to determine whether a specific 
generation is more positively (or negatively) affected than others.  
The linear correlation coefficient of the gap series “r” (−1≤ r ≤1), which determines the 
relationship between the two variables involved in a bidimensional distribution will provide an 
indicator of the variability with regards to a specific regression line, which reflects a situation 
where all generations would be identically affected (independently of the sign of future effects). 
Equation III-7. Linear correlation coefficient 𝑟 = 𝜎!"𝜎! · 𝜎! ;      −1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1 
In the formula, 𝜎!" is the arithmetic mean of the deviations products for each variable from its 
mean (covariance); 𝜎! is the square root of the variance of the gap series (typical standard 
deviation); and 𝜎! is the typical standard deviation of the time distribution of generations of the 
projects (i=1, 2, 3… I). When the trend of the linear profile of “GAPX-i” series is strong (r≈1 or 
r≈–1), the redistributive effects due to the variability among generations are small and the 
sharing of financing cost and socioeconomic benefits among the different generations is 
homogeneous, although they could generally be in favour or not of future citizens. However, 
when the correlation is weak (r≈0), it means that there is a big dispersion of GAP values and 
some generations will benefit clearly from the project whilst others will bear its financing 
burden.  
To facilitate the understanding of the redistributive intergenerational effects, the IREM model 
defines an dimensionless indicator, the “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Sharing Index” 
or IRESI, to reflect the overall intensity of the intergenerational redistributive effects 
independently of the trend, which could be as much increasing as decreasing (which is not very 
common but theoretically possible).  
Equation III-8. Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Sharing Index (IRESI) 𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼 = 1 − 𝑅!"# [!]!  ;    𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼 ∈ [0,1] 
In the formula, r2, the coefficient of determination of the GAPX-i series, is represented by R2GAP [X] 
represents. A high value of the IRESI indicates that there are strong divergences among 
generations regarding (and irrespective of) the general trend of the project, which could favour 
closer or more distant “societies”. IRESI≈0 values indicate that the intergenerational 
redistribution effects are consistent and therefore, in this case, the only characteristic to consider 
is the trend (the slope of the regression line).  
When the intergenerational redistributive effects that the financing formula entails are important, 
it will be necessary to assess separately the IRESI associated to each agent involved in the 
project, particularly users and taxpayers. This will require calculating independently the IRESI 
for both agents, to analyse the importance of the possible differences and the reasons for them. 
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In sum, the “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model” (IREM) is a microeconomic model 
that offers three key parameters (outputs) to describe intergenerational redistributive effects: 
- GUI: Indicates to what extent a project will entail “generational unfairness”. 
- Trend: Indicates us whether present or future generations will be favoured. 
- Slope11: Tangent of the regression line, giving the strength of the trend. 
- IRESI: Indicates whether particular generations will end up being greatly benefited/ 
harmed due to the financing model. 
This information can be used to assess the intergenerational redistributive effects of the different 
formulae that a GPI could choose for funding a project but also to compare intergenerational 
redistributive effects between different projects. 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF THE IREM MODEL. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
The IREM model has been used for a specific case for which reliable data were available. The 
aim of the exercise was, on one hand, to detect the practical difficulties of its implementation 
and, on the other hand, to get a first impression of the potential effects on the indicators of some 
theoretical hypotheses (length of annual generations, weighting curves of the population, etc.) 
that have been adopted on a pure conceptual basis. The current research being carried out with 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) sponsorship12 and, in particular, its fieldwork component 
should allow answering some of the IREM model questions still open, especially whose related 
with the sensitivity of society to the effects of a transport infrastructure project (that is, the 
weighting curve) and with the annual generation length.  
In the baseline scenario, the extension of a standard annual generation has been set at seven 
years and the weighting curve of the population has been defined, in accordance with it (cf. 
Table III-1). In the case study an average yearly growth rate of GDP per capita equal to 1.7% has 
been considered in the long term (BdE, 2012) based on the Central Bank of Spain forecast. The 
values of the net benefits series and the yearly financing expenditure beyond 30 years, for which 
data is not available since the CBA of the project does not take them into account, have been 
extrapolated13. 
Table III-1. Weighting of society’s yearly consumption preferences 
GENERATION 
WEIGHTS (wj) 
year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 
Standard (7 years) 0.060 0.085 0.180 0.350 0.180 0.085 0.060 
Truncated (6 years) — 0.090 0.192 0.372 0.192 0.090 0.064 
Truncated (5 years) — — 0.210 0.410 0.210 0.100 0.070 
Truncated (4 years) — — — 0.517 0.267 0.126 0.090 
Source: Author 
                                                   
11 In order to compare different projects “trend & slope” (T&S) should be shown in grades; −100g ≤ T&S ≤ +100g. 
12 Through the STAREBEI programme 2015/16 of the EIB Institute the EIB finances and provides technical support 
and information to this research project, which is aimed at producing a doctoral thesis. More detailed information is 
now available in the STAREBEI report (Penyalver & Turró, 2016). 
13 Extrapolation of the yearly net socioeconomic benefits series beyond the last year of the stated project economic-
lifecycle can be done taking into account just the period of years needed to cover the calculations of the model for 
the last generation in the timespan considered. For the yearly financing expenditure series, on the other hand, it has 
to be taken into account the amortisation periods in the funding components and whether there exist (or not) 
financing burdens to bear after the lifecycle considered in the CBA.  
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The case analysed corresponds to the Almanzora motorway, stretch Baza to Purchena, promoted 
in Spain by the Government of Andalusia (GPI)14. Since this stretch is part of a toll-free 
motorway (A-334) no “pay per use” system has been considered. The project lifecycle has been 
set at 30 years (4 years construction phase plus an operation phase of 26 years). The average 
yearly long-term inflation rate used in the financial analysis is 2.25%. On the other hand, 
environmental effects occurring during construction and throughout the operation phase have not 
been taken into account in the CBA. The net increase (or decrease) of regional economic activity 
due to new accessibility conditions has not been computed either. Yearly inflows of 
socioeconomic benefits (in constant terms) have been obtained for all scenarios as a result of the 
monetization of the lower operation cost of vehicles, reduced travel times and fewer accidents 
that the new transport infrastructure entails versus the option of not making any accessibility 
improvement (current situation). 
The assessment conducted by the GPI has been performed as part of the process to tender the 
construction, maintenance and operation of the motorway under a concession to a private 
operator. The data provided have allowed the analysis of the potential effects of the financing 
formula proposed by GPI (H4) but also for three alternative conventional formulae:  
- Scenario H1. Characteristic profile with budgetary funding 
- Scenario H2. Characteristic profile with conventional bank-funding 
- Scenario H3. Characteristic profile with partial bullet-loan 
- Scenario H4. Characteristic profile with private concession 
In scenario H1, GPI finances exclusively with its budget the main investment and the project’s 
costs of maintenance and operation. Any grant or contribution (e.g. from the CE) is not taken 
into account, so the profile of the financial impact that will bear GPI is consistent with the 
financial outflows of the project, including the rehabilitation investments foreseen on years 19 
and 30 (cf. Figure III-7). 
Figure III-7. Characteristic socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the project (H1.budgetary funding) 
 
Source: Author 
Based on the net economic benefits flows (B) and the financial contributions (FI) of the project 
the GAP for each generation has been obtained (cf. Table III-2). 
 
                                                   
14 Relevant information has been obtained from the Junta de Andalucía official website; “Estudio de viabiidad 
económico-financiera para la construcción, conservación y explotación”; contract dossier n. 1-AA-2900-2.0-0.0-
EG. 
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Table III-2. Analysis of the intergenerational redistributive effects (H1) 
AGi GAPi GAP intg-i GAP X-i 
1 -54.3 -89.6 -89.6 
2 -65.8 -101.1 -99.4 
3 -62.5 -97.8 -94.6 
4 -37.1 -72.4 -68.8 
5 2.4 -32.9 -30.8 
6 14.9 -20.4 -18.7 
7 23.4 -11.9 -10.7 
8 25.6 -9.7 -8.6 
9 26.8 -8.5 -7.4 
10 28.9 -6.4 -5.5 
11 32.6 -2.7 -2.3 
12 35.3 0.0 0.0 
13 37.4 2.1 1.7 
14 39.5 4.2 3.4 
15 41.7 6.4 5.1 
16 42.3 7.0 5.4 
17 43.7 8.4 6.4 
18 43.5 8.2 6.2 
19 41.5 6.2 4.6 
20 47.4 12.1 8.8 
21 51.5 16.2 11.6 
22 54.1 18.8 13.2 
23 57.6 22.3 15.4 
24 59.5 24.2 16.4 
25 62.1 26.8 17.8 
26 64.6 29.3 19.2 
27 66.3 31.0 20.0 
28 68.3 33.0 20.9 
29 69.5 34.2 21.3 
30 71.5 36.2 22.2 
31 74.9 39.6 23.9 
32 77.7 42.4 25.2 
33 79.9 44.6 26.0 
Source: Author 
By analysing the “GAPi” series it is possible to observe that the financing formula involves 
differential impacts. In this scenario they are particularly negative for generations 1 to 4, which 
means that the population paying for the main investment expenses will not be sufficiently 
compensated by the net socioeconomic benefits generated by the project.  
Figure III-8. Time-profile of the intergenerational redistributive effects (H1) 
 
Source: Author 
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To analyse the redistributive effects from an intergenerational perspective, we build the time 
profile of the intergenerational gap (cf. Figure III-8), which shows a T&SGAP-intg=+82.5g. The 
yearly GDP/c growth helps to mitigate, at least in part, the effects of the gap between the 
expected net socioeconomic benefits and the payments due to the financing formula, so the T&S 
of the time profile of the modified intergenerational gap is also positive, but its slope is less steep 
(T&SGAP-X =+79.1g). Only from the 12th generation GAPX-i values become positive. Finally, by 
considering the intergenerational redistributive effects sharing index value (IRESI=0.32) we 
conclude that H1 entails a moderate risk of intergenerational redistributive effects. 
In scenario H2 the Project Developer is expected to private bank loans (bank funding) to 
guarantee the financing viability of the project. In this scenario the financing profile of the 
investment will correspond with the schedule of the deferred payments (cf. Figure III-9), which 
doesn’t affect the time distribution of the net socioeconomic benefit flows. 
Figure III-9. Characteristic socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the project (H2.Conventional bank funding) 
 
Source: Author 
From an intergenerational perspective, after generation 20th, the net benefits of the project would 
be much higher than the impact of the financial contribution (cf. Figure III-10), although 
redistributive effects are consistent (R2GAP[X]=0.98) and, in general, all generations benefit 
equally, that is, the risk that intergenerational redistributive effects due to the financing formula 
of the project is not significant (IRESI=0.02). 
Figure III-10. Time-profile of the intergenerational redistributive effects (H2) 
 
Source: Author 
In scenario H3, on year 25th, the Project Developer will repay 50% of the borrowed capital 
(“bullet” effect). The corresponding profile of the financial impact is shown in Figure III-11. 
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Figure III-11. Characteristic socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the project (H3.Partial “bullet” loan) 
 
Source: Author 
When the main investment is financed using a “bullet” loan, the magnitude of the slope of 
“GAPintg-i” and “GAPX-i” series, T&SGAP-intg=2.43 y T&SGAP-X=1.89 respectively, becomes, in 
comparative terms, almost as important than in the previous H1 scenario. As shown (cf. Figure 
III-12), the intergenerational redistributive effects in scenario H3 are substantial (IRESI=0.11). 
They might be indeed important enough for paying attention to the impact of the financing 
formula on some specific generations (24th to 26th). 
Figure III-12. Time-profile of the intergenerational redistributive effects (H3) 
 
Source: Author 
The scenario H4 corresponds to a PPP (concession) under the Built-Operate-Transfer modality, 
which was the financing formula chosen by the Government of Andalusia to carry out the project 
(cf. Figure III-13). The private concession holder assumes the risk of building and financing the 
transport infrastructure and maintaining it in service conditions according with the PPP 
agreement. As compensation, the private partner will receive recurring availability payments 
during the exploitation phase of the motorway, but assumes the risk of suffering penalties when 
quality standards are not met. Under these conditions the concessionaire company expects to 
obtain a NPV=203.9 M€ (discount rate 6%) and an IRR=12.1%. The discussion about the 
justification for the shadow tolls level will no be raised here, but it is important to understand 
that, being pure transfers, toll flows are not affecting the results of the CBA. On the other hand, 
the risk assumption by the private partner justifies that GPI will not include the investment as 
public debt and this is probably a main reason for the adoption of a PPP in this case. 
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Figure III-13. Characteristic socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the project (H4.Private concession) 
 
Source: Author  
As in previous scenarios, in H4 the trend of “GAPintg-i” and “GAPX-i” series is positive, but 
slopes (T&SGAP-intg=2.51 and T&SGAP-X=1.88) are less steep than in the H1 and H2 scenarios. In 
this case the observed trend continues without showing significant variations because there is 
little volatility in the yearly gaps (cf. Figure III-14), so intergenerational redistribution effects are 
consistent (IRESI=0.04). 
Figure III-14. Time-profile of the intergenerational redistributive effects (H4) 
 
Source: Author 
The PPP system chosen by the Andalusian Government means users do not contribute to pay out 
the transport infrastructure. The socioeconomic benefits to road users are thus the only ones 
taken into account in the CBA carried out by GPI. Unfairness indicator (GUI) indicates in H4 
that more than 35% of generations affected by the project will obtain socioeconomic net benefits 
lower than the financial burden they will borne, which is three times the GUI’s value of the 
former hypothesis. Consequently, even taking into account that outcomes obtained in the 
analysis of the intergenerational redistribution effects appear acceptable (cf. Table III-3), if the 
net benefits do not grow as expected, for instance due to optimistic demand forecasts, the trend 
of the “GAPX-i” series could become flat or even negative. In this case, the financing formula 
adopted would require a specific justification. 
Table III-3. Summary of the intergenerational analysis of the motorway A-334 project 
Outputs of the 
GAP X-i series  
FINANCING FORMULA SCENARIOS 
H1. Budgetary H2. Long Term Loan  H3. “Bullet”  H4. Concession 
GUI 12.1% 12.1% 12.1% 36.4% 
T&S +79.1g +71.4g +69.0g +68.9g 
IRESI 0.32 0.02 0.11 0.04 
Source: Author 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditionally, the financing formula for an infrastructure project is only taken into account once 
the assessment of its viability has been completed. Quite often the adopted formula responds to 
constraints that are not responding to efficiency or equity considerations. It could, however, 
severely affect many of the objectives that were essential to the initial considerations for its 
construction. A main aspect in any major project is who will end up paying for it. Curiously 
enough, the intergenerational effects due to the different possible financing structures have not 
been properly addressed until now. 
The IREM model that has been proposed provides a set of indicators allowing decision-makers 
to easily understand the importance of the intergenerational effects associated to the financing 
formula of an investment project. It is based on the comparison between the yearly net 
socioeconomic benefits obtained from the cost-benefit analysis and the yearly payments made by 
the various agents participating in the project, essentially users and taxpayers. By comparing 
both time profiles, and adjusting them to the context conditions, it is possible to produce a time 
series of the gap between them and calculate four indicators: the Generational Unfairness 
Indicator (GUI), which gives the percentage of “AGi” with negative gaps over the total, the 
trend of the gap series (increasing or decreasing), the slope, which indicates its importance, and 
the Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Sharing Index (IRESI), which reflects concisely 
whether there is a strong variability among the generations considered in the project cycle. From 
them it will be easy to determine whether the potential intergenerational effects of the project 
will be substantial and, where appropriate, to take them into consideration for adopting decisions 
about the financing system to be chosen by the promoter of the transport infrastructure.  
With the proposed IREM model, a motorway promoted by the Government of Andalusia (Spain) 
has been evaluated, taking into account for it four different financing formulae. This is an 
empirical work only as an illustration of how to implement the indicators of intergenerational 
redistribution effects. In these four hypotheses the standards of quality, durability and stability of 
the project do not change, regardless of the management system. The “generational unfairness 
indicator” for the Hypothesis 1 to 3 (GUI=12%) confirms that some generations (annual 
generations from 1 to 4) are paying more than the net benefits they receive from the investments 
in transport infrastructure. However, the GUI for the Hypothesis 4 is particular high since a 36% 
of the annual generations will pay more than they receive from the investment. The value of the 
“Trend&Slope” for the set of Hypothesis (+79<T&S<+69g) further indicates that transport 
infrastructure projects tend to benefit future generations (certainly overlapped) within the project 
timespan. 
The Government of Andalusia opted for a PPP system (concession) to carry out the investment. 
The application of the IREM model to the case has shown that the redistributive effects across 
generations do not seem important (IRESI=0.05) with the adopted financing solution. Other 
formulae could, however, imply more substantial intergenerational effects and require a 
particular attention from the decision-maker. 
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SECTION IV. INTERGENERATIONAL PERCEPTION OF THE UTILITY  
OF MAJOR TRANSPORT PROJECTS  
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Abstract 
A basic question for the assessment of the fairness of a project financing formula on successive 
generations is to determine what is the most appropriate method to group the affected individuals 
over the years. The generational approach in the “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects 
Model” (IREM) deals with it through the ad-hoc concept of overlapping annual generations. 
This concept requires establishing the number of years (or timespan) included in the generation 
and how to incorporate in it those individuals living in years that are not the central one. To do 
so in a way that reflects the sensitivity of society to the effects of a major transport infrastructure, 
specific surveys with an approach novel have been designed. The outputs from the survey 
carried out in Catalonia show evidences suggesting that discount functions should tend to decline 
at a higher rate in the short term than in the long term. Thus, future impacts of transport 
investments, both future socio-economic net benefits and financial burdens, should be 
considered less important than immediate (present) outcomes in decision-making process. 
Further, there are reasons to consider that discounting is not neutral to reflect the social interest 
of large-scale transport projects for the successive generations involved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding how people perceive, evaluate and undergo the effects of major investments 
should be particularly relevant for decision makers. To a large extent, people’s preferences and 
their support to investment decisions depend, among other factors, on their experiences and 
expectations on the positive and negative outcomes that may result from investments with 
capacity to constraint individuals’ future choices (Lewis, 2001; McLachlan & Gardner, 2004). 
For example, when dealing with major investments enhancing mobility in congested areas, the 
well-known benefits (travel time savings, environmental positive impacts from reduction in 
pollution, etc.) that are immediately perceived are frequently more important for individuals that 
the costs and benefits that are uncertain, delayed or that might occur to others elsewhere (Gatting 
& Hendricks, 2007). 
The financial structuring of the investments that the society “of each moment” requires is also of 
great importance. At the macroeconomic level, disposing of money to pay for the construction of 
an infrastructure project will affect public accounts and divert funds from other potential uses. At 
the microeconomic level, the financial structure determines who will end up paying for the 
investment. As this structure typically adjourns actual payments through credit facilities, it 
affects future cash flows and, as a consequence, it has intergenerational impacts. These impacts 
can be assessed through a model that compares the allocation of net socioeconomic benefits over 
time with the flows of obligations (in terms of payments) arising from the financing formula. 
The effects that are identified using the Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model or IREM 
(Penyalver & Turró, 2017) may have strong impacts on the social welfare of generations to come 
and should thus be considered in the decision-making process. 
The paper explains the process followed to identify the perception of the citizens on the effects 
on the welfare of their generation and on future ones of major investments in infrastructure. This 
perception is essential for the definition of the concept of “annual generation”, which is critical 
for the IREM. The paper explains the issues that led to the development of IREM and the use of 
a specific survey to determine some key parameters of the model. Surveys are essential for 
gathering data in the applied social sciences (Groves et al., 2009). In this case it was necessary to 
place the respondent in a forthcoming situation to obtain her appreciation of the impact of major 
transport infrastructure projects on someone living in the future. The work represents a first step 
into the incorporation, with a degree of objectivity, of the redistribution effects of such 
infrastructure projects on the multiple generations affected. 
 
2. THE INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF MAJOR PROJECTS 
The decision-making process for major infrastructure projects focuses on selecting those that 
represent the best use of resources for society. Feasibility studies are expected to estimate the 
socioeconomic profitability of a project, which is the key indicator of its efficiency. This 
profitability is calculated using classical economic models 1 , which assume that a single 
theoretical welfare-function can adequately represent the preferences of the different 
(overlapped) generations bearing the costs and the benefits of an investment. The balance 
between these costs and benefits is referred to the moment of the analysis through discounting. 
Properly applied, discounting is useful to establish how much future benefits and costs are worth 
today (static perspective). In essence, the future utility of an infrastructure investment is assumed 
                                                   
1 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the microeconomic model traditionally used to measure efficiency for major 
infrastructure projects. The main outcome from CBA is the Economic Net Present Value (ENPV), which is limited 
to the costs and benefits that can be monetised and entails using a suitable social discount rate (SDR). 
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to be the additional social welfare generated during the project lifecycle, measured through the 
economic net present value (ENPV). 
A critical point in the discussion about the assessment of the long-term effects of certain 
investments in civil infrastructure projects, such as nuclear plants, which have obvious impacts 
on future generations, is whether the method of discounting and/or the value of the social 
discount rate in Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) lead to the right conclusions in terms of efficiency 
for all the people affected over the project life. Discounting methods of long-term effects are 
problematic because some people’s values and preferences are treated differently because they 
live at different times (Lee & Ellingwood, 2015). In the discussions on discounting the concept 
of intergenerational redistributive effects is, nonetheless, absent in spite of the clear differential 
impacts across generations of certain long-run effects (e.g. climate change) of major investments 
with long timespans (50, 100 or more years).  
Properly placing the project effects over time is essential for ENPV calculations. This requires 
estimating the preferences of the affected individuals. Preferences may be analysed with 
standard methods when framed in relatively short-term time horizons and within an 
intragenerational context. Integrated investment programmes and major infrastructure projects 
must be placed, however, in an intergenerational context, which addresses extremely long-term 
horizons and the impacts on and preferences of unborn generations (EPA, 2016). The distinction 
between both contexts is important to establish whether the method of discounting is suitable to 
adequately represent the impacts of major projects and, if so, which social rate of time 
preference should be used in each case (Groom et al., 2005). The conflicts between 
intragenerational and intergenerational effects are often set up under the perspective of the 
sustainable use of natural resources. It can be argued, though, that the redistribution effects 
across generations should go beyond this and also consider a fair split of economic and financial 
impacts.  
The consideration of intergenerational effects on decision making –in principle through a kind of 
multicriteria analysis– is more justified when dealing with major infrastructure investments2, as 
they mobilise huge amounts of economic resources, are prone to complex financial structures, 
including public-private partnerships (PPPs), and have very long project cycles. In this type of 
investments, the government promoting the investment (GPI) may use a wide range of 
management systems and funding options to develop the project3. These options will determine 
the relationship between the net socioeconomic benefits during the operation of the project and 
the actual end-of-the-line payments for its construction. To help understanding the issue, it is 
worth to imagine a situation where the whole investment is financed by the GPI through a bullet 
loan4. Those individuals belonging to the generations at the end of the loan cycle would end up 
bearing most of the financial costs, unless they are able to refinance the loan5, whilst their net 
benefits in terms of resources would probably be even less than average due to congestion, 
poorer performance, etc., and very uncertain besides. The particular aspects of transport 
infrastructure investments are therefore most adequate to analyse intergenerational effects. 
                                                   
2 The IREM model used in the research has been applied essentially to transport infrastructure projects. 
3 The GPI may fund the investment directly through its annual budget or using bank loans (that will be repaid using 
budget funds), or may decide to delegate the management of the project to a public Agency or Company. The GPI 
may also decide developing the project by means of a public-private partnership, including a pure concession. A key 
issue is how users will pay for the use of the infrastructure. 
4 It is a loan where the repayment of the entire principal, sometimes even the principal and interest, is due at the end 
of the loan term. 
5 In any case the burden of refinancing will fall upon them. 
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IREM has been specifically developed to analyse whether there exists a balanced distribution 
between the socioeconomic net benefits and the financial burden over time for the different 
overlapping generations concerned by the project. IREM’s outputs should only be analysed, 
however, in terms of fairness/unfairness6. Efficiency is, in principle, assessed from the CBA, 
using an adequate social discount rate (SDR). But overall efficiency does not take into account 
how the project is financed (as financial cash-flows are essentially transfers that are not affecting 
the Cost-Benefit Analysis or CBA, although they are often used to value resources). The 
intergenerational analysis is complementary to the CBA and provides a view of the fairness of 
the actual financial payments for the project across the various generations affected. This 
analysis requires both defining a “generation” and an ad-hoc utility function that reflects the 
economic preferences of this generation. This estimation process is the object of this paper. 
 
3. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
A main challenge in the elaboration of the IREM model was incorporating how citizens perceive 
their integration in a particular generation when it is concerned by an infrastructure project with 
a very long time projection and how citizens, placed within their own generation, apprehend the 
effects of such a project both in terms of its benefits and the predisposition to pay for them. 
Conventional surveys place the respondent in the present or in well-defined future contexts. In 
our case it was necessary both to place the respondent in a complex future situation and as part 
of a group of people who would be affected by the project over time. This required a new 
approach in the preparation of the questionnaire and in the quantification process. The 
cooperation between psychologists and project specialists (engineers, economists, financiers) 
was essential to prepare the questionnaires and to analyse the outcomes of the survey. The results 
of this research show the importance of a multi-disciplinary approach in developing tools for 
project appraisal. 
This paper focuses on the work carried out to: 1) establish the most suitable timespan to properly 
represent a generation in the IREM, and 2) define a utility function that represents society’s 
preferences within each generation according to the main features and effects of major 
infrastructure projects. After these introductory chapters, Section 4 reviews the main features of 
the utility functions characterising the collective preferences in the allocation of consumption 
across generations7 in the traditional economic approach. Section 5 contains a brief presentation 
of the generational concept used in the IREM model to assess the fairness of a project financing 
formula on successive generations. Section 6 presents the methodology followed for designing 
and conducting the survey carried out in Catalonia to estimate the parameters of the model in a 
real context and its main findings. Here, the parameters that define a generation linked to major 
transport projects are introduced. Finally, in Section 7, the main conclusions of the research are 
highlighted. 
 
 
 
                                                   
6 The “fair/unfair” concept refers to moral obligations towards future generations (Rawls, 1972). It is considered that 
human cooperation is possible and necessary for coexisting individuals on a specific territory, but also across 
territories and across individuals living in different time spans (generations). 
7 Traditional macroeconomic approach assumes implicitly that the generational concept has a genealogical meaning. 
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4. INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE MODELS REVIEW 
The discounting mechanism and the SDR are critical in determining the social value of major 
investments in infrastructure. They both make up the function that in CBA transforms future 
costs and benefits into an ENPV for the generation in which the decision is taken. ENPV is a key 
indicator of the project’s efficiency from the perspective of the overall society of the time of the 
decision to build8. SDR, on the other hand, explains how decision makers perceive the 
propensity of present generations to renounce to immediate consumption in order to have the 
possibility to consume more in the future and thus an indication of how public resources are used 
to maximise the welfare of the citizens affected by the investment over its project cycle.  
The theoretical framework of the SDR comes from the Ramsey Model (Ramsey, 1928). Social 
welfare can be conceptualised through a function (Wt) representing its dynamic of change that, in 
turn, is represented by the intertemporal sum of the utility that a person obtains from individual 
consumption. 
Equation IV-1. Dynamic Social Welfare Function 𝑊 = 𝑊! · 𝑒!!"𝑑𝑡!!   
 
∼  Wt = U(Ct) Value of welfare on each “t” period in terms of utility from individual consumption 
∼  r = loge(1+i); Continuously rate of discount/interest (Samuelson, 1937) 
∼  i Rate of discount/interest per unit of time 
Graphically, it is possible to build up a preference function from the concept of indifference 
curve introduced by Irving Fisher (cf. Figure IV-1).  
Figure IV-1. Optimum inter-temporal choice scheme 
 
Source: adaptation from Feldstein (1964)  
The X axis represents the individuals’ consumption in year 1 from the available annual budget. 
The Y axis represents the amount saved for future consumption in year 2. The line CG represents 
the consumer’s possible use of the budget for year 1. Its slope m is frequently referred as the 
Consumption Rate of Interest (CRI); CRI=−(m+1).  
                                                   
8 The time when the project is formally given the go-ahead (Flyvbjerg, 2005). When this date is not available or 
representative, the date of project approval by the main financiers can be adopted as the time of decision. 
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For a particular income level the indifference curve ‘Ui’ represents the relationship between two 
amounts of different goods that entail the same satisfaction degree for consumers (Fisher, 1930). 
The more income the higher ability to obtain goods, and thus the curve moves from U1 to U2, 
U3… For an investment, the question of interest is to determine how much consumption in the 
present will become consumption in a second period of time taking into account its expected 
utility. Curve CH shows the real opportunities of transforming present consumption into future 
consumption through investment. Its slope represents the social productivity of investment for 
society as a whole, which is expressed through the internal rate of return of the capital invested. 
The marginal efficiency of capital between two consecutive years decreases with the investment 
amount. Assuming U(Ct) is time invariant, its first derivate is U’>0 and U”≤ 0, and CRI is 
defined as the rate at which the marginal welfare of consumption falls over time: 
Equation IV-2. Consumption Rate of Interest  𝐶𝑅𝐼 = − (𝑑𝑊!"/𝑑𝑡)𝑊!"  
∼  Wct Welfare effect of a marginal increase in the consumption in period t 
A multitude of factors could have influence on the value of CRI. On the one hand, individuals 
may consider that the consumption satisfying present needs is more useful that the same 
consumption in a period afterwards (decreasing marginal utility of consumption), which can be 
explained by a question of impatience or immediacy (Pigou, 1920; Ramsey, 1928; Harrod, 1948) 
and certain aversion to the risk involved in postponing consumption (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1970). 
Some individuals could even take into account their own probability of death at the moment of 
making decisions about consumption/saving (Angelsen, 1991). In sum, although pure time 
preference is heterogeneous among the agents within an economy (Gollier & Zeckhauser, 2003), 
the former arguments justify considering time consumption preferences at the moment of 
establishing the value for SDR (Tinbergen, 1956; Eckstein, 1961; Scott, 1977; Scott, 1989). 
According to the Ramsey Rule, SDR encompasses society’s pure-consumption preferences 
(social value) and other factors related to the social productivity of collective investments for 
society (opportunity cost for society or social cost). 
Equation IV-3. Ramsey Rule 𝑟 = 𝜌 + 𝜃𝑔 =  𝛿  
∼  g Growth rate of consumption. As it is expected some economic growth over time, it 
is assumed that g>0. 
∼  𝜃 Elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (marginal utility of consumption): it is a 
measure of the curvature of the utility function, and is mathematically equivalent to 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion; 𝜃 = − !"! 𝐶! . 𝜃>0. High “𝜃” implies a 
strong preference for consumption now rather than in future periods. If 𝜃=0, the 
welfare increase of one monetary-unit extra income to the consumer is the same 
regardless of his initial consumption. 
∼  𝜌 Rate of time preference of consumption; 𝜌 > 0 implies that individuals prefer early 
consumption to later consumption, even if the consumption level is the same. 
Equation IV-3 shows the relationship between the social rate of time preference (𝛿), the “utility 
discount rate” or rate of pure time preference (𝜌), and the social rate of return to investment (r), 
which matches with the private return to investment (i) in absence of externalities and other 
distortions (Groom et al., 2005). Each of these rates is a contender for use as the SDR, where the 
appropriate discount rate for use in CBA depends upon the numeraire employed (Groom et al., 
2005).  
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Combining factors g and 𝜌 it is possible to obtain different values for SDR. As shown in Table 
IV-1, with positive growth and concave utility the SDR will be positive. In this case, discounting 
consumption streams in CBA can be synonymous with the equal treatment of generations’ 
welfare (Lind, 1995).  
Table IV-1. Different cases for the function of discount rate 
 𝜌 > 0 𝜌 = 0 
 [1] 𝜃𝑔 > 0 CRI > 0 CRI > 0 
 [2] 𝜃𝑔 = 0 CRI > 0 CRI = 0 
 [3] 𝜃𝑔 < 0 ? CRI < 0 
Source: adaptation from Angelsen (1991) 
Positive values for SDR do not imply 𝜌>0, which means that the individuals’ pure time-
preference might or not vary over time. Actually, if the marginal utility rate of consumption (g) 
is not regressive for individuals, the future effects will be less important than those at the 
moment of the analysis, independently of the consumer’s time preferences. On the other hand, if 𝜌  >g or 𝜌~0 , individuals could prefer immediate consumption and have therefore lower 
propensity to save, which from a collective perspective can lead to postpone investments and to 
reduce the flow of benefits for future generations. This collective behaviour would imply a 
negative impact on future generations (Olson & Bailey, 1981; Moellendorf, 2014). Finally, as 𝜃 
represents preferences for smoothing consumption over time, high values of 𝜃  would be 
correlated to (comparatively) small ones for the marginal utility rate of consumption (g) and vice 
versa (Dasgupta, 2007).  
In conclusion, from a theoretical perspective, the SDR value should reflect both society’s 
preference for present consumption rather than future one (social value approach) and the yield 
that could be obtained from the economic resources spent in a project in the best alternative 
investment (social cost approach). However, both values for the SDR could be quite different 
(Feldstein, 1964; Arrow & Kurz, 1970; Angelsen, 1991; Laibson, 1997; Souto, 2003; Arrow et 
al., 2004; Moore et al., 2004; Roumboutsos, 2010; Fernández-Baca, 2011; Gollier, 2011). 
In the first approach, the discounting method transforming future socioeconomic costs and 
benefits into present values does not have to adopt necessarily a constant discount rate. In the 
social cost approach, the opportunity cost for society is associated to the private return to 
investment (i), reflecting the perception of the average member of society, which undoubtedly 
has a more or less conscious relation with the financial interest rates. In this approach, to 
estimate the SDR for CBA it is assumed that resources can be distributed through generations, 
through investments in infrastructure assets having maturities limited to 30-40 years being 
financed by mechanisms that meet the requirements of financial markets (Lee & Ellingwood, 
2015). But there are multiple funding sources of capital and a variety of financing instruments 
(bonds, loans, tailored facilities, etc.), different risk perceptions, a volatile money supply, etc. 
that imply, not only a broad range of interest rates for long-term assignment of money, but strong 
variations in these rates in the capital markets over the years. In any case, the rate of return for 
private capital is hardly representative of the social values that the SDR implies. Financial 
markets focus on maximising private benefits, keep a clear general risk aversion and show an 
opportunistic behaviour9 (von Hagen et al., 2011), and their expectations seem to have little 
correlation with society’s willingness to delay consumption.  
                                                   
9 It is obvious when observing bond yield spreads in the various EU countries during the financial crisis 
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On the social value approach the estimation problems are also overwhelming, because it is 
practically impossible to estimate the return of the great number of opportunities foregone, 
which depend on the sector, investment amounts, etc. The solution adopted by most 
administrations is to take into consideration both aspects (social value and social cost) and adapt 
the rate of return to private capital, whatever the means to calculate it, through a “shadow value” 
(Feldstein, 1964).  
Thus, it is not possible to speak of a single ‘appropriate’ discount rate but of an efficient discount 
rate10. This rate should (ideally) reflect both the social value and the social opportunity cost of 
project development but, in practice, the choice of the “appropriate” SDR for a given project or 
project sector has been defined by the public administrations in order to achieve certain policy 
objectives (Henderson & Bateman, 1995; HM Treasury, 2003; Evans & Sezer, 2004; Leleur et 
al., 2007; Meunier et al., 2013).  
The decision on the SDR value to be used is critical in determining which projects will pass a 
CBA test. The potential influence of the SDR in long-term investments, with benefits and cost 
accruing over several generations, is particularly strong because even small changes in the 
discount rate have a significant impact on the indicators supporting decision-making (Lee & 
Ellingwood, 2015). Following the rational choice theory, discounting methods usually employ an 
exponential discount function (Laibson, 1997; Coleman & Fararo, 1992; Frederick et al., 2002; 
Gollier et al., 2008). Under the usual SDRs, the costs and benefits accruing to generations in the 
distant future appear relatively unimportant in present values terms.  
In formal discounting models it is assumed that consumer’s welfare can be represented as a 
discounted sum of current and future utility (cf. Equation IV-4). Thus, that utility can be referred 
to as consumption or income (Samuelson, 1937; Arrow & Kurz, 1970; Arrow et al., 1995; 
Laibson, 1997; Gollier, 2011; Arrow et al., 2014; Freeman et al., 2015).  
 
Equation IV-4. Ramsey’s generalised discounted model (Laibson, 2003) 
𝑊 ≡ 𝑈! = 𝐷(𝜏) · 𝑢!!!!!!!!!  
 
∼  Ut Total utility from the perspective of the current period (year) “t” 
∼  𝐷(𝜏) Adaptation to year 0 of the welfare of the consumer occurring at time “𝜏”; sometimes called 
objective utility function or “discount function”. The higher the discount rate11 the greater the 
preference for immediate benefits over delayed rewards. 
∼  𝜏 ≡ ∆𝑡  Time period used to discount the utility series until the horizon year at the frequency “∆”. 
∼  T The last period considered (for example, the last year in the lifecycle of an investment) 
∼  𝑢!!! Utility of consumption in period “𝑡 + 𝜏”, sometimes referred to as instantaneous utility or felicity 
                                                   
10 The efficient discount rate can be estimated in three different ways: as the continuously changing rate of interest 
from financial markets, as the marginal rate of return on productive capital in the economy, and as the welfare-
preserving rate of return on savings (Gollier, 2011). The rate to be obtained from reinvestment of returns and the 
risk differences between private and public investments have also been considered determinants of the socially 
efficient discount rate (Baumol, 1968). Even if we were able to estimate these values, it seems evident that we 
cannot speak of a single appropriate discount rate (Stiglitz, 2013).  
11 It is not, however, the discount rate used by economists to discount future cash flows, although there is a link 
between both. 
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In Equation IV-4, the total utility (Ut) is an additive function. The benefits obtained of immediate 
consumption have no effect on the utility of the benefits obtained afterwards. Otherwise, 
incongruence from time inconsistency results in consumption and saving plans that are sub-
optimal for all generations (Weitzman, 1998). Whilst it is assumed that the consumers’ 
preferences do not change over time, granting the property of time consistency, discounting 
utility at a constant rate (𝜌) insures that the mechanisms that constitute the basis of decision-
making are also time consistent (cf. Equation IV-5). This assumption known as time consistency 
or dynamic consistency allows isolating time 0 and time t in the welfare-preserving discount rate 
evaluation: in time t=0, preference reaches its maximum D(0)=1. For t>0, the discount function 
slopes down as time increases, D’(t)≤0. Therefore, 1 = D(0) ≥ D(t) ≥ D’(t) ≥0, with ??(t)=−D’(t)/D(t) being the rate at which the discount function declines. 
 
Equation IV-5. General expression of the exponential discount function (Laibson, 2003)  
𝐷 𝑡 = lim!→! 11 + 𝛥 · 𝜌(𝑡) ! ! = 𝑒!!(!) = 𝛿! 
A second body of research argues, however, that choice behaviour is largely inconsistent (Little, 
2002). For some authors, discounting utility appears ‘ethically indefensible’, ‘rapacious’ and 
‘defective’ from an intergenerational perspective, in spite that, under certain conditions 
(context), it can be useful to reflect how society’s time preferences decline (Ramsey, 1928; 
Harrod, 1948; Freeman & Groom, 2014). Since economists’ conclusions about economic welfare 
incorporate consumers’ behaviour in a timeless manner (Little, 2002), «decisions made today on 
the basis of CBA appear hence to tyrannise future generations and, by extension, discounting 
appears to be contrary to the widely supported goal of sustainability» (Arrow et al., 2013). This 
occurs because, on the one hand, time preferences vary due to uncertainty and to other 
contextual factors, such as price fluctuation of goods and services (Coleman & Fararo, 1992; 
Frederick et al., 2002; Groom et al., 2005; Gollier et al., 2008; Arrow et al., 2013; Arrow et al., 
2014; Freeman et al., 2015) and, on the other hand, market prices do not exist for many of the 
determinants of utility such as environmental assets. In this sense, the theoretical framework for 
intertemporal choices modelling resembles the one used in business, which applies a compound 
interest formula, and does not adequately reflect the collective preferences over time (Frederick 
et al., 2002).  
Research shows that individuals prefer a smaller but earlier reward than a larger reward coming 
later in time (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995). According to this, the SDR over longer time horizons 
should be lower than over shorter ones (Frederick et al., 2002), implying that costs and benefits 
should be discounted at higher rates in the short run than in the long run (Frederick et al., 2002; 
Laibson, 2003; Soman et al., 2005; Arrow et al., 2014). 
A recently proposed solution to estimate discount rates for the very long-term, which is the case 
of investments encompassing very large timespans whose costs and benefits entail high degrees 
of uncertainty (e.g., high speed railway networks development, nuclear power, etc.), is to use a 
declining discount rate (DDR) according to some predetermined trajectory. There is no 
consensus, however, on how to apply this solution. On the one hand, declining utility discount 
rates may produce time inconsistent planning (Groom et al., 2005). Whilst dynamic 
inconsistency, i.e. violating the assumption of time consistency, has been successful to explain 
some phenomena in the behavioural economic literature, e.g. procrastination and addition (Harris 
& Laibson, 2001), the welfare measured in terms of the utility for society cannot be maximised 
in a process where the discount rate changes as time moves on (Groom et al., 2005). On the other 
hand, in a declining model the rate of decline usually adopts hyperbolas and quasi-hyperbolic 
functions (Herrnstein, 1961; Mazur, 1987; Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) showing 
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much higher discount rates in the short-term than in the long-term, when they remain relatively 
constant. Therefore, to determine the schedule of DDRs it is necessary to make some 
assumptions concerning the point in time at which uncertainty concerning the discount rate 
begins (Weitzman, 1998) as well as to calibrate the trajectory that a DDR has to follow from this 
point (Newell & & Pizer, 2003; Groom et al., 2005). 
What is more widely agreed is an arbitrage between exponential discounting and declining 
discounting through an equivalent SDR, although it appears more useful as a way of determining 
the maximum ENPV of investments rather to compare different alternatives to solve the same 
problem (Weitzman, 1998; Groom et al., 2005; Lowe, 2008; Freeman & Groom, 2014; Freeman 
et al., 2015). The use of an equivalent SDR is especially adequate where the effects under 
examination are very long-term and involve very substantial and, for practical purposes, 
irreversible wealth transfers between different genealogical generations (Lowe, 2008). 
In short, there exist different approaches to determine the social value of major investments in 
infrastructure. They focus on optimising the discounting process to offer “present” decision-
makers the most suited value of SDR. According to the time consistency approach, exponential 
discounting through a constant SDR may be appropriate to determine with rigour the maximum 
utility of project decisions in the short run (Lind, 1990). For long-term investments, declining 
discounting by using a DDR or an equivalent SDR is an option that allows taking into account 
collective preferences over time more adequately (Henderson & Bateman, 1995). However, 
whilst this approach can be optimal for the current GPI, it can result in a sub-optimal (time-
inconsistent) use of public resources from the perspective of successive governments (Barro, 
1999; Karp & Lee, 2003). 
From the former considerations it can be argued that current discount models are not properly 
analysing the impact of investments implying large timespans and affecting different 
generations. The simple aggregate of benefits and costs does not offer information about the 
resulting redistribution of wealth (Bradford, 1997) and, in particular, across the generations 
affected by the project. Discounting and SDR are useful in CBA to determine the most efficiency 
alternative for a project from a static present-time perspective, but they appear inadequate to 
incorporate the interests of future generations, which will undoubtedly be affected by the impacts 
that present investments in transport infrastructure will have on their welfare.  
 
5. THE GENERATION CONCEPT IN THE IREM MODEL 
Investment projects are typically analysed through a socioeconomic CBA that considers the use 
of resources, so they are assigned to the period (year) when they are consumed (costs) and 
generated (benefits). On the other hand, the financial analysis looks at the expected cash flows 
and at the money inputs and outputs of the various stakeholders, among them the users of the 
project if they are directly contributing to its financing. The objective is to make sure that 
funding is available for the implementation of the project and that no major stakeholder will be 
the subject of financial failure as a consequence of the investment; to ensure financial 
sustainability. In general, these two analyses are carried out separately and are often improperly 
mingled.  
The welfare considerations, as already mentioned, are made from the perspective of the present 
generation, but even though the investment resources, such as those used in the construction of 
the infrastructure, are “lost” by the society in place during the implementation, the actual effects 
on people’s welfare are mostly perceived when they have to pay for these resources either 
through user charges or through taxes. So, when analysing the fairness of the distribution of 
Section IV. Intergenerational perception of the utility of major transport projects 
 
Penyalver, D. (2019) - 71 - 
 
actual costs and benefits (welfare) across the generations affected by the project, it is necessary 
to look on the one hand at the net benefits in terms of resources during the relevant period and 
the amounts paid during this period for the use of the project (tariffs, tolls, etc.) and as a 
contribution to its financing, which clearly depends on the funding mechanism applied, in 
particular the distribution of the public budget used to pay for the investment directly or through 
loans.  
In practice the budget payments for public investments (or private investments requiring public 
subsidies) are embedded in the public accounts and this is probably why the issue of the fairness 
of intergenerational distribution has been somehow absorbed by the major problem of the long-
term effects of public debt. However, when decisions must be taken at project level, the effects 
of the funding mechanism on intergenerational fairness seem relevant. To make a proper 
assessment of these effects across the generations it is necessary to compare the net benefits 
arising for each of them with the actual payments they make in relation to the project either as 
users and/or taxpayers. IREM provides a suitable approach to deal with the incorporation of this 
critical aspect for major infrastructure investments which has not been properly addressed until 
now.  
IREM is a new tool that is useful for decision makers looking for a more balanced distribution 
between the net socioeconomic benefits and the financial burden stemming from long-term 
projects affecting multiple (overlapped) generations. In the transport sector, the economic 
lifespan of major infrastructure projects is very long (20, 30, 40… years), but properly 
maintained these types of infrastructures may last indefinitely. A well-designed financing 
formula, besides ensuring the project’s financial sustainability, should arguably ensure 
intergenerational equity. The IREM model offers a way to analyse the impacts on overlapping 
generations, meaning the various groups of people, centred around a specific year, that will be 
affected by the project. The people included in a generation will not change very much in 
relation to the prior or the next one, as not many people enter or leave society in a year, but after 
many years the component of a generation will be sensibly different (ISR, 2017).  
In this model, the gap between the central year of overlapping generations in of one 
year. Accordingly, intergenerational redistributive effects are those occurring between annual 
generations. The main difference between this generational approach and the one used in most 
scientific papers consists on the meaning of what a generation is12. Typical assumptions for the 
generational concept (and, by extent, the concept of “intergenerational”) in macroeconomic 
models imply a genealogical meaning without a clear definition of its timespan and, on the other 
hand, genealogical generations essentially do not overlap. A clear definition is also absent in 
microeconomic studies, and in studies that aim to assess the implicit distribution in the CBA of 
the intergenerational preferences of society. However, the concept of overlapping annual 
generations has an ad-hoc meaning in IREM, including a central year and a timespan.  
In the IREM, the concept of annual generation (AGi) refers to a generation pivoting around a 
year, i, of the project’s lifecycle, which incorporates, besides the “society” of year i, those of  
some previous years and those of some of the successive years. As explained before, the non-
central “societies” do not have the same members and those who stay as members of the 
generation have a decreasing interest the farthest they are from the year in which they are 
observing the project13. This explains the use in the model of a theoretical bell-shaped curve to 
represent the weighted sum of the utilities of a transport project for the society belonging to any 
given annual generation (cf. Figure IV-2). 
                                                   
12 For more details and references see Penyalver & Turró (2017). 
13 It is essentially the same argument that justifies the use of the SDR. 
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Indeed, considering year i as the pivotal moment associated to an annual generation, individuals 
living in that year can assess the value of the benefits and costs, but only part of the effects 
occurring in preceding or following years. Moreover, although most individuals in year i have 
already been affected by the project in previous years and they will probably continue to be 
affected in the future, they are less numerous and subject to more uncertainties as they find 
themselves farthest from the pivotal year.  
Figure IV-2. Conceptual curve of an annual generation in the IREM model  
 
Source: Penyalver & Turró, 2017  
Figure IV-2 shows that the curve function (onwards, the weighting curve) for an annual 
generation keeps the highest utility of transport infrastructure projects in the short-term for 
society living in the present (central) year in comparison to the long-term. From this pivotal year 
(i), the weighting curve for the years included in the generation slopes down on both sides. 
Because the economic preferences of the agents in the generation reach, logically, their 
maximum in the central year.  
Figure IV-3. Generational assessment of the inter-annual differences between costs and benefits 
 
Source: Penyalver & Turró, 2017 
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Taking as time reference the moment of decision to build, the intergenerational impact analysis 
in IREM is performed from the perspective of a “present in motion” where the investment has 
not been happened yet. It is assumed that only individuals living in the central years of the future 
generations affected will really know what finally occurred, so risk perception should be similar 
for both current decision-makers and future generations concerned by its impacts (cf. Figure IV-
3). 
Finally, a critical difference of the IREM with other economic approaches is that the function 
represented by the weighting curve includes, for each year within an annual generation, both past 
and future project-related effects. 
 
6. ASSESSMENT OF THE POPULATION’S TIME PREFERENCES 
A major aspect of the research was to define a theoretical function for the weighting curve in the 
IREM. Conducting an ad-hoc survey was considered the best way to design a representative 
function. It was designed with the purpose of determining the importance of major transport 
infrastructure projects for individuals living in a specific year and how they would appreciate 
them when they saw them far from the central year in which they were living. In a hypothetical 
scenario given to respondents, this importance was reduced the further they were placed from the 
central year of the annual generation. The resulting weighting curve was expected to represent 
people’s perceptions and preferences related to the relevance of past and future project-related 
effects in their present welfare.  
Survey research is one of the most important sources of gathering data in the applied social 
sciences (Groves et al., 2009). When survey questions have high reliability, they allow to 
measure opinions, attitudes and behaviours (Alwin, 2007). Nevertheless, measurement error is 
an inherent component of survey research, and survey questions are imperfect representations of 
the concepts they intent to measure (Biemer et al., 2011). In our case, the development of the 
measurement instrument (questionnaire) was based on current best practices in survey research. 
In order to minimise measurement error properly, it was followed a three-step procedure to 
design survey questions (Saris & Gallhofer, 2014). In the first step, the concepts to be measured 
were defined in detail. In the second step, specific statements derived directly from the concepts 
were developed. In the third step, all the elements that the questions should have were included 
in the statement; for instance, contextual clues, and, finally, they were transformed into survey 
items. The first survey item included an introduction with explanations about the hypothetical 
infrastructure investment and related definitions, the question stem, a numeric response scale and 
a visual aid for an online survey which included a map pointing out the places affected by the 
new infrastructure. 
The questionnaire was developed with the idea to be administered in an online access panel. 
Both the infrastructures of reference and the members of the panel were located in Catalonia. 
Respondents were asked to choose the language of the survey between Catalan and Spanish. It 
was divided into five blocks and each block had an introduction. In the first block, the survey 
was presented with a short description of its purpose. The second block described two highway 
infrastructure projects (the “Eix Transversal” and the “Forth Ring Road”). The third block 
included questions that represented control variables to detect differences in the profiles of 
respondents, e.g. questions related to mobility behaviour. The fourth block introduced an 
explanation to aid the respondent answering questions about their preferences over the transport 
infrastructure projects. Finally, in the fifth block, the concepts of interest were asked. 
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The survey was administered through the NetQuest commercial online access panel in February 
2016. Participants in the panel are recruited by invitation. As they participate regularly in the 
panel, their socio-demographic information for quota sampling is already known. The sample for 
this survey consisted of individuals over 18 years old living in the four provinces of Catalonia 
(Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona). They were randomly selected based on demographic 
quotas that mirror the characteristics of the population. Upon full completion of the survey, 
respondents received points that give access to gifts. The total number of completed interviews 
was 208. The data was analysed to define the time span of an annual generation and to establish 
the weights for a theoretical weighting curve. Analyses were conducted using R Studio Version 
0.99.893 (RStudio Team 2015) user’s interface for R statistical environment (@R Version). 
The generation concept was incorporated in the survey by means of a question relating both to 
the respondents' economic behaviour and their perception on how society should repay the 
investment (onwards, control question). This question confirmed whether respondents 
understood the concept of generation or not: 
 
«Now, imagine that the third lane of the C25 motorway project is open in 2020: Which one 
of the following groups of people should bear the largest part of the public expenditure 
that this investment entails?» 
A. People living in Catalonia when the project’s construction starts (before 2020). 
B. People who will live in Catalonia from 2020 on, after the project is commissioned. 
C. People living in Catalonia during and after the project’s construction. 
D. People living in Catalonia before, during and after the project’s construction. 
In order to estimate the time span of a transport infrastructure investment, the survey presented a 
vignette describing a hypothetical investment that consisted in adding the third lane in an already 
existing motorway (Eix Transversal of Catalonia C-25). Respondents were given a detailed 
description of the project including a map. The project would be implemented from 2016 and 
would be commissioned in 2020. In this hypothetical situation, respondents were public officers, 
responsible of deciding which was the most suitable time span to finance the investment (a 
number from 0 to 100 years). The question, translated into English, was as follows: 
 
«For how long, do you think, the Catalan Government should spend public money from its 
annual budget in this investment?» 
This question was used to establish a time span that allowed estimating the yearly importance 
weights in the annual generation. Following the results of the survey’s pre-test phase, the 
investment’s time span in the questionnaire was fixed in nine-years. Pretesting results indicated 
that an odd number better reflected a generation centred around the commissioning year of 
project. It also showed that a generation covering a slightly longer period that the first one 
proposed (7 years) would be better adapted to represent everyone’s perceptions. Next, 
respondents were asked to imagine they were in 2020. Taking this year as a reference, they rated 
on a score from 0 to 10 points the importance of the infrastructure project’s effects over time, in 
comparison to the value they assigned to  the central year (2020). 
The participants in the survey were asked to rate first the central year (2020). Then, they could 
rate the importance of the project's impact in pairs of years (2019-2021, 2018-2022, 2017-2023 
and 2016-2024). This provided them with the stimuli to understand that they could rate the social 
impact of the project in a different way depending if the year they rated preceded or followed the 
opening of the motorway extension. The aim of presenting a project that would expand an 
existing motorway was to make respondents aware that infrastructure investments convey 
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potential social effects and to make them familiar with the rating mechanism. This facilitated the 
repetition of the exercise presenting a second scenario, a new motorway in the public agenda of 
Catalonia, the “Forth Ring Road” (B40 motorway) that has been discussed for a very long time. 
As the IREM is expected to be used in decision-making processes of infrastructure investments, 
this case presented an illustration of its potential use in a real situation.  
Despite following best practices in survey research to develop the survey measures used for this 
case, answering about hypothetical scenarios may be a difficult task for some respondents. 
Actually, it should not be excluded the possibility that respondents rated the importance of the 
project’s impact considering their present situation, not a future one. However, research suggests 
that judging concrete scenarios, even if hypothetical, can be closer to judging real daily life 
events (Alexander & Becker, 1978; Beck & Opp, 2001). Therefore, by presenting very concrete 
scenarios, respondents in the survey were able to form an opinion on the subject under 
investigation. Results presented below show high variability in the data when sub-samples of 
different socio-demographic characteristics were analysed, being an indication that different 
profiles of respondents had indeed a different opinion. 
The first outcome of the survey data analysis was the estimation of the time span. Figure IV-4 
shows that the average value was 8.4 years (sd=10.7), which should be interpreted as the average 
number of years survey respondents thought an infrastructure should be fully paid in14. The long 
tail indicated a large variability on perceptions about how public money should be managed and 
spent. By analysing sub-samples of different age cohorts, different cities classified according to 
their population range, among other indicators, significant differences were found among some 
sub-groups for both, the average time span and its standard deviation. 
 
Figure IV-4. Density trace of the ‘stated timespan’ for the global sample 
 
Source: Author 
The total sample was divided in four groups (A, B, C and D) corresponding to respondents’ 
answer on whom should bear the project’s costs15. Within each sub-sample, similar time span 
values and similar tails for density traces were obtained (Figure IV-5). This indicates that 
citizens’ opinion about public money management differs after controlling for age, sex, place of 
residence, etcetera.  
                                                   
14 Two extreme values both with a timespan = 99 years were dropped from the analysis. 
15 According to the options A~D in the survey, respondents had to decide what generations of taxpayers in Catalonia 
ought to foot the bill of the project: A) taxpayers, during the construction phase; B) taxpayers, from the 
commissioning of the project onwards; C) taxpayers living in Catalonia during and after the construction phase; D) 
the same that C) and, in addition, generations of taxpayers living even before the construction phase. 
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Figure IV-5. Density traces of the ‘stated timespan’ based on the classification of respondent’s opinion 
  
  
Source: Author 
The second part of the survey data analysis aimed at estimating the importance of weights given 
to each year included in an annual generation, AGi. As already mentioned, a time span of 9 years 
was fixed in the questionnaire. Respondents’ scores were transformed to obtain values in a 
standard scale in order to properly compare them. As respondents were asked to rate on a score 
from 0 to 10 each year within a time span of 9 years, the resulting data allowed comparing 
respondents' preferences year-on-year within the time span, but it did not allow statistical 
analysis for the whole sample (because the total amount of points differ for each respondent). 
Therefore, for each respondent, every set of yearly scorings in the time span was divided by the 
maximum score given by the same respondent. In all cases, this maximum corresponded to year 
5, the central year in the questionnaire’s time span. The respondents’ answers were kept out 
when they scored zero at any year in the time span (11.3% respondents in the survey item about 
the B-40 motorway project). Onwards, the set of the resulting valid outputs was referred as 
respondents’ adjusted scoring. 
Next, the focus was set on the correlation of the whole set of socio-demographic control 
variables in the survey with the respondents’ adjusted scoring. Particularly, it was found that the 
“age cohort” and “control question” variables had an important influence in the respondents’ 
scoring. Information about the place of residence, gender, language of the survey, etc. did not 
show significant differences among classes. Moreover, disaggregating to further levels resulted 
in very small sub-samples without statistical power. 
Once identified the main variables conditioning respondents’ outputs, it was possible to 
disaggregate the sample’s yearly scores and to calculate the main statistical indicators in each 
year within the time span. Figure IV-6 shows a low dispersion in the respondents’ adjusted 
scoring obtained for every age cohort, regardless of their response to the control question 
(“control” in the Figure's label). A similar pattern was found for all the years in the timespan (cf. 
Table IV-2). 
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Figure IV-6. Box chart for the respondents’ adjusted scoring in year 5 
 
Source: Author 
The yearly average for the adjusted scoring within the time span of 9 years is a reliable indicator 
of the respondents’ preferences for both the B40 and the C25 motorway projects. As shown in 
Table IV-2, the value of the yearly median and the standard deviation for the average confirmed 
that the yearly average for the respondents' adjusted scoring represents the collective preferences 
in the sample. 
Table IV-2. Yearly-average for the respondents’ adjusted scoring within a timespan of 9 years 
TIMESPAN OF 
 9 YEARS 
AVERAGE FOR THE ADJUSTED SCORING  
year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 year 8 year 9 
Median 6.00 6.70 7.80 8.60 10.0 8.70 8.30 8.55 10.0 
Average 5.62 6.22 6.90 7.54 8.61 7.72 7.41 7.00 6.68 
Standard deviation 4.06 3.63 3.23 3.01 2.44 2.82 3.03 3.47 3.96 
Yearly increment 
(+) /decrement (−) --- +0.62 +0.68 +0.64 +1.07 -0.89 -0.31 -0.39 -0.32 
Source: Author 
By taking into account the trends and patterns represented by the yearly increments or 
decrements in the importance values, it can be analysed how people’s preferences change over 
time. Our results show that from the year of reference (2020) to the future, respondents’ adjusted 
scoring decreases in the short run. Between the year 5 to 6, this decrement is three times bigger 
than in the long run (years 6 to 9). For typical discounting models reflecting consumers’ 
preferences it implies that the SDR should decline at a higher rate in the short term that over 
longer time horizons. This pattern, indicating that consumers’ preferences for major transport 
projects change over time, is actually a major finding of this research because it puts into 
question a basic hypothesis of the rational choice theory. A second conclusion is that, from the 
past to the year of reference, the rate of change in the respondents' adjusted scoring increases 
almost twice at years 4 and 5 (2016 and 2017). This pattern implies that choice behaviour is not 
very consistent over long time horizons.  
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Our findings show that when respondents were asked to take decisions that would affect them 
and the rest of the society they lived in, they still prefer earlier benefits to later ones. The overall 
pattern of responses confirms that individuals care more about consumption effects in their 
welfare in the short term (years around the year of reference) than about benefits before or after 
the reference year. This finding implies that the property of time consistency assumed in 
discounting models does not hold for preferences about investments in transport infrastructure. 
The next step was to determine the most suitable function, F(t), to represent the weighting curve 
in the IREM within the and the corresponding length of a standard annual generation. The results 
of the survey suggest that any curve adapted to the IREM’s definition of annual generation 
should have two different branches. The first one increasing from the past to the pivotal year of 
reference i, and a second one decreasing from this year i to future time units. Most probabilistic 
functions follow this pattern and many of them are non-symmetrical. They can be defined by 
three shape parameters (a, b, c): one that determines that the highest value in the curve occurs for 
the pivotal year of reference (year 5 within the time span of the survey); a second one determines 
this value (in the pivotal year); and, the third one determines the rate of declining for the curve.  
It was estimated the best fitting curve according to the value of the respondents’ adjusted scoring 
for every year and the pattern of increments and decrements described by the survey data. The 
points representing those values were plotted and taken as benchmarks to validate the 
probabilistic curve. The theoretical symmetrical features for the curve considered in the IREM 
(Penyalver & Turró, 2017) were not well adapted to the benchmark intervals resulting from the 
survey, as can be seen in the chart in Figure IV-7. The gradient for the branch from the past to 
the central year of reference should be stronger than the gradient from this pivotal year to the 
future. Therefore, the theoretical model was adjusted empirically in order to adapt it to the best 
fitting curve, exploring several options, among them a Gaussian, a Gumbel and a Weibull 
function.  
After exploring and rejecting Gaussian and Gumbel probability functions to adjust the weighting 
curve F(t) linked to a standard generation16, the Weibull probability function17 appeared as quite 
adequate, given the non-symmetrical attenuation of the yearly weights within a non-determined 
time span and the possibility of adjusting a shorter branch from the past to the pivotal year. To 
find the best fit for the curve, it was took the central year of reference in the time span in the 
survey questions (2020), which corresponded to the year with the maximum in the respondents’ 
adjusted scoring. It was assumed that the pattern of mitigation i.e. the weights’ yearly attenuation 
from the pivotal year, could be represented by percentage weights18, wj, decreasing through time. 
For t>0, the gradient of the respondents’ adjusted scoring represented by the function F(t) 
declines more strongly in the short term than in the long term. Fitting a Weibull function 
required imposing the following boundary conditions: 
 
 
 
                                                   
16 The methodology followed to fit and reject the Gaussian and the Gumbel probability functions is documented in 
the Appendix attached. 
17 The Weibull function also behaves as a non-exponential rate of decline function when t>0, therefore, it will tend 
to decrease strongly in the short term more than in the long term. 
18 Percentage weights correspond to people’s preferences over costs and benefits occurring either before or after the 
‘pivotal year’ of a standard annual generation.  
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A. The curve reached its maximum at the pivotal year in the time span. According to the 
empirical data from the survey, this corresponds to year 5. 
B. From the pivotal year to the past, at year j-4 the function’s value corresponded to the 
minimum of the respondent's adjusted scoring. The scoring at year j-5 should be as 
close to zero as possible. 
C. According to the time span’s statistical outcomes (average= 8.4, sd=10.7 years), the 
future branch would not go beyond year j+10. 
D. The weighted respondents’ adjusted scoring predicted with the parametric function 
for the year j-4 was a comparative reference to identify the limit for the time span in 
the curve from the pivotal year onwards.  
Figure IV-7 shows the adjusted curve representing the shape and pattern of the empirical data. 
Figure IV-7. Curve fitting from a Weibull function  
 
Source: Author 
The equation for the Weibull function obtained from the curve plotted in Figure IV-7 shows that 
the number of years defining the time span of a standard generation was the range between a 
scoring equal to 3.4 at year j-4, and the year with a similar value to the future of the reference 
year, j+10, (3.3 points), therefore, the time span of the generation was set at 15 years (cf. Table 
IV-3). 
Table IV-3. Predicted yearly-scoring for a 15 years timespan from a Weibull curve 
TIMESPAN OF 
15 YEARS 
ADJUSTED YEARLY AVERAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS’ SCORING TOTAL 
SCORING j-4 j-3 j-2 j-1 j j+1 j+2 j+3 j+4 j+5 j+6 j+7 j+8 j+9 j+10 
Scoring* 3.4 5.8 7.3 8.0 8.3 8.2 7.8 7.3 6.7 6.1 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 90.7 
Yearly increment 
(+) /decrement (−) 3.4 2.4 1.5 0.7 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 --- 
 (*) Values calculated from the parametric function shown in Figure IV-7. 
Source: Author 
Next, it was determined the scoring corresponding to every year within the aforementioned time 
span of 15 years and the corresponding year-on-year variation. The predicted yearly scoring at 
each year within the time span fitted the pattern obtained by the respondents' adjusted scoring in 
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the survey for a 9 years time span. This implies that individuals’ preferences in the very short-
term, either from the year of reference to the future or to the past are well represented by the 
gradients of change shown by the curve in Figure IV-7. Next, it was calculated the percentage 
weights for each year within the AGi with a simple transformation from the predicted-scorings, 
finally defining the weighting curve for any standard generation with a 15-year time span (cf. 
Figure IV-8). 
Figure IV-8. Weighting curve for any standard annual generation (AGi) of 15 years 
 
 
Source: Author 
As in the IREM the concept of generation is strictly linked to the individuals affected by the 
project, and this concept reflects how important a transport project is for the society belonging to 
a same period of time within the lifecycle of the project (no matter the moment of the analysis), 
it is fair to concluded that a Weibull weighting curve (imposing the boundary conditions, A~D) 
correctly reflects the weights given by the respondents of the survey to their appreciation of both 
transport projects. Table IV-4 shows that the non-symmetrical theoretical weighting curve and 
its parametric function adopted are suitable to reflect how significant the effects of a transport 
project are for a society’s welfare within a standard generation spanning over a 15-year time 
span. 
Table IV-4. Weights in a weighting curve for any annual generation of 15 years 
GENERATION 
PERCENT YEARLY WEIGHTS (wj) 
1 2 3 4 *5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Standard (4+11 years) 3.7 6.4 8.1 8.8 9.2 9.0 8.6 8.0 7.4 6.7 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.6 
** Truncated (3+11 years) - 6.6 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.3 8.9 8.3 7.7 7.0 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.7 
** Truncated (2+11 years) - - 9.0 9.8 10.2 10.0 9.6 8.9 8.2 7.5 6.8 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.0 
** Truncated (1+11 years) - - - 10.8 11.2 11.0 10.5 9.8 9.0 8.2 7.5 6.6 5.9 5.1 4.4 
** Truncated (0+11 years) - - - - 12.6 12.3 11.8 11.0 10.1 9.2 8.4 7.4 6.6 5.8 4.9 
(*) In the weighting curve for the standard annual generation of 15 years the “year of reference” is year 5. 
(**) The weights for the truncated annual generations have been calculated by sharing out proportionally the 
excluded weights among the rest of weights in the corresponding truncated annual generation. 
Source: Authors 
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According to the society being analysed, the values in Table IV-4 cannot be considered as fixed 
for any IREM application, which should probably be adapted to the society being analysed. The 
methodology to obtain the relevant values appears, however, as robust and generally applicable. 
IREM has been applied and is currently being used in a wider research aiming at analysing the 
intergenerational impact of particular case studies as well as part of a comprehensive 
methodology to detect white elephants19 in the transport sector. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper explains the reasons why a fair decision-making process to invest in major 
infrastructure projects should consider its real effects on future generations. Whilst exponential 
discounting and typical SDR are appropriate to estimate the social value of public investments 
from the perspective of the generation deciding whether or not to carry out the project, they are 
not neutral to reflect the social interest of projects implying very large timespans. Indeed, the 
results from this research show that consumers’ preferences for major transport projects change 
as time moves on, which would support the use of declining discount rates (DDRs) to estimate 
the social value of long-term investments through CBA. This also supports the basic hypothesis 
of our research line, which states that the present practice to appraise major projects does not 
take sufficiently into account their impacts on future generations. 
The “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model” (IREM) model offers a way to incorporate 
in the decision-making process of a major project its intergenerational impacts. The model 
provides indicators that compare the net benefits with the real financing burden for overlapping 
generations, meaning the various groups of people around a specific year, that will be affected 
by the project. This analysis is complementary to the CBA and provides a view of the fairness of 
the actual financial payments for the project across the various generations affected. 
The first aim of the research presented in this paper was to empirically define the function to be 
used as a weighting curve in IREM. To determine this function and the timespan of a standard 
generation required a specific survey with an innovative design in order to place the respondents 
in a future situation from which they were asked to value the impacts of an infrastructure project 
in the past and in the next few years. This survey was conducted in Catalonia and in relation to 
well-known transport projects. The data collected were of good quality and used, in a complex 
fitting exercise, to establish the timespan for any “standard generation” in 15 years for major 
investments in transport infrastructure, and to propose the weighting curve shown in Table IV-4 
using a Weibull distribution. The values obtained cannot be considered as fixed for any IREM 
application, which should probably be adapted to the society being analysed. The methodology 
to obtain the relevant values appears, however, as robust and generally applicable. 
The results presented here have been essential for a proper application of the IREM model to 
several transport infrastructure projects, funded with different mechanisms. The IREM indicators 
obtained show the strong influence of the project financing models on intergenerational impacts 
and thus the need to incorporate the financing mechanisms and their implications for future 
generations into the project appraisal procedures. 
 
 
                                                   
19 This concept is mostly used in relation to public investments representing a severe misallocation of society’s 
resources and, as a consequence, expenditures that can be deemed to reduce the wellbeing of its future members. 
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9. APPENDIX A 
In order to define F(t), first, it was tested a Gaussian parametric function because it represented 
our theoretical expectations. A symmetric curve was estimated from a central (pivotal) year 
declining to both past and future years following the same pattern. To adjust the curve, it was 
took the central year of reference in the time span in the survey questions (2020), which 
corresponded to the year with the maximum in the respondents' adjusted scoring. It was assumed 
that the pattern of mitigation i.e. the weights' yearly attenuation from the pivotal year, could be 
represented by percentage weights20, wj, decreasing through time. For t>0, the gradient of the 
respondents' adjusted scoring represented by the function, F(t), declines more strongly in the 
short term than in the long term. 
It was assumed that the Gaussian parametric function would reach values close to zero at the 
years outside the time span. Moreover, during the years before year j-4 (j-5, j-6, …) it was 
assumed that people would be highly unconcerned about the project's early stages, such as 
planning, design, procurement. Actually, those early stages of investments in transport 
infrastructures could last several years. Following the same logic, values for years after j+4 
(j+5, j+6, …) should be close to zero. During the length of the generation time span, i.e. 
between the year j-4, and the year j+4, values would match the ones obtained in the survey data 
life span (average= 8.4 years).  
The value for parameters a and c, were determined by successive approximations to plot a 
Gaussian curve of the respondents’ adjusted scoring yearly-average from year j-4 to j+4. Figure 
IV-A1 shows the resulting function and the values for its parameters. Grey points represent the 
respondents' adjusted scoring from the survey data. The plot indicates that a Gaussian function 
did not adjust correctly the data. Therefore, it was concluded that a Gaussian function does not 
represent the social preferences for investments in transport infrastructure projects obtained from 
the data. 
Figure IV-A1. Curve fitting from a Gaussian function 
 
Source: Author 
                                                   
20 Percentage weights correspond to people’s preferences over costs and benefits occurring either before or after the 
‘pivotal year’ of a standard annual generation.  
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As the Gaussian function did not fit the data, a Gumbel21 function was tested to adjust the 
weighting curve linked to a standard generation. This allowed testing a non-symmetrical 
attenuation of the yearly weights within a non-determined time span. Unlike our previous fitting 
of a Gaussian curve for which a symmetrical curve was aimed at drawing for a pre-defined time 
span of 9 years, the Gumbel function requires to calculate the parameters for a non-symmetrical 
probabilistic function with the following boundary conditions (A~D): 
A. First, the curve reached its maximum at the pivotal year in the time span, according to 
the empirical data from the survey this corresponds to year 5. 
B. From the pivotal year to the past, at year j-4, the function's value corresponded to the 
minimum of the respondent's adjusted scoring. The scoring at year j-5, should be as 
close to zero as possible. 
C. According to the time span’s statistical outcomes (average= 8.4, sd=10.7 years), the 
future branch would not go beyond year, j+10. 
D. The weighted respondents' adjusted scoring predicted with the parametric function 
for the year j-4, was a comparative reference to identify the limit for the time span in 
the curve from the pivotal year onwards. 
Figure A2 shows the Gumbel curve fitted to estimate the function parameters. To define the time 
span of a generation using this function the adjusted scoring for the year j-4, of 2.4 points, was 
used. Unlike the Gauss curve, where this value matches the respondents’ adjusted scoring in j+4, the Gumbel curve conditions outlined above required estimating the adjusted scoring for the 
years following the pivotal year. It was identified the adjusted scoring in future time 
observations at j+7, (2.3 points) matching its counterpart in past observations at j-4 (cf. Table 
IV-A1). Accordingly, the time span was set in 12 years for a Gumbel function; 4 years for the 
branch from the past to the pivotal year and, 8 from the pivotal year to the future. 
Table IV-A1. Predicted yearly-scoring from a Gumbel curve 
TIMESPAN OF  
12 YEARS 
ADJUSTED YEARLY AVERAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS’ SCORING 
j-4 j-3 j-2 j-1 J j+1 j+2 j+3 j+4 j+5 j+6 j+7 
Scoring* 2.4 4.5 6.6 8.0 8.4 8.0 7.2 6.0 4.9 3.9 3.0 2.3 
 (*) Values calculated from the parametric function shown in Figure A2 
Source: Author 
As in the case of a Gaussian function, a Gumbel function did not fit to represent the society’s 
preferences for investments in transport infrastructure projects. As it is observed in Figure IV-
A2, the Gumbel curve does not match the empirical benchmarks representing the adjusted yearly 
scoring obtained from the survey data. 
                                                   
21 Gumbel functions also behaves as a non-exponential rate of decline function when t>0, therefore, it will tend to 
decrease strongly in the short term more than in the long term. 
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Figure IV-A2. Curve fitting from a Gumbel function  
 
Source: Author 
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SECTION V. HUNTING WHITE ELEPHANTS ON THE ROAD.  
A PRACTICAL PROCEDURE TO DETECT HARMFUL PROJECTS OF TRANSPORT 
 INFRASTRUCTURE 
Turró, M. & Penyalver, D., 2019 
Abstract 
The white elephant concept is used to qualify public investments representing a severe 
misallocation of society’s resources or expenditures that can be deemed to reduce the wellbeing 
of its future members. In the transport sector, white elephants (WEs) are particularly relevant due 
to the vast amount of resources involved in large-scale infrastructure projects and to their long 
lifecycle. In most articles on the subject, WEs are major projects showing a certain political or 
even economic short-term appeal but that are essentially inefficient. In this paper, the definition 
includes, beyond those that are inefficient, projects that are financially unsustainable and/or very 
unfair to future generations when properly analysed over their project lifecycle. An early 
identification as WEs of those efficient projects from the socioeconomic point of view that are 
bound to entice the failure of a main stakeholder or are unfair to future generations, facilitates 
reconsidering their financial structuring in order to make them acceptable and avoid the WE 
label. 
The authors propose a new approach to detect WEs that goes beyond the traditional detection 
through standard techniques, such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and involves the incorporation 
in decision-making of new indicators. Those of the Intergenerational Redistributive Effects 
Model (IREM) show the importance of the long-term impacts arising from major investment in 
transport infrastructure. Using the annuities of the socioeconomic CBA and financial analyses, 
the IREM indicators allow a look beyond the future impact of the project on society’s welfare –
measured through conventional CBA– and its capacity of being financed, and produce a good 
assessment of its intergenerational effects. In this paper, the authors present the results of 
applying IREM to a set of transport projects in the European Union and, with more detail, to 
several Spanish motorway projects with private financing. The IREM’s outputs indicate that 
most of the projects in the sample will be fair to future generations. Some of the analysed 
investments could, however, be considered as WEs when applying the intergenerational 
perspective. IREM appears therefore to be a useful tool to avoid decision-making mistakes in 
major infrastructure projects.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Decisions about transport infrastructure development are usually based on the general belief that 
investing in public assets is “productive” for society. In a slightly more sophisticated setting, 
decision makers require that such public investments be efficient, i.e. expected to generate more 
socioeconomic benefits than the resources consumed for infrastructure construction and for its 
operation and maintenance. For investments that can be deemed to reduce the wellbeing of its 
future members, either because they are inefficient from an economic point of view or because 
they are financially unsustainable, the label of white elephant (WE) has often been informally 
used. In this paper, the WE label is also used to identify projects whose redistribution effects can 
be very unfair when properly analysed over the project lifecycle and therefore, as in the white 
elephant story, may be ruinous for future generations. 
Efficiency is typically evaluated ex-ante through a conventional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
(Thomopoulos et al., 2009; Meunier et al., 2013). In the transport sector, CBA mostly focuses on 
the analysis of users’ utility, even though costs and benefits are unevenly distributed among the 
various project stakeholders (Turró, 2004) and investment in infrastructure entails strong impacts 
of social, environmental and territorial nature over and above user effects (Litman, 1996; Viegas, 
2001; Raux et al., 2006; Beyazit, 2011; Trannoy, 2011). The uneven distribution of the project 
impacts is often pursued by decision makers in order to favour specific social groups or 
stakeholders (Henisz & Zelner, 2006), whilst non-users impacts, such as climate change 
agreements, are increasingly taken as the sole justification for certain actions. In some instances, 
redistribution seems to be the only real argument for certain investments, although this is seldom 
clearly reflected in the decisional process (Penyalver & Turró, 2018).  
Major infrastructure projects systematically involve a strong responsibility for the Government 
Promoting the Investment (GPI), i.e. the government agency behind the investment. The GPI is 
therefore expected to engage only in projects that are efficient from the socioeconomic point of 
view when considering their whole project cycle (Berechman, 2009; Salling & Banister, 2009; 
Turró, 2015) and ensure that the financing of the project is structured in a way that guarantees 
that it will not be stopped due to lack of money, at least during the period of its execution and 
early operation. When financial sustainability is not ensured during this period, a project easily 
ends up with blockages and consequent cost overruns and delays that unavoidably affect its 
efficiency. Of course, there is always a great deal of uncertainty on the assumptions adopted in 
the feasibility analyses and some projects considered convenient ex-ante could become negative 
for society due to exogenous shocks1. However, this is essentially related to the quality of 
forecasts, a topic falling outside the scope of this paper, which concentrates on the long-term 
implications of investment decisions based on the best available hypothesis on the consequences 
of the project at appraisal time.  
The possibility of blockages may also come from the opposition of specific sectors/groups or 
even from the hostility of the bulk of taxpayers. Public investment decisions in general, and for 
the transport sector in particular, are quite often driven by considerations other than the result of 
the socioeconomic appraisal (Robinson & Torvik, 2004; Henisz & Zelner, 2006); when this is 
the case, they are supposed to ensure policy compliance and fairness. On the other hand, even 
when major investments are deemed efficient from the point of view of the overall society and 
respond to policy objectives, they may result in unsustainable and/or unfair financial costs for 
the GPI behind the investment (Hoyos, 2014) and, by extension, for the taxpayer supporting the 
                                                   
1 The recent financial crisis and other circumstances, such as the impact to a country of becoming a EU member 
state, which implies a rapid adoption of EU competition policy rules, with strong effects on captive national markets 
(Veebel et al., 2018), have imply unexpected socioeconomic shocks that have had clear impacts on transport 
demand forecast.  
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public promoter. In this sense, it must be observed that, in traditional project appraisal, 
investment costs are essentially assigned to the first years of the project cycle when the resources 
are actually consumed. This is reasonable in terms of society’s overall wealth (in available 
resources), but the financial expenditure involved in this consumption is not actually paid during 
this period, but according to the financing formula adopted. This means that the cash flows that 
end up covering the financing of the project are generally quite different than the costs and 
benefits in terms of resources considered in the CBA and depend on the use of loans and other 
financing mechanisms, which typically postpone the actual payment of the investment.  
The financing formula and, in particular, the distribution over the years of the actual payments 
that concerned users and/or taxpayers will endure, is key to determine if a project that appears as 
viable according to standard practice can be considered as unfair due to the negative 
redistribution effects on future generations. It is obvious that future taxpayers and project users 
cannot react to present decisions. This does not justify, however, that they are treated unjustly. 
Especially when distant generations will be affected, intergenerational inequality and unfair 
redistribution may pass unnoticed, but our society is actually becoming increasingly aware, 
through issues such as climate change and pensions coverage, of the need to incorporate 
intergenerational fairness into our present decisions. 
To measure the effects of the financing formula on the generations concerned during the project 
lifespan is relatively complex. The Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model or IREM 
(Penyalver & Turró, 2017) has been designed to analyse these effects comparing the increase in 
resources generated by the project (net socioeconomic benefits) with the flows of obligations (in 
terms of actual payments) for the successive overlapping generations affected by the project. 
IREM indicators may offer valuable insights to identify those projects that would represent a 
clearly unfair treatment of future generations, in spite of showing an acceptable socioeconomic 
return for the current society (Penyalver & Turró, 2017). Although it is clear that efficiency 
should be the main concern of decision makers, the financial implications of certain financing 
formulae commonly used for the development of major projects of transport infrastructure justify 
that even efficient projects must show that their financial structuring ensures sustainability and 
fairness, i.e. that all major participants in the project are able to comply with their expected 
financial commitments and that future generations are fairly treated.  
This paper is organised as follows: The next section offers a review of the literature on both the 
concept of white elephants (WEs) in relation to infrastructure investments and the root causes 
that may bias the results of conventional feasibility analysis. During this review, a number of 
arguments on the relevance of the analysis of potential redistribution issues for WEs 
identification are introduced. Section 3 proposes a comprehensive methodological procedure to 
hunt WEs. Even if the results of the CBA should be central in normative decision-making to 
identify WEs (Robinson & Torvik, 2004; Scambary, 2015), a major assumption here is that a 
step-by-step procedure that incorporates the long-term effects of major projects is necessary to 
detect WEs and thus to improve the decision-making process. This procedure is actually 
considered a major contribution of this paper as it encompasses, for first time, both traditional 
economic approaches and the analysis of redistribution effects, including the intergenerational 
ones. Section 4 describes the general outlines on how to perform a proper intergenerational 
impacts analysis with the IREM model. Although the model have been largely presented in other 
pieces already published, this paper introduces, as a novelty, several details related to financial 
structuring that are important to correctly run IREM in practice. In addition, it presents an 
overview of the intergenerational equity patterns obtained from the first systematic application of 
the model to a relevant sample of (greenfield) projects carried out in the European Union. A 
more detailed analysis of these intergenerational impacts, based on a case study of three 
motorway projects in Andalusia (Spain) shows, in Section 5, how IREM can be used to detect 
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WEs. Section 6 offers general conclusions and recommendations to avoid decision-making 
mistakes in major infrastructure projects. Finally, Appendix A deepens in some particularities of 
the IREM model that may be of particular interest to readers. 
 
2. THE SEARCH FOR WHITE ELEPHANTS. A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Historically, the concept of white elephant refers to “gifts” that may lead the receiver to 
bankruptcy and cannot be transferred or sold under normal circumstances (Prasser, 2007; 
Papanikolaou, 2013; Locatelli et al., 2017). It has been widely used in relation to public 
investments (somehow “gifts” for the beneficiaries) that represent a severe misallocation of 
society’s resources and have intergenerational consequences (Henisz & Zelner, 2006; Hoyos, 
2014; Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2015; Veebel et al., 2018). For infrastructure investments in 
particular, this concept refers to projects that have a certain appeal for many people due to their 
magnitude and “modern” character, are very convenient for potential beneficiaries and may even 
be apparently affordable but, in practice, entail financial obligations that are too heavy for the 
citizens receiving the “gift” (Mangan, 2008). Inefficient projects, i.e. projects with a negative net 
economic present value, which diminish society’s economic resources, have often been labelled 
as WEs (Engel et al., 1997; Robinson & Torvik, 2004; Richard, 2008; Appel, 2012; Wünderich, 
2014; Scambary, 2015; Ganuza & Llobet, 2017).  
Existing methods for projects appraisal have not been very successful at preventing the presence 
of WEs in many countries. Available experience indicates that the business cases for public 
infrastructure often show CBAs and social and environmental impact assessments supporting 
investment decisions that are unsatisfactory either due to defects of principle or of application 
(Pickrell, 1990; Richmond, 1998; Williams et al., 2009; Scott et al., 2011; Merrow, 2011). The 
more typical factors introducing biases in the CBA that may lead to the acceptance of WEs are 
costs underestimation and optimistic demand forecasts (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2007; 
Flyvbjerg, 2014). Inefficient projects are harmful for society, but when they end up with 
important differences between ex-ante financial estimates and real values, something that is 
rather common, as shown by Flyvbjerg (2007), they can have dramatic consequences on the GPI 
budget and its capacity to fund other priorities (Ansar et al., 2016).  
 
2.1. DISGUISING THE ELEPHANT. POLITICAL BIASES 
Biased CBAs are, in general, supported by political criteria that aim at favouring certain 
redistribution effects, in particular territorial, social and/or environmental (Turró, 2015). The 
project itself may be designed to support specific areas (territorial effects) or particular social 
groups through, for instance, the design of a pricing policy favouring well-identified cohorts 
within society (social effects). It may also affect in very unbalanced ways some main 
stakeholders in the project (Turró, 2004). In a major rail investment, for example, the distribution 
of the burden between the infrastructure manager and the service operators may severely affect 
its long-term viability. In many projects, the distribution among the different administrations 
involved (national, regional, local) could also affect the development of the project.  
Some elements of the CBA are used, even systematically as in the case of shadow values2 for 
labour (DG-Regio, 2015), to positively bias the viability of certain investments following 
                                                   
2 Shadow values are often used in relation to the reduction of unemployment and poverty and with the promotion of 
equal opportunities (Harris & Kende-Robb, 2008; World Bank, 2013; Ferreira & Peragine, 2015). For example, the 
use of workforce wage values lower than the real ones with the aim of supporting labour-intensive projects in 
Section V. Hunting white elephants on the road.  
A practical procedure to detect harmful projects of transport infrastructure 
 
Penyalver, D. (2019) - 93 - 
 
specific objectives. In other cases, it is the use of inappropriate economic values, for instance for 
travel time savings (Mackie et al., 2001; Fosgerau, 2007; Bang & Banister, 2009), or the 
inclusion in the CBA of, often unjustified, spillover effects that may generate poor results of the 
ex-ante appraisal (Martín, 1997; Vickerman, 2007). These biases are typically used to enhance 
the social effects of the investment during construction (e.g., job creation) and to promote 
economic development, but may also be used for other objectives that could be important for 
decision makers but not necessarily good for society’s welfare. Politically-driven biases may 
thus be instrumental in reducing transparency in the CBA methodology and to justify 
investments that eventually turn out to be WEs. 
Equity approaches, which are of major interest for the method presented here, are getting an 
accrued attention by researchers and planners (Martens, 2006). Particularly in democratic and 
wealthy societies, the sensitivity to unfair treatment of specific sectors/groups can be expected to 
hamper those investments that neither address public participation adequately nor incorporate 
measures to balance unfairness. This is obvious with projects with negative local impacts3. If the 
redistribution effects are strong, they may generate serious opposition from those negatively 
affected or somehow representing the “mistreated” social groups. 
The use of a social discount rate (SDR) to compare the socioeconomic costs and benefits 
expected to occur over the years represents a strong hypothesis on the willingness of society to 
renounce to early resource consumption for an accrued amount in the future. On projects 
unfolding over long timespans the SDR tends to severely reduce the potentially strong effects 
that may occur in the long-term (Nesticò & Maselli, 2018). The SDR hypothesis which should 
(ideally) reflect both the social value and the social opportunity cost of project development 
(Gollier, 2011) is, in any case, adopted from the perspective of the interests of current society, 
i.e. adopting a clearly “egoistic” view of what the common good is. As the adopted SDR is 
based, in practice, on a regulated value which may be biased or modified by decision makers, 
they may end up imposing the use of an “appropriate” value in order to achieve certain 
legitimate policy objectives (Evans & Sezer, 2004; Leleur et al., 2007; Meunier et al., 2013). 
This value may respond to the objective of “fairness towards our children”, an ecologist mantra 
that, with the excuse of ethereal benefits in the long run4, is often used by GPIs to justify 
extraordinary construction costs. But the fact that low SDRs have the potential to help long-term 
investments projects to pass the CBA test (Lee & Ellingwood, 2015), does not mean that they are 
necessarily fair for future generations. 
Current procedures for assigning subsidies from upper level administrations (such as Federal 
Governments, the EU) may also be indirectly supporting WEs. In general, the GPI is expected to 
demonstrate positive CBA indicators. This represents an incentive to bias the forecasts on costs 
and benefits in order to obtain grants. Once obtained, the correction of the process to implement 
the WE becomes extremely difficult and potentially unfeasible. The main point for WEs hunting 
is that even with grants and subsidies, the financial burden on the GPI, once the higher costs and 
lower benefits become real, may become unsustainable. In some Member States that are 
recipients of European funds5, this mechanism of facilitating the acceptance of WE, besides 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regions with high unemployment levels is accepted by the EU (e.g., road projects) and by some International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs). 
3 The Not-in-my-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome and the “greens” opposition to transport infrastructure projects are 
an increasingly serious problem for decision makers. 
4 At the time of the decision to build, it is notoriously difficult to measure the economic benefits of goods without an 
explicit market, such as reduction of GHG emissions. Moreover, for some transport projects (e.g. high-speed 
railways) these benefits will materialise several decades after construction. 
5 In particular those stemming from the European Structural and Investment Funds. 
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entailing a waste of resources, has had the additional undesirable collateral consequence of 
increasing the public deficit/debt in the recipient country due to the requirement of national 
matching funds to complement EU grants.  
 
2.2. RUINING FUTURE GENERATIONS 
In general, the simple aggregate of discounted total benefits and costs that is presented as CBA 
results does not offer information about the redistribution of wealth and the long-term 
implications resulting from the project (Henderson & Bateman, 1995; Litman, 2009). A positive 
economic net present value (ENPV) essentially suggests that investing is convenient for the 
society of the moment, as future costs and benefits are discounted to the “present”. The idea 
underlying discounting in CBA is that future resources are less valuable than present ones for the 
society for which the decision is taken and that citizens are the same over the years. As a result, 
the CBA implicitly assumes that the project is generationally neutral, i.e. its effects are 
considered affecting the same cohort of people, which would extend across the project cycle, 
even if infrastructure projects unfolds over large time spans. However, the dynamics of society 
imply an evolution of the members of the different generations (ISR, 2017). Although the 
socioeconomic CBA assigns both costs and benefits to the year when the consumption and 
generation of resources occur, the positive effects of the project are indeed mostly perceived by 
individuals belonging to the society of the year in question, i.e. the users and, generally, the 
society “of each moment”, which can be grouped as a generation6. Obviously, a generation, even 
if assigned to its central year (referred here as “annual generation), must cover a set of 
individuals who were living before this year and will be alive afterwards. A proper way to define 
such annual generations, which are logically overlapping, has been proposed (see point 4). 
Projects that are not delivering, to the overlapping generations concerned, a fair relation between 
the net benefits and the financial burden could be considered as unfair from an intergenerational 
perspective. To easily understand the concept, take as an example, an investment funded by the 
GPI through a “bullet” loan7. Under such a funding mechanism, taxpayers of a few specific years 
–distant from the period in which the decision is taken– end up bearing the responsibility for the 
full repayment of the principal of the loan, whilst project benefits are similarly split among all 
the overlapping generations of the project lifecycle. There are strong arguments in favour of 
including the analysis of fairness in the decision making process for long-term investments 
(Groom et al., 2005; Lee & Ellingwood, 2015). It is in this sense that decision makers are 
expected to measure not only the global gains and losses but who benefits and who-and-when 
bears the costs in order to be able to say whether a policy, integrated investment programme or 
project is good or bad for society (Bradford, 1997; Ascher & Krupp, 2010). Intergenerational 
fairness is especially relevant in the case of major investments in transport infrastructure due to 
the risks and the high opportunity costs that these projects entail for individuals that are young 
today or even unborn but that may end up bearing much of the negative consequences of 
potential WEs. This is the main reason why it is proposed to use the IREM model to deal with 
this critical issue in the detection of WEs. Although a different approach or a more elaborated 
version of the model may be developed in the future, it is considered that IREM represents a 
major step in the assessment of intergenerational effects. 
                                                   
6 Since Mannheim’s “The problem of generations” (1923), the concept of “generation” or “social generation” has 
been used in the sense of “cohort”, which refers to people within a delineated population who experience the same 
significant event within a given period of time (Pilcher, 1994). 
7 It is a loan where the repayment of the entire principal, sometimes even the principal and interest, is due at the end 
of the loan term.  
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3. METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSAL 
Figure V-1 indicates the critical blocks of the proposed method for white elephant “hunting”. 
This method could be deemed to be similar to standard project appraisal procedures. The 
difference is that it is both more explicit regarding non-CBA aspects than most procedures to be 
found in manuals and guides (Engel et al., 1997; Robinson & Torvik, 2004; Scambary, 2015) 
and that the focus on financial aspects and, in particular, on their implications for future 
generations of users and taxpayers is considered essential. The ultimate goal of the Figure V-1 
scheme is to represent a generic process of proposal, analysis and selection of investment 
programmes/major projects of transport infrastructure that, if properly followed, can be useful to 
establish whether an investment should be labelled as efficient, financially sustainable and fair or 
whether, otherwise, it should be considered a WE. The scheme is mostly applicable to public 
funding. In the case of PPP arrangements, there is a greater complexity in the procurement and 
financing mechanisms requiring a greater detail in some parts of this scheme. The 
intergenerational implications of private participation in transport infrastructure procurement 
have been analysed in Penyalver et al., 2019. 
In order to proceed to the assessment of the project, the analyst should, first, gather sufficient 
insights of the project’s viability by means of a cost-benefit analysis. A major project should 
agree with a rational plan or investment programme to ensure that it is framed in an integrated 
decision process and counts on sufficient political support. The fulfilment of regulations, notably 
on environmental matters, is also a requirement for the project’s positive performance in the 
long-term and must be checked as part of the appraisal procedure. While there is not always a 
solid justification for some environmental regulations, it must be recognised that they are usually 
aligned with the concern for the wellbeing of future generations, which is a major point in our 
definition of WEs. 
As a second phase, it is necessary to carry out a basic screening process of the feasibility studies, 
which should include a CBA clearly defining the do-minimum situation and the options that 
deserve consideration. The analyst should also obtain sufficient information about the 
financing/procurement mechanism foreseen for the project. This mechanism, particularly when it 
is not a pure public sector financing, should also be considered an option to be analysed and 
compared on the basis of efficiency and efficacy objectives, with standard procurement options, 
in line with the democratic mandate of the GPI. In addition, a thorough analysis of the 
governance system is essential to prevent the risk of the project not performing as foreseen. A 
proper legal and administrative framework allowing the necessary flexibility to adapt the 
implementation process to changing circumstances and a professional and objective-driven 
management are essential to avoid the delays and cost overruns that could convert a potentially 
efficient project into a WE. 
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Figure V-1. Flow chart of the WEs hunting methodology 
 
Source: Author 
The third stage of the WE hunting procedure must ensure the socioeconomic viability of the 
target investment. A properly executed CBA is essential to avoid investing in WEs because 
socioeconomic efficiency is the critical factor in defining the interest of a project for society. The 
importance of avoiding biases in the elaboration of the CBA has already been stressed. As CBA 
has many subjective aspects (for instance, in the values for travel time savings, often critical in 
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transport projects) (Lave, 1996), the results of the CBA must always be questioned. They should 
be positive but also show their robustness through ad-hoc scenario and sensitivity analyses (DG-
Regio, 2015), in particular of the questionable variables or parameters (De Palma et al., 2012). 
Projects showing a low economic rate of return (ERR) are strong candidates to be labelled WEs, 
particularly if the sensitivity analysis indicates a high probability of obtaining even poorer 
results. To avoid the WE label at this stage of the procedure, the positive and non-monetised 
effects of the project that have not been taken into account in the CBA must be valuable enough 
for society to compensate the high risk of the project ending up with a negative ENPV. In this 
sense, the conclusions of studies on the potential social, territorial and/or environmental 
redistributive effects stemming from the project may be used to support decisions for 
investments with low ERR (Penyalver & Turró, 2018). 
There are, nevertheless, some other factors that could justify that projects with negative ENPV 
become socially acceptable and may, therefore, avoid being labelled as WEs. As the CBA takes 
only into account the effects of the project that can be measured and monetised to reflect their 
value for society as a whole, those that are not included in the CBA, in particular some positive 
externalities, may justify the execution of projects that do not show adequate profitability. On the 
other hand, there is also the possibility that non-monetised negative effects appear strong enough 
to question the viability of a project with positive ENPV. In a proper decision-making process, 
these effects, not included in the CBA (not even through shadow values or similar) should be 
somehow compared with the ENPV value to check their potential to alter the consideration of 
the project as viable or not and, as a consequence, if they deserve the WE label.  
As a fourth stage, if the project passes the CBA screening, the analyst should assess the financial 
viability of the project according to the financing mechanism adopted. The conventional and 
intuitive approach to analyse project efficiency through CBA is also commonly used for 
financial risks analysis (Raftery, 2003). The GPI may opt for purely public financing, the 
traditional model for most transport investments, or find alternatives, either through a public 
company (as it is the case in many rail projects) or a PPP. The financial proposal must ensure 
that, under the adopted hypothesis and reasonable variations, no main stakeholder may be unable 
to comply with its financial commitments (DG-Regio, 2015). This means that the GPI should 
demonstrate that the project will generate enough revenues to allow a proper long-term financing 
of the investment (a responsibility that could be assigned to the private partner in PPP) and/or 
that there would be, in principle, sufficient budget allocations to pay for the annuities (direct 
payments and loan amortisations) that the GPI is expected to cover when, as is often the case in 
transport projects, user payments will be insufficient. When, for some reason, budget allocations 
cannot materialise or the private partner is unable to cover its financial commitments, project 
implementation will be delayed and, as a consequence, cost overruns will appear. This might 
easily mean that the profitability expectations plunge and that the project may eventually become 
a WE. 
The firth stage consists of the identification of redistribution issues as, by definition, they are not 
included in the CBA. The quantification of the redistributive effects from the project on the 
various agents involved through the Stakeholders/Effects (S/E) Matrix (Turró, 2004) may offer 
valuable insights on political and social connotations that are critical for the investment viability. 
Besides the differential impacts on stakeholders, those of territorial, social and environmental 
nature should also be identified. These effects, usually difficult to quantify and monetise, must 
be compared with the ENPV. Having a clear money reference to compare with, should allow, at 
least, some reasonable discussions about the feasibility of the project. However, it is worth 
noting that some of the most credited redistribution effects (regional development, social 
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integration and similar) will only be observable in the long run8; in this sense, it can be pointed 
out that, beyond the social policy being pursued, they show, in general, a positive bias towards 
future generations. In line with this point of particular interest for the detection of WEs, which 
are precisely characterised by their capacity to end up ruining their theoretical beneficiaries, the 
hunting methodology puts a special focus on the intergenerational effects of major investments 
because they cannot be incorporated in current CBA procedures. 
Finally, there is a last factor to be used to recognise that the “elephant” will be endangering the 
wealth of its owner through its long-term impacts. Major investments in transport infrastructure 
will affect many overlapping generations due to their magnitude and their long lifecycle, so costs 
(in terms of actual payments) and benefits should be balanced to avoid future generations to 
unfairly pay for the profligacy of current decision-makers, as in the white elephant story.  
The actual money payments for the investment are defined by the financing formula adopted. 
Such payments and those related to the operation and maintenance of the transport infrastructure 
are ultimately made by users, through direct payments such as tolls, and/or by taxpayers feeding 
the public budgets contributing to the project. Therefore, the redistribution effects among users 
and/or taxpayers of different generations are relevant to hunt WEs, while the payments between 
the government agency (GPI) and private actors and ultimately the redistribution effects between 
private actors and between these and public administrations as a result of a particular fiscal 
policy unrelated to the project do not fall within the scope of the intergenerational analysis, 
because they are only transfers occurring within specific years. The eventual redistribution 
effects among the different project stakeholders may raise during the project cycle could be 
analysed through the S/E Matrix (Turró, 2004). 
The case of intergenerational redistributive effects diverges from the other redistributive effects 
because, by definition, future generations cannot participate in the decision. It is, however, the 
capacity of users and/or taxpayers to comply with future commitments what establishes whether 
an investment should be labelled as a WE or, on the contrary, the project has to be deemed to be 
efficient, financially sustainable and fair from an intergenerational perspective. 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS. AN OVERVIEW 
Decision makers usually determine the final financing formula of a project, within the envisaged 
financing/procurement mechanism, after the decision to build has been adopted. This formula 
should, in theory, follow a positive conclusion on its efficiency and its financial sustainability. It 
should also consider the redistribution effects generated by the project. Some of these effects are 
relatively easy to measure, but there is a lack of metrics to determine whether the funding burden 
is adequately shared among the various generations affected by the project. This deficiency can 
be observed in the investment reports of public entities, which disclose very little about this issue 
(Kotlikoff, 1992; Auerbach et al., 1994; McCrae & Aiken, 2000; Williamson & Rhodes, 2011). 
IREM has been developed with the objective to cover this gap in the relevant literature and 
provides indicators on the intergenerational redistributive effects arising from major investment 
in transport infrastructure. These effects, which are linked to the financing model, are estimated 
comparing the increase in resources obtained from the investment with the financial charges to 
users and taxpayers. This is done for each one of the overlapping “annual generations” in the 
project lifecycle (cf. Figure V-2).  
                                                   
8 Some effects may be included in the CBA through induced traffic over time, for instance, but they are not 
identified as separate beneficiaries. 
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Figure V-2. Scheme showing the weight given to the different years of the overlapping generations 
 
Source: Penyalver D. & Turró M., 2017. 
The concept of annual generation (AGi) refers to the population pivoting around a year, i, of the 
project’s lifecycle and incorporates, besides the individuals living in year i, a percentage of those 
living in the few years before and after the year of reference (Penyalver & Turró, 2017). The 
function that defines both the timespan and the weighting curve for the “lateral” years that is 
used to make the relevant calculations for the standard annual generation in IREM is shown in 
Figure V-3. This function reflects how significant the socioeconomic costs and benefits, but also 
the financing effects, stemming from an investment in transport infrastructure are for the 
individuals (users and/or taxpayers) of an annual generation (Penyalver et al., 2018).  
Figure V-3. Function used to represent a standard annual generation in IREM  
 
Source: Penyalver et al., 2018. 
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As already mentioned, the objective of IREM is to compare the net socioeconomic benefits after 
commissioning, indicated by the CBA annuities, with the actual payment schedule stemming 
from the project’s financing formula affecting both taxpayers and users. This is done for every 
annual generation using the relevant weights for the various years included in it. Investment 
costs are not included in the net benefits calculation because IREM refers to the difference 
between the resources generated and consumed annually by the project after commissioning, 
when it starts generating net benefits. These are compared with the actual payments to be made 
to cover the investment costs. Some of them may be provided by the GPI budgets of the 
construction years, so they will be confronted with zero benefits on these years, but most 
projects are financed through loans or other financial mechanisms postponing payments. The net 
financing amount of the year (amortisation and interest of public loans for public projects or the 
amount paid by users and the eventual public contributions when privately managed) is then 
used to calculate the amount contributed by the annual generation. The model thus provides a 
single value, the gap (GAPi) of the project (net benefits minus financial burden) for each 
“annual generation” using different weights for the various years in the generation (cf. Table V-
1). 
Table V-1. Weights in the weighting curve for a standard annual generation 
STANDARD ANNUAL 
GENERATION 
PERCENT YEARLY WEIGHTS (wj) 
1 2 3 4 *5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Timespan = 15 years 3.7 6.4 8.1 8.8 9.2 9.0 8.6 8.0 7.4 6.7 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.6 
(*) In the weighting curve for the standard annual generation of 15 years the “year of reference” is year 5 
Source: adapted from Penyalver et al., 2018. 
The time series of the intergenerational gaps is made from a common baseline to offer a clear 
picture of the evolution over time of the project’s effects on the concerned generations and is 
used to calculate the different IREM indicators. The average of the different generational gaps 
obtained along the project lifespan (𝐺𝐴𝑃) indicates whether the project net benefits to be 
obtained by the successive generations concerned are globally higher than the concomitant 
financial burden. It is thus a valuable metric on the utility of the investment from the perspective 
of the future users and/or taxpayers (Penyalver et al., 2019).  
The other IREM indicators obtained from the time series allow the assessment of the project’s 
effects on three interlinked dimensions (cf. Table V-2) showing: (1) if certain generations are 
paying (or expected to pay) more than the net benefits they receive; (2) whether present or future 
generations will be favoured and the strength of this trend; and (3) whether particular generations 
will end up being greatly benefited/harmed due to the financing model. These indicators are 
particularly suitable for large-scale transport infrastructure projects, as they require great 
amounts of economic resources during long periods of time for their construction and, after 
commissioning, they still need both significant expenditure in yearly maintenance and operation 
and in periodical heavy-maintenance to ensure performance continuity. Due to their size and 
complexity, GPIs use a wide range of management systems and financing structures to 
implement these projects. Depending on the adopted financial model, users and citizens 
belonging to generations that theoretically will benefit from the project may be charged, through 
direct payments and taxes, quite differently. The indicators can help selecting a financial 
structure that distributes the financial burden in a way that does not represent unfairness9 to the 
generations to come and avoid the project to be labelled as a WE (cf. Table V-3). 
 
                                                   
9 Overall, the “fair/unfair” concept refers to moral obligations towards future generations (Rawls, 1972). 
Section V. Hunting white elephants on the road.  
A practical procedure to detect harmful projects of transport infrastructure 
 
Penyalver, D. (2019) - 101 - 
 
Table V-2. Analysis of intergenerational impacts: dimensions and general outlines of IREM outputs 
Dimensions of the  
analysis of intergenerational impacts IREM indicators  Assessment of IREM outputs 
D1. Intergenerational Utility 𝐺𝐴𝑃: Average value of the different 
generational gaps (GAPi) obtained 
along the project lifespan, expressed in 
millions of euros (M€) 
A 𝐺𝐴𝑃<0 essentially suggests 
that the project’s financing 
formula has a negative impact 
for most of the generations 
affected. 
The project’s financing formula 
finally adopted by the government 
promoting the investment should 
sustain the welfare of future 
individuals. This implies positive 
gaps between net benefits and 
financial payments (by users and/or 
taxpayers) for the sets of affected 
individuals (grouped in annual 
generations) over the project 
lifecycle. 
GUI: The General Unfairness Indicator 
(0 ≤ GUI ≤ 100%) reflects the 
intergenerational utility of the project. It 
represents the rate (%) of overlapped 
generations enduring financial payments 
higher than the increase of resources 
obtained from the project 
Low values for GUI indicate 
that the number of annual 
generations being unfairly 
treated (paying more than the 
net benefits they obtain) is 
small. 
D2. Intergenerational Performance 
T&S: Trend and Slope (in grades) of 
the time series of the generational gaps 
of the projects. 
(−100g ≤ T&S ≤ +100g) 
T&S>0 means that the value of 
the successive gaps tends to be 
more positive or less negative. 
The higher the value of this 
indicator the more useful (or less 
harmful) the project is for future 
individuals. 
The evolution over time of the effects 
of the project on the concerned 
annual generations. 
D3. Intergenerational Redistribution IRESI: The Intergenerational 
Redistributive Effects Sharing Index 
informs about how redistribution 
effects are shared among generations 
over time 
(0 ≤ IRESI ≤ 1.00)  
IRESI tends to 1.00 if the 
differences between the value of 
the positive and the negative 
generational gaps are important, 
which means that the financing 
formula is severely biased in 
favour of certain generations.  
In projects unfolding over large 
timespans, redistribution issues may 
arise if there are significant transfers 
of the project’s financial burden 
among groups of annual generations.  
Source: Author 
Projects with 𝐺𝐴𝑃 > 0 typically show a positive performance (T&S >0) and thus they must be 
considered positive for future generations. In this case the project’s label must be “fair-
balanced”. A negative T&S is also possible in combination with a low GUI, which typically 
implies that 𝐺𝐴𝑃 > 0, meaning that the annual generations involved will have lower (positive) 
GAPi as years go on. In any case, if 𝐺𝐴𝑃 > 0 and GUI is low, the project’s intergenerational 
impact should be considered positive but unbalanced, as only a few overlapped generations may 
end up with net benefits lower than the concomitant financial impact. In this case the project 
must be labelled as “fair-unbalanced”. 
Table V-3. Different cases for the combination of IREM’s outputs (Project Intergenerational Rating Scale) 
D1. 
 Utility 
D2. 
Performance 
D3. 
Redistribution Project intergenerational impact Project Label 𝐺𝐴𝑃 GUI T&S  IRESI 
> 0 ≈ 0 > 0 ≈ 0 Positive Fair-balanced BAL 
> 0 Low > 0 Any Positive but unbalanced Fair-unbalanced UNB 
> 0 High > 0 Low Positive but unfair Unfair + UF+ 
≈ 0 High Any High Poor and very unfair (*) Very unfair VUF 
≤ 0 High < 0 Any Negative (*) Regressive RGS 
(*) Transport infrastructure projects candidates to be labelled as white elephants  
Source: Author 
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Projects with high GUI may be complex to label if they show a positive intergenerational 
performance. In these situations, the analyst should first look closely at the value of the 𝐺𝐴𝑃: If 
GUI is high but 𝐺𝐴𝑃 > 0 (many generations paying more than the perceived benefits with most 
negative gaps being small), T&S is positive and redistribution effects can be disregarded (IRESI 
≈ 0), the project’s intergenerational impact must be considered positive but unfair (“unfair+” 
label). But if GUI is high and the generations having negative gaps lead to a 𝐺𝐴𝑃 ≈ 0, the 
project’s intergenerational utility is poor besides unfair. In these situations, the project might be 
considered as (strongly) positive just for a few annual generations and, therefore, should be 
labelled as “very unfair” overall (“VUF” label). Actually, depending on the value of the GUI and 
the strength of the T&S, a project with modest redistribution effects could even be considered as 
a white elephant. This is obviously the case of projects with 𝐺𝐴𝑃 < 0 (usually concomitant with 
a high GUI) with a negative T&S, which leads to label such projects as “regressive”, as the 
financial burden is increasingly higher than the expected socioeconomic net benefits for the 
annual generations within the project lifecycle. In this case, the intergenerational impact must be 
considered absolutely negative and the project should be labelled as a WE. 
Figure V-4. Socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the example (different vertical scales) 
 
 
Source: Author 
IREM is thus useful to establish to what extend the project’s impact is positive for society from a 
broader perspective than the traditional CBA, as it introduces a comparison between what the 
individuals affected by the project get as benefits and what they actually pay as users and 
taxpayers. Whilst benefits are somehow inherent to the project design, payments depend on the 
financial structure chosen by the GPI to finance the infrastructure. Therefore, in the case of a 
negative label, the GPI has the chance to increase (to a certain extent) the project’s 
intergenerational fairness by altering the structure of the project’s financial package. The actual 
distribution of yearly charges may be redesigned to better follow the time distribution of the 
project net benefits and ensure that the project’s 𝐺𝐴𝑃 is positive. An example on the potential of 
the financing formula to align actual payments to the project’s socioeconomic benefits is shown 
next.  
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Figure V-4 is a graphic representation of the characteristic time-profiles of socioeconomic net 
benefits (B) and financing impact (FI) of a simulated transport project for two alternative 
financial scenarios: Figure 4a shows the time-profiles of a 40 years project cycle (with 4 
construction years) financed through funds obtained from project bonds or public debt 
emissions10 with 30 years maturity. The reimbursement of the funds is made starting at year 31, 
according to the capital consumed during the construction period. Figure 4b shows the time-
profile of the project financed through soft loans11 to be repaid during 30 years, with a grace 
period of 4 years. The IREM model compares the cash flows from the financial analysis with the 
flows of socioeconomic net benefits, thus their values are in constant terms (removing inflation, 
in the example estimated at 2%, from the actual financial flows). 
Figure V-5. Time profile of the generational gaps of the project 
 
 
Source: Author 
As can be observed, financing through a bond or a debt emission with long-term maturity is 
equal to transfer the investment financing problem to individuals living in a distant future. In this 
scenario, early generations obtain net benefits from the project whilst bearing a (relatively) small 
financial burden (debt interests and O&M costs). However, the rest of the concerned generations 
endure actual payments that are higher than their net benefits (cf. Figure 5a). If the project is 
financed through soft loans from IFIs, the investment impact is distributed over the many 
generations who must repay them. In the example, this results in a more balanced redistribution 
among the generations affected during the project lifecycle (cf. Figure 5b). 
When using long-term loans, users and taxpayers will thus contribute in a more balanced way to 
fund the project, as shown in Figure 6b. Certain generations will suffer, in any case, from (small) 
negative gaps because some redistribution among generations exists. This might be disregarded 
or solved with some light measures. However, in the alternative scenario (debt emission), the 
                                                   
10 Debt emissions and project bonds must be repaid to investors at maturity and are actually quite similar to bullet 
loans.  
11 Loans from public lending institutions (IFIs, national banks, etc.) that offer particularly good conditions in terms 
of duration, interest rates, grace periods, etc. 
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project appears as regressive besides very unfair (cf. Figure 6a), and thus it must be labelled as a 
white elephant.  
Figure V-6. Time profile of the generational redistributive impact of the example 
 
 
Source: Authors 
The graphic analysis can be done with more precision using the IREM’s outputs (cf. Table V-4). 
In the example, the metrics obtained show that, overall, the financing formula based on a long-
term loan is useful to sustain the welfare of future individuals, even though GUI= 59.5%, 
meaning that around 60% of the (annual) generations affected will endure financial payments 
higher than the increase of resources obtained from the project (net benefits for the whole of 
society). The rationale is simple; being the differences between the value of the positive and the 
negative generational gaps so small (IRESI=0.08), and being theses generational gaps 
increasingly higher (T&S= +17.2g), the average of the gaps is positive when all the project 
lifespan is considered (𝐺𝐴𝑃= 0.86M€). Accordingly, the project should be labelled as positive 
but unfair (UF+) from an intergenerational perspective. On the contrary, if the financing formula 
is based on debt emission, the project should be labelled as regressive from the intergenerational 
point of view. In this case, the intergenerational redistributive effects are really high 
(IRESI=0.72) and the level of usefulness of the project financing formula is negative (T&S= –
9.3g). This means that early generations will obtain extraordinary (positive) gaps whilst the rest 
will bear financial burdens far above the actual net benefits provided by the project, as confirms 
a GUI= 40.5%. As a consequence, this financing formula has a negative impact on the welfare 
of future individuals (𝐺𝐴𝑃= –0.49M€) and the project should be labelled as a white elephant. 
Table V-4. IREM’s outputs and project label for the financing scenarios of the example 
Financing 
scenario: 
D1. Utility D2. Performance D3. Redistribution Project 
Label  Intergenerational Impact 𝐺𝐴𝑃 GUI T&S IRESI 
Debt emission –0.49 M€ 40.5%  –9.3g 0.72 RGS Regressive (white elephant) 
Long-term loan 0.86 M€ 59.5%  +17.2g 0.08 UF+ Positive but unfair 
Source: Author 
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4.1. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY PATTERNS IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
The potential impact on project selection of using the proposed method to detect WEs, in 
particular regarding its last phase on intergenerational fairness, was analysed through the 
application of IREM to a sample of greenfield investments, mostly with the objective of 
assessing whether the model could be easily applied and if it produces the expected type of 
results. The typical lack of public information on projects, both on their CBA and on the specific 
financing formula finally adopted to carry them out, is a major problem in project financing 
research as such agreements are usually subject to commercial confidentiality. In this case it was 
possible, however, to use the authors’ database for which the profiles of the socioeconomic net 
benefits (B) and the financing impact (FI) were available and could be studied in detail. 
Moreover, for these projects it was known whether the initial schedule of payments was 
maintained or not and what were the reasons for the changes (early repayment, additional loans 
to finance cost overruns, etc.).  
It worth noting here that the funding structure is an integral part of the overarching financing 
mechanism chosen by the public promoter (GPI). The GPI establishes whether the user (totally 
or partially) or the taxpayer will end up paying for the investment in selecting the sources of 
finance for the implementation of the project and how the taxpayer will pay for the funding 
component falling on the public budgets, including their contribution to the financial blending in 
a PPP. For major transport projects, the GPI could decide to spread it out over time through 
long-term loans from commercial banks and/or IFIs. In this case, it can be assumed that the GPI 
will pay interests and reimburse the principal according to a pre-defined amortisation schedule, 
without possibility to recycle the loans once repaid, independently of such schedule. This rigidity 
is actually a main assumption used in IREM to calculate the time profile of the project’s 
financial impact.  
The GPI may also decide to obtain the required funds from the financial market through the 
emission of additional public debt, which usually can be recycled indefinitely. In this case, even 
though the bonds may have different maturity periods and be recycled, they are typically not 
linked to the asset (project). In IREM such additional public debt has been assimilated to a bullet 
loan with interests distributed throughout the project’s life span. Thus, it has been assumed that 
the effects in the overall costs of the country’s public debt are negligible.  
The application of IREM, adopting the former assumptions, has allowed the comparison of the 
intergenerational effects of projects with similar characteristics (cf. Table V-5). The sample 
should not be considered representative of the universe of major transport investments, but its 
analysis would suggest that transport infrastructure projects tend to benefit future generations 
even if, in general, some generations tend to pay more than the net benefits they receive. 
Besides, the low average value of the redistribution index (IRESI) indicates that the effects are 
not very strong, although substantial differences between types of projects do exist. As already 
mentioned, due to the small sample size of some sub-sets, these results should only be 
considered representative of the concrete set of projects analysed and should not be used to infer 
general conclusions on the different infrastructure types. 
According to the IREM’s outputs, both for the high-speed railway (HSR) and the joint projects 
in the sample indicate that all affected generations obtain benefits that are higher than the actual 
payments they have to bear (GUIaverage =0% with GUIsd =0.0). For both sub-samples T&S>0, 
which shows a positive bias toward future generations, even though there exist some differential 
effects among generations (IRESIaverage>0). As a result, according to the flow chart shown in 
Figure V-1, they could be labelled “fair and positive investments for future generations”, 
provided that they have overcome the previous tests on efficiency, etc. 
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Table V-5. IREM statistical outcomes by type of project (*) 
Type of 
infrastructure 
Sample 
Size  
GUI Trend & Slope (T&S) IRESI 
average sd average sd average sd 
Total sample 22 5.3% 12.2 +64.8g 28.4 0.14 0.20 
HSR projects 3 0.0% 0.0 +86.9g 8.9 0.32 0.28 
UPT projects 9 12.2% 17.2 +54.9g 34.6 0.11 0.20 
Motorway projects 8 0.8% 2.2 +67.1g 25.8 0.13 0.19 
Joint projects  2 0.0% 0.0 +66.9g 13.2 0.04 0.03 
(*) Low values for GUI and IRESI with sound positive values for T&S imply that, overall, the 
intergenerational impact of the projects in the sample should be considered positive. 
Source: Author’s database 
For the group of projects within the UPT sample, which consists of investments in both metro 
and tramway infrastructure to extend the UPT network in different metropolitan areas, the results 
of the model indicate that most generations obtain positive gaps (GUIaverage<13%). On the other 
hand, intergenerational redistribution appears as rather unimportant (IRESIaverage=0.11) and the 
evolution over time of the projects’ effects on the concerned generations is positive 
(T&Saverage=+54.9g). Thus, the overall intergenerational impact of the UPT projects should be 
considered as fairly positive even if the financial structure appears as controversial for a number 
projects (GUIsd=17.2). This signals that there might be an equity issue and therefore it is 
necessary to analyse in depth the adopted financial model and the impacts on the annual 
generations concerned, which are the inputs behind the IREM’s indicators. It must be pointed out 
that equity issues are not always sufficient to label as WEs projects that were previously 
considered as efficient and financially sustainable from a traditional approach.  
The results of the model for investments in motorways suggest that the sample, if the projects 
have passed the feasibility tests, does not contain WEs (GUIaverage=0.8% with GUIsd=2.2). They 
tend to benefit future generations (T&Saverage=+67.1g), although there are significant variations 
on the intensity of the benefits (T&Ssd=25.8). However, it must be taken into account that all the 
projects in the database are PPPs channelled through special purpose vehicles (SPVs)12 holding 
long-term concessions based, in turn, on design-build-finance-maintain & operate (DBFMO) 
contracts. Hence, the financial structures shown in Table V-6 cannot be considered 
representative of the whole motorway sector. The IREM indicators for both motorway and 
bridge projects (road sample) suggest that: a) on average, the overlapping generations affected 
by these projects do not pay more than the benefits they receive from the investments; b) the 
statistical outputs do not reflect important intergenerational redistributive impacts 
(IRESIaverage=0.07; IRESIsd=0.16); and c) whilst the sample should not be deemed representative 
of the global road project population, it can be argued that, when channelled through PPPs, most 
road investments seem to be fair regarding the intergenerational redistribution effects. 
In short, the transport infrastructure projects in the sample show, in general, a positive bias 
toward future individuals (T&Saverage=+64.8g), even if concrete annual generations tend to pay 
more than the net benefits they receive (GUIaverage=5.3%). Moreover, the average value of the 
IRESI suggests that the intergenerational redistributive effects amongst generations are not very 
strong (IRESIaverage=0.14), although differences among projects do exist (IRESIsd=0.20). 
 
                                                   
12 The investment vehicle chosen by the GPI to develop transport infrastructure projects may be totally public, being 
managed by the Administration itself or by a public agency or company, or totally or partially private (usually 
through an SPV) when carried out through a PPP. 
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Table V-6. Financial structures of the motorway projects in the sample 
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− 0% 34.0% 4.6% 30.0% 31.4% 0% 0% 
06/100-02 2012 − 2.3% 9.0% 38.4% 24.2% 26.0% 0% 0% 
07/004-01 2003 − 2.0% 47.0% 2.6% 31.8% 16.6% 0% 0% 
07/006-02 2006 − 8.8% 28.8% 1.7% 38.3% 22.4% 0% 0% 
07/006-03 2006 − 6.6% 46.8% 0.4% 35.3% 10.9% 0% 0% 
07/006-05 2006 − 5.8% 25.5% 6.6% 41.6% 20.5% 0% 0% 
07/007-06 2007 − 0% 16.6% 26.2% 30.8% 26.4% 0% 0% 
08/908-01 1998 − 0% 30.8% 30.8% 24.6% 13.9% 0% 0% 
Source: Author’s database 
 
5. A CASE STUDY: TOLL-FREE MOTORWAYS OF ANDALUSIA (SPAIN) 
IREM has been applied to a set of different toll-free stretches13 of motorways that the Agency of 
Infrastructures of Andalusia (Spain) intended to build in the early 2010’s as part of a strategic 
transport plan of regional scope. In projects “05/007-04” and “05/102-05” demand forecasts 
mainly depend on the GPI’s estimates on the ability of the new motorways to gather existing 
traffic from disperse routes in target areas, while in project “05/102-06” some 50% of the yearly 
demand forecasts comes from induced traffic as it was expected that this toll-free motorway 
would increase the economic activity in the surrounding area. As the purpose of this exercise is 
to show how IREM can be used to detect WEs, the early steps of the phase “project analysis” 
shown in Figure V-1 (implications from regulations, environmental impact assessment, etc.) and, 
in particular, the analysis on whether estimates on costs and benefits and demand forecasts were 
biased or not and other factors affecting the quality of the CBA falls out of the scope of this 
paper. The taxes expected to be collected from the additional fuel consumption of induced traffic 
have been considered in the analysis of intergenerational impact, as they do have an impact in 
the IREM model.  
Table V-7. Economic and Financial Rates of Return of the Andalusian motorways 
Project ID Project Description ENPV i ERRi FRRi (*) 
05/007-04 Autovía de la Almanzora. Tramo Baza-Purchena 12.9 M€ (SDR=5.0%) 5.4% 10.7% 
05/102-05 Autovía A-306. Tramo Torredonjimeno-El Carpio 52.8 M€ (SDR=3.0%) 4.0% 11.7% 
05/102-06 Autovía de la Cuenca Minera. Conexión N-435 con A-66 71.0 M€ (SDR=4.5%) 9.2% 11.6% 
(*) Financial rate of return values correspond to the project’s overall profitability for the private investors14. 
Source: Author’s database 
                                                   
13 Relevant information has been obtained from the Government of Andalusia (Junta de Andalucía) official website; 
“Estudio de viabiidad económico-financiera para la construcción, conservación y explotación”; contract dossiers n. 
1-AA-2900-1.0-0.0-EG (Autovía del Almanzora en la A-334. Tramo Baza-Purchena), n. 1-AA-2902.0-0.0-EG 
(Autovía de la Cuenca Minera. Conexión de la N-435 con la autovía A-66, Ruta de la Plata) and n. 1-AA-2905-2.0-
0.0-EG (Autovía A-306. Tramo Torredonjimeno – El Carpio). 
14 The overall profitability for the private investors has been calculated comparing both the cash-outflows needed for 
the SPV to complete the whole investment and the SPV’s set-up costs with the cash-inflows expected for the 
concessionaire before debt repayment during the concession period. To calculate the profitability for investors, the 
overall capital invested by the SPV has been compared with the overall income for the SPV during the concession 
period once debt amortisation and interests as well as other legal provisions are discounted. Finally, the profitability 
for the equity holders has been calculated comparing it with the revenues for the SPV after debt repayment. 
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The assessments performed by the Spanish GPI indicate that the projects should not be 
considered as white elephants (cf. Table V-7), as socioeconomic CBAs showed positive results 
and the high financial return for the private sector indicated that the projects were financially 
sustainable provided that the Agency would have sufficient budget to pay for the envisaged 
availability payments15. It is worthwhile noting that such studies (“screening of socioeconomic 
viability” and “financial analysis” in Figure V-1) were produced in the context of the Financial 
Crisis (2007-2012), when the use of concession contracts was considered to be a good option to 
attract private financing to (provisionally) relieve public budgets, and also that, according to the 
authors’ knowledge, the Agency of Infrastructures of Andalusia did not run any analysis on 
equity considerations once the decision to carry out the projects was adopted. 
The proposed financing structure was based on a DBFMO agreement establishing that the 
concessionaire finances the totality of the project construction as well as the operation and 
maintenance costs. The GPI pays a yearly concession fee, subject to availability conditions, once 
the motorway is implemented. The yearly “availability payments” depend on the 
accomplishment of pre-defined objectives on quality and safety for the motorway as well as on 
certain operation obligations regarding critical aspects in case of emergency situations. The 
availability payment can increase if demand rises above certain pre-defined limits. The 
conditions described in the payment mechanism imply that the GPI will practically always pay 
the maximum yearly concession fee, as the factors that could somehow reduce it depend on 
availability criteria with minimum-service requirements that are easily achieved and are subject 
to self-monitoring. This financing formula appears well suited for institutional investors, as any 
experienced concessionaire could be expected to obtain reasonable financial profits for equity 
investors and guarantee the restitution of the funds obtained from funding institutions, while the 
risks of incurring in losses are quite limited.  
 
5.1. ANALISYS OF INTERGENERATIONAL IMPACT   
The IREM’s outputs for the Spanish motorways (cf. Table V-8) indicate that most generations of 
taxpayers will pay for the projects whilst a few users will obtain net benefits (GUIaverage=69.8%). 
Furthermore, as 𝐺𝐴𝑃 < 0 , because gaps between the socioeconomic net benefits and the 
financial provisions are negative for most generations in projects “05/007-04 and 05/102-05”, 
the indicators T&S and IRESI are not really relevant for the analysis of intergenerational impact 
(see Table V-2). As a result, these two projects should be labelled as “very unfair” (VUF) and 
regressive (RGS) respectively. By contrast, project “05/102-06” obtains a 𝐺𝐴𝑃 > 0 as well as a 
T&S>0 despite GUI≈40% and, thus, the intergenerational impact of the project “05/102-06” 
could be considered positive but unfair, so the project is labelled as “UF+”. 
Table V-8. Main results from IREM for the Spanish motorway projects 
PROJECT IREM’s OUTPUTS Project 
Label Project ID Type of Infrastructure 𝐺𝐴𝑃 SD GUI T&S IRESI 
05/007-04 Toll-free motorway –6.7 M€ 10.8 M€ 68.8%  +40.7g 0.13 VUF 
05/102-05 Toll-free motorway –47.1 M€ 6.6 M€ 100%  −7.0g 0.97 RGS 
05/102-06 Toll-free motorway 3.6 M€ 8.3 M€ 40.6%  +36.8g 0.03 UF+ 
Source: Author 
 
 
                                                   
15 An interesting digression would be to check why the Junta would not use available EU funds for these 
investments. Contrary to upfront grants, availability payments are not eligible to ERDF or other grant programmes. 
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The singularities of the motorway project with code “05/102-05” are particularly striking. The 
payments borne by the individuals affected (taxpayers) are higher than the socioeconomic net 
benefits generated by the project (cf. Figure V-7), which suggests that demand expectations 
could be seriously flawed (biased). As a consequence, it is highly likely that the results of a 
properly executed CBA, using an appropriate discount rate, would have recommended against 
this PPP. In intergenerational terms, the gap for any generation is negative, meaning that the 
project will deliver poor net socioeconomic benefits over the years for the whole of the society in 
comparison with the financial provisions that the future taxpayers will endure as a consequence 
of the financing formula adopted (cf. Figure V-8).  
Figure V-7. Socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the project “05/102-05” 
 
Source: Author 
This simple analysis does not provide information about whether some generations are more or 
less affected by the financial model than others, but it is clear that equity issues will arise during 
the project lifespan due to the financing formula adopted by the Andalusian Agency. The 
project’s net benefits and the financing impact during the construction phase (cf. Figure V-7) 
appear quite balanced but, from the time of project commissioning, the financing requirements 
are twice the increase in resources obtained for the whole of society. As a result, every annual 
generation involved in the project “05/102-05” obtains a negative gap (cf. Figure V-8). 
Figure V-8. Time profile of the generational gaps of the project “05/102-05” 
 
Source: Author 
Moreover, this project has a negative trend (T&S = – 7.0g), even though the slope is very small 
(cf. Figure V-9). This means that, while its rather low ERR may be deemed acceptable, the 
project’s redistributive effects appear as regressive to future generations and thus would be a 
potential drag on the economy in the long run. Moreover, the financing formula leads the 
indicator of redistribution to its maximum rate (IRESI = 0.97), which means that there are strong 
divergences among the generations involved regarding (and irrespective of) the general trend of 
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the project. As shown in Figure V-9 the gaps for generations 6 to 22 are below the line that 
represents the locus where the gaps average is null (dashed line), meaning that they will be 
adversely affected by the negative gaps of the project with more intensity than generations 1 to 5 
and 23 to 32 above the dashed line.  
Figure V-9. Time profile of the generational redistributive impact of the project “05/102-05” 
 
Source: Author 
In sum, the outcomes provided by the GPI for the motorway project “05/102-05” suggest that 
this investment could be viable for Andalusia as it shows an acceptable socioeconomic 
profitability (ENPV= 57.8 M€; ERR=4.0%; B/C=1.14). Besides, regarding the financing formula 
explained before, the business case appears as a cost-effective operation for the set of private 
investors as 1) the earning generated by the project widely exceeds its anticipate costs 
(FNPV=321.52M€), 2) the opportunity cost linked to this operation is soundly covered by the 
equity return (FRR=11.7%) and, 3) the project will pay for itself in an acceptable period of time 
(Payback period: 8 years).  
Similar conclusions can be achieved for the case of institutional investors (FNPV=242.12M€; 
FRR=13.1%; Payback period: 12 years) and equity holders (FNPV=207.48M€; FRR=11.7%; 
Payback period: 13 years). Accordingly, it is also an attractive business case for private credit 
entities. Nonetheless, from the intergenerational perspective, the IREM’s outputs indicate that 
this project should be labelled as regressive because no overlapping generation within the project 
lifecycle obtains net benefits higher that the corresponding financial burden and, furthermore, the 
financial burden is increasingly higher than the expected socioeconomic net benefits for the 
generations involved. It could be argued that part of the payments made by users and taxpayers 
are returning to their generation through the financial profits of private stakeholders which, in 
this case, seem relevant. The intergenerational effects of these profits have been disregarded. 
Besides the difficulties of getting the required information on amounts and distribution over the 
years, a subject to be eventually developed for the IREM, the flows involved should be modest 
and, in principle, of similar value over the years and have, therefore, little effect on the model 
outcomes. 
The financing formula chosen by the Agency of Infrastructures of Andalusia to develop its 
regional road network through DBFMO agreements also appears as unfair from an 
intergenerational perspective for the two projects with 𝐺𝐴𝑃 < 0, but with special intensity for 
the project “05/102-05”, where GUI=100%. The IREM’s outcomes suggest that the Agency 
should have chosen better financing structures for these projects16 (“05/007-04” and “05/102-
05”).  
                                                   
16 It seems, however, that the model is fashionable, at least in Spain. The PIC (the Investment Plan in the national 
Road Network of Spain) promoted by the former national government during the first half of 2018 in general and, in 
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In short, although there is a need for additional research with larger samples of case studies, 
these results indicate that the combination of projects showing modest usefulness from a 
socioeconomic point of view –in terms of CBA outputs– and inappropriate financing formulae 
may potentially result in redistributive effects that are very unfair, even regressive, for 
generations to come. When the envisaged overall utility of the project in terms of resources for 
the successive generations is not substantial, it is possible that the actual financial charges linked 
to the main investment that future taxpayers will have to bear are so high that the project should 
be labelled as a WE due to the unfairness of the resulting intergenerational redistribution. 
In the particular case of the motorway projects 05/007-04 and 05-102/05, both the negative 
average of the generational gap (intergenerational utility) and the negative intergenerational 
performance are a result of poor project’s socioeconomic benefits over the years in combination 
with the financial burden linked to the PPP arrangements intended by the Agency of 
Infrastructures of Andalusia.  It could be argued that the harmful intergenerational effects could 
be avoided with a shorter concession period or reducing the profits expectations for the private 
agents involved. However, an experienced analyst might judge the demand forecasts as 
overoptimistic. A more realistic scenario would result in lower net benefits, which also affect the 
GAP values. On the other hand, even if there is a real motive to adopt PPP solutions to expand 
the road network of Andalusia, there are probably other sustainable financing solutions that 
would be fairer to future generations. DBFMO contracts are a development solution for transport 
infrastructure that very often entail a substantial increase of the public expenditure linked to the 
project compared to other solutions based on conventional public procurement contracts 
(Penyalver et al., 2019). It is surprising that none of the agents involved in the financing process 
seemed to have observed that, for both projects17, the yearly financial provisions during the 
project life cycle were, overall, higher than the (high) estimates of yearly socioeconomic net 
benefits. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The white elephant concept refers to integrated investment programmes or major infrastructure 
projects apparently convenient for society that, however, represent a severe misallocation of 
society’s resources. This misallocation is typically related to the results of a cost-benefit 
analysis. Although efficiency should be the main concern of the government promoting the 
investment, CBA, which measures the socioeconomic efficiency of the project from the 
perspective of the society at the time when the decision to invest is taken, is often not the real 
determinant of investment decisions. Financial considerations are often critical in such decisions 
and they are not always leading to adequate solutions. In any case, a main concern of any 
decision-maker should be that financial structuring ensures that all major participants in the 
project are able to comply with their liabilities. Even efficient projects may become WEs if their 
financial sustainability is not properly ensured through adequate long-term commitments with 
capacity to prevent potential cash shortfalls.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
particular, the project “Eje Norte-Sur de Murcia” (Eje viario alternativo a la autovía A-30 entre Archena y el enlace 
la Paloma), which counts on the support of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments (EFSI), replicates, with small differences, the main distinctive features of the financing 
formula used by the Agency of Infrastructures of Andalusia (explained in the introduction of Section 4). 
17 Only the project with code “05/007-04” was actually tendered and awarded under private finance, through a PPP, 
in 2007. Before the start of the works, the GPI decided to cancel the concession contract and to carry out this project 
under a traditional contracting-out model. This decision was appealed to the Court of Justice by the concessionaire. 
At the moment, the concessionaire still claims millions in compensation. 
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The project’s redistributive effects could also derail the implementation of a project and convert 
it into a WE, as they may have strong negative impacts on specific project stakeholders or on 
social and territorial groups. The lack of a comprehensive procedure to detect potential WEs 
could favour, in practice, that decision makers base their investment decisions on political 
grounds rather than on a proper analysis of their long-term effects for the agents concerned. 
The aim of this paper is the development of a methodological proposal to detect WEs. Its focus 
is, however, on the long-term impacts of the project, which are those that characterise WEs. The 
discounting process of the standard CBA expresses a “present generation” approach. 
Incorporating the intergenerational redistribution effects in project appraisal means going beyond 
this approach. The comparison of net benefits with the actual financial payments of users and 
taxpayers (who are finally paying for the loans and other financial mechanisms used to structure 
the finance of the project) for the various generations affected during the long project cycle, 
through a specific model (IREM), allows assessing the fairness of the redistribution of the 
project effects across these generations. 
IREM has been applied to a set of projects of different typologies. The results indicate that this 
model is suited to perform a proper analysis of intergenerational redistributive effects. The 
IREM indicators offer valuable insights to identify those projects that would represent a clearly 
unfair treatment of future generations, in spite of showing an acceptable socioeconomic return 
for the current society. A major finding of this research is actually that projects showing modest 
usefulness from a socioeconomic point of view may easily entail redistributive effects that are 
very unfair, even regressive, for generations to come, when they are implemented through 
inappropriate financing formulae and should be labelled as a WE. 
The IREM’s outputs may help public managers to both 1) prove that the investment-strategy’s, 
i.e. the combination of project’s effects and financial package, is useful to sustain the well-being 
of future generations; and 2) adopt financing formulae that smooth down the redistributive 
effects among the successive generations involved in long-term investments. The paper analyses, 
in more detail some Spanish motorway concession projects that the Government of Andalusia 
intended to carry out by having recourse to DBFMO contracts. Whilst this financing mechanism 
allows to align the financial provisions (yearly payments through a concession fee) with the 
project performance in the long run, the results show that some projects, which could appear 
acceptable under the traditional decision-making process, entail financial implications that make 
them very unfair for future generations and should thus be considered white elephants. Either the 
funding formula should be modified or the motorway in question should not be built under the 
current delivery model. 
Finally, the results of this research stress that the financing formula of major transport 
infrastructures, which are very often defined at the later stages of decision-making, should be 
considered earlier and as a key factor of the process, both to check their financial sustainability 
and the compliance with the principle of intergenerational fairness. 
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8. APPENDIX A: COMPUTATION OF THE IREM INDICATORS; AN OVERVIEW 
IREM18 is an overlapping generations model that allows to compare the time profile of the net 
socioeconomic benefits (B), obtained from the annuities of the CBA, produced by a project with 
the time profile of the financing impact (FI) stemming from the project’s financing formula 
through the concept of “annual generation” (Penyalver & Turró, 2017). As FI is determined by 
the payment schedule foreseen for the project that users and/or taxpayers are bound to honour, 
through the investment vehicle chosen by the GPI, the FI time profile includes tolls, fees, etc. 
levied on the various users and/or the funds devoted to the project coming from the public 
budgets either to reimburse the loans (principal and interests) assigned to the project or to pay for 
the investment, operation and maintenance costs not covered by the former loans (cf. Figure V-
A1). 
Figure V-A1. Key sources of financing and links of cash in/out-flows to obtain the financing impact (FI) 
 
Source: Penyalver & Turró, 2017 
There are a number of steps that the analyst must follow to perform a proper analysis of the 
project’s intergenerational impact. Following Penyalver & Turró, 2017, the first step consists of 
calculating the difference (Di) between net benefits value (Bi) and financing impact (FIi) for each 
year, i, across the project life cycle.  
                                                   
18 This Appendix is a synthesis of the original paper that describes the IREM model: “Assessing the fairness of a 
project financing formula on successive generations” (Penyalver & Turró, 2017) 
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Next, it is possible to calculate the gap for each annual generation (GAPi) from the weights (wj) 
of the weighting curve19 that represents a standard annual generation in IREM (cf. Equation V-
A1). 
Equation V-A1.Calculation of the GAP for an annual generation in year i  
𝐺𝐴𝑃! = 𝐷! · 𝑤!   ;   𝑤! = 1!!!!!!
!!!
!!!   
The times profile of the generational gaps allows to identify how the financing burden is shared 
each year between users and taxpayers and what is the gap between the net benefits from the 
project and the amounts paid. As negative gaps are perceived more strongly than positive ones, 
with the size of these positive effects being relatively irrelevant, the existence of a potential 
problem of unfairness treatment can be simply quantified through the Generational Unfairness 
Indicator (GUI), which gives the percentage of the number of generations with negative gaps 
(NEGAP) over the total annual generations (N) considered (cf. Equation V-A2). 
Equation V-A2. Calculation of GUI 𝐺𝑈𝐼 = 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑁 · 100 
To calculate the rest of the IREM’s indicators, it is necessary to use a common baseline to 
compare the intergenerational effects of different options available to finance them. In order to 
do so, the analyst has to calculate, first, the average value of the different generational gaps 
obtained along the project lifespan (𝐺𝐴𝑃) and, next, the intergenerational gap (GAPintg-i) for 
each year according to Equations V-A3 and V-A4. 
Equation V-A3. Calculation of the 𝐺𝐴𝑃 𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝐺𝐴𝑃!!!!!𝑁    
 
Equation V-A4. Calculation of the intergenerational GAP 𝐺𝐴𝑃!"#$!! = 𝐺𝐴𝑃! − 𝐺𝐴𝑃  
The variations over the life cycle of GAPintg-i indicate whether some annual generations are more 
or less affected by the financial model than others. However, as the impacts on society of future 
gaps are mitigated by the wealth growth of its members, which is usually measured through the 
GDP (gross domestic product), the above calculations have to be modified to take into account 
the reduced value of the gaps between expected net socioeconomic benefits and payments for 
generations20 to come. It is done as shown in Equation V-A5, discounting from the GAPintg-i 
series the long-term annual growth of GDP/c following an exponential pattern similar to the 
social discount rate. The modified intergenerational gap for each generation is represented as 
GAPX-i.  
                                                   
19 This concept has been presented in the epigraph 4 of this paper. The weights (inputs) to be used for the calculation 
of the GAPi are also shown in Table 1 and Figure 3 of point 4. 
20 In IREM, the weights (wj) for each year within an annual generation define, together with its timespan, the 
relevance for society of the project’s effects considering the reduced value of non-central years. Reducing the 
GAPintg-i values by means of the GDP/c aims at representing society’s long-term wealth growth. Thus, each 
mechanism of time discounting has a different target and function (double discounting is avoided).  
Section V. Hunting white elephants on the road.  
A practical procedure to detect harmful projects of transport infrastructure 
 
Penyalver, D. (2019) - 118 - 
 
Equation V-A5. Calculation of modified intergenerational GAP 𝐺𝐴𝑃 !!! = 𝐺𝐴𝑃!"#$!!(1 + 𝑇𝐶!"#/!)(!!!) 
The distance of each GAPX-i with regards to the geometrical line resulting from the linear 
regression of the whole intergenerational gap series allows determining whether a specific 
generation is more positively (or negatively) affected than others. The separation of the yearly 
values from the trend, represented through the coefficient of determination of the GAPX-i series 
(R2GAP[X]), provides information about the redistributive effects that occur due to the financing 
formula of the project and how they affect different generations of users and taxpayers 
(intergenerational effects). To facilitate the understanding of the redistributive intergenerational 
effects, the model defines the Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Sharing Index (IRESI), 
which offers information on the overall intensity of the intergenerational redistributive effects 
(cf. Equation V-A6).  
Equation V-A6. Calculation of IRESI 𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼 = 1 − 𝑅!"# [!]!  ;    𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼 ∈ [0,1] 
 
On the other hand, the trend of the best-fit line indicates whether, globally, the proposed 
financing structure will tend to (relatively) benefit or harm future generations. The slope of the 
regression gives the strength of the gap in favour of future generations. As a result, the indicator 
“Trend and Slope” (T&S) provides information about the evolution over time of the effects of 
the project on the concerned annual generations (intergenerational performance). The bigger the 
angle of the slope the highest will be the benefits for generations to come.  
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SECTION VI. MEASURING THE VALUE FOR MONEY OF TRANSPORT 
 INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENT; AN INTERGENERATIONAL APPROACH 
Penyalver, D., Turró, M. & Williamson, J.B., 2019 
Abstract 
Cost-benefit analysis is essential for decision-making in connection with major transport projects 
and integrated investment programmes. Projects of transport infrastructure have traditionally 
been publicly promoted and managed, but funded through both public and private sources. While 
budget allocations are always somehow present, the financing of the project may involve private 
participation, including user fees and loans of various types. Actually, management models 
involving private actors have been increasingly used in recent decades. The background 
supporting this trend is that private ingenuity and expertise in dealing with risk improves overall 
project efficiency enough to compensate for the additional expenditure generated by these 
models. In addition, the government promoting the investment may use private finance as a 
mechanism to place it off-budget. 
Current methods of project appraisal, in particular cost-benefit analysis, look at actions from the 
point of view of today’s society. Decision makers usually determine the financing formula after 
the decision to build has been adopted, which should ideally follow a positive conclusion on the 
efficiency of the project. But the financing formula has an impact across the successive 
generations of users and/or taxpayers that will end up footing the bill stemming from the 
investment. This paper actually highlights the importance of looking closely at the 
intergenerational effects of the adopted financing mechanism to ensure its fairness and 
convenience. It describes the outcomes obtained from the analysis of the intergenerational 
impacts performed with IREM –a model developed precisely to analyse these effects– to a set of 
urban public transport infrastructure projects. The IREM results show that public-private 
partnerships, although often entailing a substantial increase of the public expenditure linked to 
these projects compared to conventional procurement mechanisms, are typically better in terms 
of intergenerational fairness. This conclusion cannot be extended to all PPPs, as it depends on 
the alternative public sector funding, but it is a strong argument in favour of including in the 
Value for Money analysis of PPPs, besides the standard efficiency and financial considerations, 
an analysis of the intergenerational effects of the different procurement options and to compare 
these effects with those of the purely public financing alternative 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The convenience of major infrastructure projects for society is typically determined through an 
analysis of efficiency by using cost-benefit analysis CBA (Bristow & Nellthorp, 2000; Meunier 
et al., 2013). The main advantage of CBA compared to other appraisal methods is that it allows 
decision makers to compare various alternative investment-options at a given point of time 
through simple key indicators of the project’s efficiency (Thomopoulos et al., 2009). This is 
done using a discounting mechanism that, through the social discount rate, transforms future 
costs and benefits into an economic net present value (ENPV). The ENPV is actually a key 
indicator to measure the future utility of the project for the generation in which the decision is 
taken, as it represents the additional welfare for the present society, as a whole, generated during 
the project lifecycle (Gollier, 2011; Boardman et al., 2017). CBA is also considered critical for 
determining which projects are appropriate to be developed through public-private partnerships, 
PPPs (Saavedra & Bozeman, 2004; Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011). In this case, the question of 
interest is whether the Value for Money1 (VfM) of alternative delivery models to typical 
infrastructure procurement2 (TIP) is high enough to compensate the additional costs of locating 
trading partners and executing transactions under different forms of economic organisations and 
contractual arrangements (transaction costs). It is worth noting here that, in the socioeconomic 
CBA, the payments between the government agency (Government Promoting the Investment, 
GPI) and private actors will be treated as an expenditure on the public side that is fully 
compensated by the revenue for private actors within the period (year) the resources are 
consumed and generated (DG-Regio, 2015). 
In the transport sector VfM typically refers to the (likely) additional efficiency for the whole 
society brought about by the private participation in project financing and management (EPEC, 
2011; ITF, 2018). Infrastructure provision has been traditionally publicly financed, directly out 
of general tax revenues and usually by having recourse to some type of contracting-out 
mechanism (Vickerman, 2004). But in recent decades governments have been encouraged to 
favour private finance in an effort to access a wider range of resources and expertise (Bryson et 
al., 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991) as well as due to growing concerns over the recurrent budgetary 
deficits of public administrations (Debande, 2002; Vickerman, 2004; Vecchi et al., 2017). 
Private participation in project financing is not a new idea (Eichengreen, 1995); pure concessions 
and other types of PPPs have been traditionally used with the argument that they enhance project 
efficiency and efficacy, because PPP arrangements allow introducing incentives that can favour 
infrastructure delivery and service provision at the lowest costs (Hodge & Greeve, 2009; Eadie 
et al., 2013; Sarmento, 2014). The use of private finance can be, however, controversial. The 
private participation entails high transaction costs for projects unfolding over long timespans 
(Vining & Boardman, 2008) because PPP participants have different goals (Forrer et al., 2010) 
and, as the contracts cannot be fully specified (Hart, 2002; Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010), 
there is a substantial amount of preparatory and monitoring work to be carried out that is much 
more cumbersome than in TIP.  
                                                   
1 The VfM concept can broadly be defined as what a government judges to be an optimal combination of quantity, 
quality, features and costs, expected over the whole of the project lifespan (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011). 
Although it is broadly defined in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Diamond, 2005), VfM is related to 
the idea that PPPs can produce a flow of services at least equivalent in quality to that which could be provided by 
the public sector but a lower overall cost (Sarmento, 2010). This increase in efficiency can be delivered through risk 
transfer, innovation, greater asset utilisation and integrated whole-of-life management (Fitzgerald, 2004). 
2 The concept “traditional infrastructure procurement” (TIP) refers to conventional public procurement contracts, 
separately awarded for construction and maintenance, traditionally used by a contracting public sector entity for 
infrastructure construction and services delivery (Debande, 2002; Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011).  
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From the point of view of society, the best way to provide infrastructure is the arrangement that 
better fulfils its agreed objectives. Obviously, a main objective is always the maximisation of 
efficiency in terms of resources that is commonly measured through CBA. There are, however, 
other critical aspects to judge. Vining & Boardman (2008) suggest that one potential criterion is 
that the GPI should seek to minimise the overall expenditure linked to the project, holding 
quality constant. However, decision makers usually determine the project’s financing formula 
after the decision to build3 has been adopted. As a consequence, the probable incidence of the 
formula on production costs is very often ignored, even though these costs could alter the 
ranking of infrastructure delivery models (Vining & Boardman, 2008). In addition, when dealing 
with long-term investments, the delivery model in general and, in particular, the financing 
formula chosen by the GPI have the potential to change the relation between the actual payments 
and the net socioeconomic benefits4 apprehended over time by the individuals concerned, 
grouped in annual generations5 (Penyalver et al., 2017). This could severely affect some of the 
objectives that were included in the initial considerations for the project construction. The 
desired fairness of the impacts distribution of the project over its lifecycle is particularly relevant 
for the decision-making process (Turró & Penyalver, 2019). 
The Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model IREM (Penyalver & Turró, 2017) is a 
microeconomic tool, complementary to traditional economic approaches and decision-making 
methodologies, that allows looking closely at the redistributive effects of the overall public 
expenditure from an intergenerational perspective (Turró & Penyalver, 2019). Major investments 
aiming at enhancing the welfare of different generations should contribute to meet the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future individuals to meet their own needs 
(sustainability condition). Thus, they cannot be fully justified without at least careful 
consideration of the impact on those who will be alive in the decades ahead, including those who 
are young today, or even unborn, and may end up bearing much of the actual payments in 
relation to the investment if it is funded with long-term debt. Actually, this paper shows that 
there is a need to go deeper into intergenerational redistribution effects to ensure the fairness of 
the adopted financial scheme. Taking an intergenerational approach in the decision-making of 
long-term investments and financial plans through IREM, which has been developed precisely to 
analyse these effects, can offer complementary insights on the VfM of the different financial 
structures for the same project. 
The paper is organised as follows: The next section provides background on alternative financial 
mechanisms for infrastructure provision and points out key considerations surrounding the 
intergenerational redistributive effects of the overall expenditure involved in the development of 
major transport projects, whatever the specific delivery model. Section 3 provides arguments on 
why the metrics obtained from IREM provide valuable insights of the VfM for both TPI and PPP 
delivery model for any financial scheme. In section 4, the intergenerational impact analysis 
                                                   
3 The time of making the decision to build the project is usually the time the project was formally given the go-
ahead (Flyvbjerg, 2005). When this date is not available or representative, the date of project approval by the main 
financiers can be adopted as the time of decision. 
4 In IREM, net benefits refer to the difference between the resources generated and consumed annually by the 
project. Investment costs are, however, excluded from this calculation because the objective is to compare the 
impact of the project for the whole of society with the actual payment schedule stemming from the project’s 
financing formula affecting both taxpayers and users. For more details see Penyalver & Turró (2017). 
5 Since Mannheim’s “The problem of generations” (1923), the concept of “generation” or “social generation” has 
been used in the sense of “cohort”, which refers to people within a delineated population who experience the same 
significant event within a given period of time (Pilcher, 1994). But the concept of “annual generation”, which refers 
to the group of individuals affected by the effects of a major transport infrastructure project over time, is more 
explicit, as defines the number of years (or timespan) included in the (social) generation and allows representing the 
individuals’ preferences on such effects through a survey-based weighting curve (Penyalver et al., 2017).  
Section VI. Measuring the value for money of transport infrastructure procurement; an international approach 
 
Penyalver, D. (2019) - 122 - 
 
model (IREM) is applied to different financial schemes for a set of projects of transport 
infrastructure already developed within metropolitan areas. The aim of this effort is to deliver 
evidence on whether the added value of financial structures sustaining traditional infrastructure 
procurement is lower or not than for alternative public-private partnerships. Finally, Section 5 
offers general conclusions and policy recommendations in terms of intergenerational fairness.  
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE FINANCING 
STRUCTURE ADOPTED FOR INVESTMENT IN MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS 
2.1. MAIN EFFECTS OF FINANCING SOURCES FOR SOCIETY 
Cost-benefit analysis compares the costs and the benefits of a project over its whole lifecycle. In 
socioeconomic CBA, the costs and benefits in terms of resources affecting those individuals 
belonging to the society of each year are estimated to assess if the project is worthwhile, i.e. 
efficient. This is done using a discount formula that gives an indication of the value of the 
project for the extant society (i.e. the Net Present Value, NPV), implying a progressive reduction 
of the weight of the effects the more remote they are. In terms of costs, most of the resources 
consumed are those linked to the construction phase and to the operation and maintenance 
(O&M) stemming from the investment. The benefits generated by major infrastructure projects 
come mainly from direct benefits to users (improved services, operating costs savings, safety 
improvements, etc.), as well as from other positive effects for users and non-users of the region 
where the investment takes place (e.g., increase in competitiveness, reduction in local pollution) 
and for the whole society (e.g., reduction in greenhouse emissions). Positive externalities related 
to indirect effects occurring in secondary markets, such as displacement of activities, which are 
irrelevant in a general equilibrium setting, are seldom taken into account in CBA, at least in the 
EU (DG-Regio, 2015), but negative externalities, in particular those related to the environment 
are getting an increasing weight in project evaluation. 
The socioeconomic CBA assigns both costs and benefits to the year when the consumption and 
generation of resources occur. This is logical in terms of resource accounting, but it does not 
reflect what is actually happening. The positive effects of the project are indeed mostly 
perceived by individuals belonging to the society of the year in question, i.e. the users and, 
generally, the society “of each moment” (which can be referred as a “generation”). However, the 
actual money payments for the investment and its operation and maintenance are defined by the 
financing formula adopted. Such payments are ultimately made by users, through direct 
payments such as tolls, and/or by taxpayers feeding the public budgets contributing to the 
project.  
Major infrastructure projects (transport projects, in particular) are traditionally funded by means 
of budgetary contributions. In this case, the contributions included in the budget annuities of the 
GPI during the construction phase are often covering only a small part of the total cost, so the 
GPI is bound to obtain loans of different characteristics, emit project bonds or use other 
mechanisms6 to get the required short-term money availability to pay the construction bills. The 
common financing instruments for infrastructure investments are reimbursed over a long period 
to ensure the financial sustainability of the project, essential for its long-term success (Turró & 
Penyalver, 2019). On the other hand, it is worth stressing here that loans are “money transfers” 
that are not relevant for the CBA because they do not involve resource consumption or 
                                                   
6 While public debt and even project bonds could have tenures of several decades, loans to specific projects hardly 
ever go beyond 25-30 years.  
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generation. Unless some of these money transfers are external to the “society”, they are neutral 
in terms of resources7. 
The model that is chosen for infrastructure delivery, while not directly affecting socioeconomic 
profitability, has nevertheless a clear impact on public accounts (Boardman & Vining, 2010). 
Project-specific financial instruments are always checked for their public deficit/debt 
implications8. When they are strong enough, they may affect the cost of the GPI’s debt emissions 
and therefore its expenditure opportunities and the options open to its future decision-makers. 
This “external” impact could be particularly strong when there are costs overruns and delays, 
which are quite common for major infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018), as the 
consequent (and urgent) need for funds may have dramatic consequences on the GPI budget and 
its capacity to fund other priorities (Ansar et al., 2016). 
When the GPI has severe macroeconomic constraints, decision makers tend to look for external 
financing sources, mainly investments from the private sector, notably through public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), besides grants9 from higher-level administrations. By means of a PPP 
agreement the private partner (through a concession or another arrangement) may be given the 
responsibility for the design, construction, financing, operation and management of the asset to 
deliver a service to the GPI or directly to the end users, or both (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011). 
This allows the public authority to act as a regulator and thus concentrate on service planning 
and performance monitoring instead of being tied up in the day-to-day supervision of works and 
delivery of services (DG-Move, 2018).  
The main argument in favour of PPPs is that the public sector should benefit from private 
ingenuity and expertise in dealing with project risks, with a positive impact in project 
performance. Decision makers will highlight quality, economy in the use of resources, efficiency 
and effectiveness, and better performance standards (Akintoye et al., 2003; Diamond, 2005; 
Zhang, 2006) to justify the convenience of pure concessions or other types of PPPs. However, a 
main objective of a PPP will always be to reduce the public sector short-term funding needs and 
to distribute in the long term the impact from investment payments on public accounts. Pure 
concessions are often seen as a viable option for politicians to deliver infrastructure in times of 
public-finance shortfalls (Greve & Hodge, 2017), as private participation can potentially 
minimise both on-budget expenditure and on-budget debt under certain conditions10 (Vining & 
Boardman, 2008). There are, of course, critical voices arguing that the taxpayer will end up 
paying much more for something that could be publicly delivered. While this is true when the 
                                                   
7 A loan from external sources (Foreign Direct Investment) should be considered in the CBA as resources getting in 
and out of the “society”. Ideally the related payments should reduce the investment costs but also reduce the net 
benefits with the reimbursement of the loans (principal and interests). On the other hand, loans from internal sources 
are not affecting the “resource accounts” of society. 
8 Public loans are automatically added to public debt, but the assignment of funds from the annual budget are often 
partly financed through additional public debt emissions. In this sense also such assignment, may be considered a 
time spread mechanism. 
9  Grants and other types of risk sharing mechanisms from upper-level administrations (e.g. the European 
Commission) may have a “leverage effect” because they have the potential to unlock greater levels of public- and 
private-sector resources (DG-IP, 2017). This leverage effect is particularly welcome for bankable projects that 
address public objectives but that, however, may fail to attract private investment due to macroeconomic constraints, 
as such constraints have the potential to change the demand risk perception of investors, especially when confidence 
in the overall economy is low.   
10 The accounting rules in the USA as well as in the European Union are very restrictive with regards to the 
possibilities to consider PPP loans as off-budget. However, the practice of providing a government balance sheet 
itself according to internationally accepted accounting standards with the inclusion of PPP debt details on this 
balance sheet is not particularly common, internationally (Greve & Hodge, 2017). 
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comparison is made with a similarly performing (in terms of costs and timing) public entity, it is 
more difficult to accept this negative remark when the private participation entails more 
efficiency in terms of resources, as the eventual profits for the private partners are money 
transfers within stakeholders that do not affect socioeconomic efficiency. The key factor for 
decision makers should be the ability to produce the same benefits with less resources, even if it 
means public overspending (Hodge, 2004; Hellowell & Vecchi, 2013; Connoly & Wall, 2013). 
If a PPP solution brings more efficiency, private profitability would essentially become a 
redistribution issue, which may have political implications, but should not, in principle, prevent 
opting for it. 
In recent decades, DBFMO11 contracts have been widely used to finance major investments in 
transport infrastructure, as this type of PPP allows linking payments to the users’ ability to pay 
for infrastructure services (Pagano & Perry, 2008). It is assumed that project’s efficiency can 
raise if private participation gets involved, especially when the public sector lacks expertise 
(Iossa & Martimort, 2012), despite the additional resources consumed (tendering, procurement 
and other transaction costs). However, the effects of private participation on project efficiency 
are difficult to predict or measure in the long run and therefore seldom taken into account in the 
socioeconomic CBA (Bristow & Nellthorp, 2000). Actually, many researchers and observers 
have claimed that the use of PPPs may have led to an inefficient allocation of resources for long-
term investments and, hence, the public sector would not have really obtained efficient PPPs 
deals really (Greve & Hodge, 2017; Eurodad, 2018). This can be explained by the private 
partners’ intentions and strategies in financing public infrastructure, which often involve an 
opportunistic12 behaviour (Edwards et al., 2004; Shaoul, 2005; Flinder, 2005), as they only 
pursue to seek profit opportunities rather than thinking about proper project development (Greve 
& Hodge, 2017). Indeed, although there exists consensus about the fact that some project-linked 
risks can be better managed13 by private actors (Forrer et al., 2010), the experience gained from 
the cumulated use of PPPs in some developed countries suggests that there is always a price to 
pay (Miranda, 2010), as private finance involves substantial political and democratic costs in 
terms of freedom to decide on investments by future generations (Flinder, 2005), especially 
when the private sector gets involved in certain services that “cannot be allowed to fail” (Shaoul, 
2003).  
What is clear is that the financial burden for the same amount of public investment is higher 
when channelled through private agents because both the financing costs of the private partner 
(from loans from either IFIs or commercial banks, even if the final guarantee falls on the GPI), 
and those arising from technical and legal tasks needed for project finance imply additional costs 
for the private partner (Engel et al., 2013; Medda et al., 2013). Besides, if the private sector gets 
                                                   
11 A DBFMO commitment implies for the private partner to design, build, finance, maintain and operate the 
infrastructure and, once finished the concession period, transfer it to the GPI. It can be considered a financing 
mechanism that allows the GPI to distribute the financing impact during longer time-spans when there is an 
effective transfer of the majority of risks to the private partner. Otherwise, the higher amount to be paid is included 
as debt (discounted future payments) for the GPI. 
12 Opportunism may happen at the moment of the bids, during the execution of the contract and just before its 
maturity (Williamson, 1976). In long-term concessions involving transport infrastructure provision, a major problem 
for the GPI is with the opportunistic renegotiation phenomenon, which is the incidence of contract renegotiation 
shortly after their award (Guasch, 2004; Guasch et al., 2007). 
13 PPPs are often justified on one assumption and one fundamental presumption: the assumption is that in a 
globalising world –i.e., more integrated, complex and volatile– governments simply may not possess the pre-
requisite of knowledge, capacity or managerial skills. The presumption is that the two parties of PPPs can share a 
common goal, which provides the incentives for the both sides to cooperate, innovate and work collaboratively 
towards the success of the enterprise (Forrer et al., 2010). 
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involved in project financing and management, an appropriate equity14 return should be granted 
in addition to the reimbursement of the investment. In addition, several factors, such as 
complications in the land acquisition/expropriation process, the lack of clarity with respect to the 
legal and regulatory framework or the inexistence of a credible and efficient dispute resolution 
mechanism, could mean extraordinary costs in the future (Guasch, 2004; Engel et al., 2013). 
This may lead bidders, in particular those with a low risk profile, to affect the participation in 
PPPs with a relatively high-risk premium. This explains why institutional investors tend to get 
involved in these projects one the project is commissioned and operating. 
The justification of the PPP formula for major infrastructure must therefore come from a 
substantial increase in efficiency. This is more obvious when the other main argument for PPPs, 
their positive effects on public accounts may easily become a form of fiscal illusion, because off-
budget loans may represent the same or a higher future liability as if the government had taken 
up the loans itself (PPIAF, 2009). Maintaining the illusion of reduced public deficit/debt is, 
however, particularly attractive for “present” decision makers (politicians with a short-term 
focus rather than public servants), as individuals (voters) are less likely to perceive the project’s 
costs (Coghill & Woodward, 2005; Vining & Boardman, 2008). A main theoretical advantage of 
PPPs is that private agents usually bear the full lifetime costing of the asset in which they get 
involved (Debande, 2002) but, in practice, the GPI becomes a partner of last resort of the private 
sector because it retains ultimate responsibility for service delivery (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; 
Yescombe, 2007). Major risks fall, at the end of the day, on the public partner. Moreover, as 
stated, the private partner expects an equity return, even if it is subject to penalty deductions for 
substandard service delivery, defined in terms of availability or performance. Under this 
framework, private finance, in particular when it is seen as a financial transaction in which the 
private partner undergoes a procurement process similar to the public administration, often 
represents a “buy now, pay latter” scheme (Flinder, 2005) that does not alter the project’s social 
costs or benefits but simply shifts the GPI’s book debt to another off-budget organisation 
(Vining et al., 2006) that, in practice, takes little risk if there is a final responsibility from the 
public sector, as it is often the case.  
As the proportion of total investment channelled through PPP arrangements grows, more and 
more of the future budgets of the GPI may be committed (unless the infrastructure is expected to 
be fully paid by the users), leaving less and less investment funds to the discretion of its 
decision-makers and reducing their flexibility in the event of budget constraints (Pollock et al., 
2001). The introduction of PPPs, whatever the specific model, ties the two parties together 
through long-term commitments where the eventual payment obligations to the public partner 
are ahead of other public expenditure priorities (Ball et al., 2001; IPPR, 2004; Shaw, 2004). As 
mentioned above, this has strong implications for future generations; the selection of a PPP 
arrangement requires specially robust analysis and justification (ECA, 2018), but also an 
intergenerational scrutiny of its financing impact15. 
                                                   
14 Beyond the reimbursement of the principal, the financial return for private agents encompasses the interest on 
debt, the project’s financing costs and a financial compensation for the adopted project risks. The financial rate of 
return (FRR) showing the project’s overall profitability for the private investors, which covers the whole financing 
package, has to be substantial enough for the SPV to attract the necessary capital from private investors. This 
implies that the overall expenditure linked to project development is typically higher in PPPs than in traditional 
contracting-out delivery models in the initial considerations. The financial interest for the GPI could only come from 
the avoidance of cost overruns and delays.  
15 The concept of financing impact refers to the time distribution of the public expenditure that the GPI will have to 
bear during the project lifecycle as the result of the financial model adopted for infrastructure construction and 
services delivery. This time series could be expressed in a suitable way to state the impact on future generations. For 
more details concerning its calculation see “Key sources of financing and links of cash in/out-flows to obtain the 
financing impact (FI)” in Penyalver & Turró (2017:159). 
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2.2. INTERGENERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCING MAJOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
Major infrastructure projects, due to their impact on society’s welfare, are decided by the 
relevant administration or GPI, who also decides how to finance them. In the case of transport, 
public authorities (taxpayers) are, in general, the main contributors to the funds needed for the 
investment and, often, for its operation (CODATU, 2009) through public budgets, which feed 
from general taxation on revenues, property, consumption, etc. and on specific taxes for the 
transport sector (on fuel, vehicle purchase and ownership, etc.), which, in some cases, are 
earmarked. Besides taxpayers, beneficiaries16 (users and non-users) contribute to the transport 
system income. The level of cost recovery by the users, according to the “user-pays” principle, 
depends very much on the transport and mobility policy being applied by the government17. The 
options in terms of instruments to sustainably finance major transport projects are multiple (cf. 
Table VI-1). A main challenge for the GPI is to get access to them and to combine them wisely 
and fairly (DG-Move, 2018).  
Table VI-1. Sources of funds and financing instruments for transport projects  
Funding sources /  
/ Financing instruments Source of funds 
Who bears the 
financing burden? 
Grants Upper-level government Wider society 
Public budget  Taxpayer GPI society 
Earmarked taxes Specific fund Specific taxpayers (mostly beneficiaries) 
(*) Debt facilities  IFIs, Commercial banks, Institutional investors, Capital markets  Society 
Private partners of PPPs Equity, quasi-equity, loans to private partner or to Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) Society/ Beneficiaries 
Land value capture mechanisms Real estate owners Beneficiaries 
Fees (tolls, transport tickets) Users Beneficiaries 
(**) Versement Transport (France) Employers Indirect beneficiaries 
(*) This concept refers to the group of borrowing solutions supported by the public budget (taxpayers): debt 
emission (project bonds and green bonds), long-term loans, short-term credit facilities, etc.  
(**) Local tax to finance public transport services levied on the total gross salaries.  
Source: adapted from DG-Move, 2018 
An adequate blending of funding sources under a long-term financing perspective is key to 
ensure that the effects of the formula finally adopted for the project will be acceptable. Decision-
makers are essentially concerned about their electorate, i.e. individuals belonging to the extant 
generation, so they will care more about the early benefits of infrastructure investment than the 
later ones (Penyalver et al., 2017). This is actually what is behind the use of social discount rates 
in CBA, which considers that present consumers must be compensated for their later 
consumption. The short-term view of many decision-makers favours spreading out the project’s 
financial burden over long timespans. Besides, as stated, it also favours to share, partially or 
totally, the project financing burden with private agents through some type of PPP in the case of 
macroeconomic constraints. This means that, depending on the financing formula finally 
adopted, the financing provisions linked to the investment might not be aligned with the 
distribution of the project’s benefits that the society “of each moment” obtains along the 
                                                   
16 The beneficiaries concept refers to those people, companies and business activities or entities that will obtain 
benefits from the presence of public transport infrastructure and the accessibility that it provides (optionally) without 
necessarily being direct users (DG-Move, 2018). 
17 Adequate infrastructure for mobility is considered central for social inclusion and critical to an individual’s 
capacity to participate and prosper in the modern-day economy (NLC, 2017). As a consequence, the application of 
the “user-pays” principle, supported by the EU, is seldom observed. In particular, when dealing with urban public 
transport, which involves complex environmental issues, subsidies are common. 
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lifecycle of the project. It is indeed usual that the design of the project’s financing formula 
responds more to political, including macroeconomic, constraints than to efficiency or equity 
considerations (Turró & Penyalver, 2019). 
In traditional infrastructure procurement, the actual payments to cover the project costs depend 
on the financing formula chosen, which may affect taxpayers and/or users of different 
generations. If transport investment is directly covered by annual budgets, taxpayers will bear 
the financial burden during the construction period while project effects will benefit individuals 
that will live in a very distant future. However, if investment is financed through loans or debt 
emission, the payment schedule will define a very different financial time-profile. Having 
recourse to private finance may provide certain advantages to decision makers as it can perform 
for them as a mega credit card (Hodge, 2004), but this involves additional expenditures because 
private sector participants require high premiums to accept project risk (Vining et al., 2006; 
Vining & Boardman, 2008). Both the overall expenditure and the distribution of the project’s 
financing burden over time may have a strong influence on the perception of the utility of 
projects unfolding over long timespans (Penyalver et al., 2017). The intergenerational 
implications for future contributors of the financial package finally adopted should therefore be 
carefully analysed using a long-term perspective.  
Another key issue that should be tackled is the intergenerational redistributive effects stemming 
from taxes. The value-added tax (VAT), for instance, which is a turnover tax enforced by a 
government entity, whether local, regional or national, and levied as a percentage of transactions, 
but charged only on the final consumption (Lindholm, 1970), may affect the actual burden on the 
users and taxpayers of specific years. As the VAT paid on transactions from VAT-paying firms 
prior to the final sale is deductible either from the tax liability or tax base within the current year, 
it should not entail, a priori, intergenerational redistributive effects. In particular, the effects of 
VAT linked to the project will be neutral from the perspective of the society as a whole if the 
GPI resorts to traditional contracting-out mechanisms for infrastructure provision, even though 
the existence of different levels of governments, some of them VAT recipients and others not, 
can entail some redistributions within the country where VAT is generated and declared. 
However, if the GPI resorts to private finance, e.g. through a DBFMO contract, the VAT 
generated by the paying users (for instance, on tolls18) will mean a net income for government 
(society). The amount to pay in concept of VAT is important in major infrastructure projects, so 
it is common, for instance, that a concessionaire finances such spending through ad-hoc VAT 
loans from private banks with the aim of minimising its impact on the accounts of the 
construction period. These loans are guaranteed by the VAT amounts that the concessionaire will 
collect from the end users of the facility over the years until the amount paid earlier is fully 
recovered. In this case, it could involve some intergenerational redistribution of the investment 
VAT. Profit taxes of the different private stakeholders in the project may also have some 
redistribution effects among authorities and change over the years. The effects of the financial 
package should therefore be carefully analysed using a long-term perspective.  
 
 
 
                                                   
18 When the PPP is based on publicly-paid availability payments, the VAT issues are similar to those of publicly 
financed projects. 
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3. METRICS FOR THE ESTIMATION OF THE INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE ADDED VALUE CALCULATION OF THE DIFFERENT 
DELIVERY MODELS FOR MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
A critical point in the discussion about the assessment of the long-term effects of major 
investments in transport infrastructure is whether the method of discounting and/or the value of 
the social discount rate in CBA leads to the right conclusions in terms of efficiency for all the 
people affected over the project life because, as already explained, CBA looks at actions from 
the point of view of the “present” society, as discounting is used to transform expected 
consumption and production of resources into “present values”, i.e. values for the society of the 
moment when the decision is taken.  The uncertainty about the future and the innate desire of 
immediate consumption justify the lower valuation of the project impacts appearing in the years 
to come. The fairness of such intertemporal approach to the estimation of project efficiency, a 
critical factor in decision making, is arguable (Penyalver et al., 2017). 
On the other hand the efficiency analysis is not considering, at least directly19, how the project is 
financed, because CBA is not affected by pure money transfers between users and operators or 
between them and the government (fees, taxes, etc.), as they do not involve resource 
modifications. However, there is substantial economic literature pointing out intergenerational 
equity and fairness issues stemming from transfers between generations linked to financing 
models (Kotlikoff & Raffelhuschen, 1999; Williamson & Rhodes, 2011). In the transport sector, 
money flows among stakeholders are actually critical for the financial structuring of major 
infrastructure projects (Turró, 2004). In this sense, the analysis of intergenerational impact 
performed through IREM, linking resources and financial flows, goes beyond the classical 
efficiency analysis and provides a view of the fairness of the actual financial provisions for the 
project across the various generations affected.  
IREM allows us to compare the effects of the project on the different “annual generations”, 
which include people living in the few years before and after the central year defining the 
generation (Penyalver et al., 2017). The model is based on the time series of the gap between the 
net socioeconomic benefits and the financial payments for each annual generation20, which 
requires the use of both the yearly net socioeconomic benefits obtained from the cost-benefit 
analysis and the yearly payments made by the various agents participating in the project, 
ultimately users and taxpayers. The time series obtained indicates the foreseeable differential 
impacts of the project on future generations. Its analysis allows the assessment of the project’s 
effects on three interlinked dimensions (cf. Table VI-2). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
19 Some financial factors (notably tariffs, tolls and other charges) are affecting demand and the benefits, and in a 
lesser measure the costs, of the project. 
20 This ad-hoc view of  an “annual generation” strictly refers to the cohort of individuals living around a central 
year (the model defines a formula to adequately consider those affected by the project) and allows reflecting the 
effects of a transport project on overlapping generations. 
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Table VI-2. Analysis of intergenerational impacts: dimensions and general outlines of IREM outputs 
Dimensions of the  
analysis of intergenerational impacts IREM indicators  Assessment of IREM outputs 
D1. Intergenerational Utility 𝐺𝐴𝑃: Average value of the different 
generational gaps (GAPi) obtained 
along the project lifespan, expressed 
in millions of euros (M€) 
A 𝐺𝐴𝑃<0 essentially suggests that 
the project’s financing formula has 
a negative impact for most of the 
generations affected. 
The project’s financing formula 
finally adopted by the government 
promoting the investment should 
sustain the welfare of future 
individuals. This implies positive 
gaps between net benefits and 
financial payments (by users and/or 
taxpayers) for the sets of affected 
individuals (grouped in annual 
generations) over the project 
lifecycle. 
GUI: The General Unfairness 
Indicator (0 ≤ GUI ≤ 100%) reflects 
the intergenerational utility of the 
project. It represents the rate (%) of 
overlapped generations enduring 
financial payments higher than the 
increase of resources obtained from 
the project 
Low values for GUI indicate that 
the number of annual generations 
being unfairly treated (paying 
more than the net benefits they 
obtain) is small. 
D2. Intergenerational Performance 
T&S: Trend and Slope (in grades) of 
the time series of the generational 
gaps of the projects. 
(−100g ≤ T&S ≤ +100g) 
T&S>0 means that the value of the 
successive gaps tends to be more 
positive or less negative. The 
higher the value of this indicator 
the more useful (or less harmful) 
the project is for future 
individuals. 
The evolution over time of the effects 
of the project on the concerned 
annual generations. 
D3. Intergenerational Redistribution IRESI: The Intergenerational 
Redistributive Effects Sharing Index 
informs about how redistribution 
effects are shared among generations 
over time 
(0 ≤ IRESI ≤ 1.00)  
IRESI tends to 1.00 if the 
differences between the value of 
the positive and the negative 
generational gaps are important, 
which means that the financing 
formula is severely biased in 
favour of certain generations.  
In projects unfolding over large 
timespans, redistribution issues may 
arise if there are significant transfers 
of the project’s financial burden 
among groups of annual generations. 
Source: Turró & Penyalver, 2019  
The IREM’s outputs offer a comprehensive picture that allows to label21 a project in terms of 
fairness/unfairness from an intergenerational perspective (cf. Table VI-3). The IREM indicators 
are not adequate, however, to answer the more political issue about the appropriateness or not of 
making users pay for the investment they benefit from, i.e. the application of the “user-pays” 
principle.  In blending finance the issue of “who pays” is obviously a key factor in the decision 
about the financial structure to be adopted, but it is not so relevant in intergenerational terms, 
which are essentially affected by the timing of the users and taxpayers payments of the 
investment and operation and maintenance of the asset. 
Table VI-3. Project Intergenerational Rating Scale 
D1. 
 Utility 
D2. 
Performance 
D3. 
Redistribution Project intergenerational impact Project Label 𝐺𝐴𝑃 GUI T&S  IRESI 
> 0 ≈ 0 > 0 ≈ 0 Positive fair-balanced BAL 
> 0 Low > 0 Any Positive but unbalanced fair-unbalanced UNB 
> 0 High > 0 Low Positive but unfair unfair + UF+ 
≈ 0 High Any High Poor and very unfair very unfair  VUF 
≤ 0 High < 0 Any Negative regressive  RGS 
Source: Turró & Penyalver, 2019 
It is in this sense that different blending of public budget assignments and other financing 
resources will, in general, lead to different time-series of the final financial payments and 
                                                   
21 A detailed discussion of the different labels that may result from the combinations of the IREM’s outputs is 
shown in Turró & Penyalver (2019). 
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therefore of the IREM gaps evolution and, as a result, to different values for the various IREM 
outputs. For instance, financing the public budget contribution to the investment through a 
project bond or a debt emission with long-term maturity represents delaying the payment of the 
principal and thus a transfer of most of the investment financing problem to individuals living in 
a distant future. However, if the project is financed through soft loans22, the investment impact is 
distributed over the many generations who must repay them, which typically results in a fairer 
intergenerational balance. Indeed, the most common financing formulae used for infrastructure 
projects unfolding over long timespans often misalign the financial provisions affecting the 
society “of each moment” in relation to the distribution of the net benefits it is expected to obtain 
(Turró & Penyalver, 2019). As a consequence, even efficient investments could entail severe 
redistributive effects among generations.  
The IREM’s outputs are useful to analyse the importance of these effects because they provide 
metrics on the impacts of any financing solution for infrastructure provision on the various 
generations that will be affected by the project. The basis for the model is the difference between 
the monetary payments and the net socioeconomic benefits occurring every year during the 
project cycle. These payments are the sum of what is actually paid by users (through tolls, fees, 
etc.) and what the public sector (i.e. taxpayers) must disburse to the financial entities and to 
private investors having contributed, through loans or other financing mechanisms, to fund the 
commitments to the project of the involved administrations. In this sense, when the project is 
conveyed through a private entity, how this entity is funded is irrelevant in intergenerational 
terms, as what matters is only what users and public administrations pay to compensate it for its 
financial contribution to the investment and the operation and maintenance.  
A key question on the added value of PPPs, as already explained in detail,  is whether private 
participation can deliver infrastructure and offer services at least equivalent in quality to that 
which could be provided by the public sector through traditional infrastructure procurement, but 
minimising the overall expenditure, in terms of resources, linked to the project. Indeed, if 
properly planned, private participation can be useful to introduce solutions that may enhance 
project design and have an influence on its performance and/or on users’ behaviour (e.g., 
European telepass23), which has obvious implications in terms of economic efficiency and may 
contribute to the financial sustainability of the project as well. Under the “intergenerational 
approach”, this envisaged positive impact of the PPP for the whole society should be both in the 
short and in the long run.  
The aim would be to combine the most efficient solution for project development with a fair 
distribution of the financial burden to be borne by the successive generations of users and 
taxpayers concerned. While efficiency is conventionally analysed through CBA, to ensure that 
the proposed financing structure is acceptable in terms of intergenerational utility, the IREM 
indicators should show that the PPP arrangement provides an acceptable performance, at least 
with regards to any possible publicly-managed alternative channelled through conventional 
procurement contracts. From the intergenerational perspective, the increase/decrease of the 
average of the IREM gap (∆𝐺𝐴𝑃), in particular, should be considered as a valuable insight on the 
estimation of the VfM of a PPP. 
 
                                                   
22 Loans from public lending institutions –International Financial Institutions (IFIs), national banks, etc.– that offer 
particularly good conditions in terms of duration, interest rates, grace periods, etc. 
23 The European telepass system or “Telepass EU” is a technical solution that allows an easy and fast passage 
through toll stations of a number of EU countries. This means socioeconomic benefits in terms of time, fuel 
consumption, safety, etc., but also higher revenues from users potentially, as this system comes with a number of 
advantages for customers (rebate scheme, integration of toll data, etc.). 
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4. PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
IREM has been applied to a sample of greenfield investments, carried out in recent decades, 
aiming at extending the urban public transport (UPT) network of different metropolitan areas. In 
the UPT sector there is a need for long-term financing to guarantee the financial sustainability of 
major infrastructure projects, as in the majority of urban areas, at least in the EU, UPT services 
cannot raise the necessary revenues for full costs recovery from user charges (DG-Move, 2018). 
The intergenerational approach previously described is thus of particular interest for the UPT 
sector because most PPP contracts involve compensations, besides the investment, for part of the 
operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditure24. A relevant aspect for project funding is that 
such public payments are usually quite constant for the investment component and partially 
related to demand for the O&M part. The IREM gaps should appear, as a consequence, as 
relatively stable. This means that, a priori, PPPs could be fairer than other options, such as 
upfront budget contributions or certain types of GPI loans that could represent a heavier burden 
on specific years25.  
The sample consists of investments in both metro and tramway infrastructure developed through 
traditional infrastructure procurement mechanisms (TIP scenario). The projects overcame 
previous tests on efficiency, etc. (cf. Table VI-4). A description of the particularities of these 
mechanisms for UPT as well as the funding sources and the financing formula actually used for 
the GPI in each case studio are reproduced next. 
Table VI-4. Overview of the cost-benefit analysis (Present Values in M€) 
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04/008-01 
Metro 
2008 31 4,984 74.7 2,210 1,484 11.4% 1.37 
11/008-01 2008 35 489 0.0 348 153 4.8% 0.98 
09/009-01 2009 38 953 6.3  691 126 6.0% 1.17 
10/100-02 2010 38 1,768 3.2 1,242 217  6.0% 1.21 
11/007-01 
Tramway 
2007 35 184 0.0 94.9 92.2 4.8% 0.98 
12/008-01 2008 34 490 106.4  394 197  5.1% 1.01 
13/007-01 2007 26 164 0,0 59.9 61.1 11.1% 1.36 
14/100-02 2010 31 57.8 15.0 53.2 14.0 5.7% 1.08 
16/009-01 2009 35 947 0,0 518 191  6.0% 1.34 
Source: Author 
For all these case studies, and for the single purpose of performing a comparative analysis in 
terms of intergenerational patterns, alternative “PPP scenarios” with common private finance 
mechanisms has been defined. The objective of this exercise was to perform a comparative 
analysis of the IREM’s outputs from both scenarios to obtain evidence about their respective 
added value for society in terms of intergenerational redistribution.  
                                                   
24 Compensations for O&M, in most developed countries with a high car ownership level, must cover more than half 
of the O&M costs of the UPT system and extend over the whole partnership or concession period. Those related to 
investment are usually spread over the same period or, alternatively, over a long one. 
25 A particularly dramatic case would be the use of “bullet” loans for which amortization of the principal and even 
interest are concentrated in the final years of the credit operation. But other particularities of long-term loans, such 
as long grace periods might also affect intergenerational redistribution. 
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It is worthwhile to note that UPT fares are kept relatively low for a set of reasons26 and that the 
substantial subsidies needed to cover the resulting financial gap may come from different public 
administrations. While local governments are often the GPI and contribute to both investment 
and O&M, metropolitan, regional and national bodies are, in many countries, also participating 
in the financing of the different components of the UPT project. The distribution of subsidies 
establishes which taxpayers are finally bound to contribute to the project. This is politically very 
relevant but it is not a factor in intergenerational considerations. 
 
4.1. TIP SCENARIO  
In this scenario, the public promoter, a transport authority or a public consortium with 
responsibilities in UPT services delivery (GPI), deals with external firms for infrastructure 
provision and maintenance services. These firms are typically private actors (infrastructure 
builders) providing services through tendering/awarding processes. The selected bidder (main 
contractor) executes and delivers a project according to the GPI’s plan, which finally specifies 
the type and quality of the works to be provided. Once the construction is complete, the 
infrastructure becomes a part of the public transport system, which is often managed, at local 
level, by public transport operators27 with the aim of providing efficient and reliable UPT 
services in the market. Nonetheless, it is the GPI who takes the full responsibility for the 
financial package for project development, which typically consists of public budget assignments 
and debt instruments28 that essentially represent a postponement of the budget payments (cf. 
Table VI-5).  
Table VI-5. TIP scenario: Financial structures of the UPT projects, from present values discounted at 5%  
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30.9% 0.0% 46.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 17.8% 0.0% 
11/008-01 7.8% 0.0% 27.7% 1.5% 0.0% 16.5% 36.2% 10.3% 
09/009-01 0.3% 0.0% 14.3% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 16.9% 
10/100-02 0.0% 0.0% 17.7% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 80.7% 0.0% 
11/007-01 
Tramway 
0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 41.5% 0.0% 0.0% 28.2% 24.7% 
12/008-01 1.0% 32.8% 5.9% 30.1% 0.0% 0.0% 30.2% 0.0% 
13/007-01 21.7% 0.0% 35.3% 12.2% 0.0% 0.0% 30.8% 0.0% 
14/100-02 40.9% 2.4% 11.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 47.3% 0.0% 
16/009-01 2.8% 0.0% 30.0% 0.0% 0.0% 49.9% 17.3% 0.0% 
Source: Author’s database 
 
                                                   
26 The reasons for limiting the contribution of users are to favour the diversion from cars to UPT to reduce non-
internalised externalities of urban traffic and to comply with its social role as provider of basic accessibility to 
citizens (DG-Move, 2018). 
27 They are typically 100% public services companies or public holdings that may belong to public shareholders or 
to mixed public-private ventures. 
28 GPIs have different borrowing options from IFIs and commercial banks and, in some cases, they may emit project 
bonds that, in some cases, could have fiscal incentives. Loans are common for infrastructure provision. For the 
purchase of mobile assets (e.g., trains, trams, buses), other options, such as leasing, are often used. 
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In the sample, government borrowing, through long-term loans from both IFIs and commercial 
banks, is the most common option for financing the main investment, though a number of cases 
count on higher level authorities, including the EU, to provide grants that reduce the GPI’s 
investment needs. Budgetary contributions for capital expenditure (Capex) during the 
construction period tend to be relatively small. On the other hand, public debt emissions are 
seldom used to finance UPT investments. Once the project is in operation, as fare revenues are, 
in most cases, insufficient to cover O&M costs, the financial sustainability of the project requires 
also subsidies. In this sense, Figure VI-1 below offers a good picture on how the financial burden 
stemming from the most common financing option of the TIP scenario is distributed over the 
years. 
Figure VI-1. Socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the “13/007-01” project 
 
Source: Author 
Figure VI-1 is a graphic representation of the time-profiles of the socioeconomic net benefits (B) 
and the financing impact (FI) of the project with code “13/007-01”. In this case, the main 
investment was financed with funds from EU grants (41.3% on the estimated financial gap of the 
main investment) and from a soft loan with 20 years maturity and 2 years of grace period. As can 
be observed, this option allowed the GPI to spread the investment burden across the many 
generations benefiting from the project’s effects, in the short and in the long run. As a 
consequence, the financing formula is fairly progressive, as intergenerational redistribution is 
unimportant (IRESI= 0.06) and the evolution over time of the project’s socioeconomic effects 
with regards to the financial charges to be borne by the future generations concerned is soundly 
positive (T&S= +18.6g). Besides, GUI=0% in this case, meaning that the IREM gaps will 
always be positive during the project lifecycle (cf. Figure VI-2). 
Figure VI-2. Time profile of the generational redistributive impact of the project with code “13/007-01” 
 
Source: Author 
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Table VI-6 shows the results of the analysis of the intergenerational impact performed for the 
whole sample. Overall, the intergenerational redistributive effects appear as rather unimportant 
(IRESIaverage=0.11) and the evolution over time of the projects’ effects on the concerned 
generations is positive (T&Saverage=+54.9g), which means that the financing formula is fairly 
progressive, as it shares the financial burden over the years according to the distribution of the 
project’s net benefits. On the other hand, most generations obtain positive gaps 
(GUIaverage<13%), although some exceptions exist (GUIsd=17.2).  
As a result, the overall intergenerational impact of the UPT projects under the TIP scenario 
appears as positive but unbalanced (“UNB”). The small sample size prevents, however, 
obtaining well-founded general conclusions on the different UPT infrastructure types.  
Table VI-6. IREM’s outcomes by type of project (TIP scenario) 
Type of 
infrastructure 
Sample 
Size (N) 
GUI Trend & Slope (T&S) IRESI 
average sd average sd average sd 
Total sample  9 12.2% 17.2 +54.9g 33.7 0.11 0.20 
Metro  4 12.0% 14.1 +80.0g 23.2 0.01 0.00 
Tramway  5 12.4% 21.1 +34.9g 29.3 0.19 0.25 
Source: Author’s database 
 
4.2. PPP SCENARIO 
In this scenario, it is assumed that private actors can deliver infrastructure and offer UPT 
services equivalent in quality to those that can be provided by the public sector in the TIP 
scenario if they get involved in project financing and management through a long-term 
agreement, such a DBFMO contract29. The private initiative is expected to be more efficient and 
avoid cost overruns that are quite common in TPI projects. On the other hand, PPP arrangements 
are commonly used by public authorities to attract private investment to UPT infrastructure 
development. The private partner (a concessionaire in many cases) typically manages all aspects 
of the project, channelling its participation in the PPP through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), 
which is a legal structure especially created to take the project risk (cf. Figure VI-3). This 
investment vehicle is designed to reduce exposure for the larger parent organisations that are 
usually providing the equity and quasi-equity components of the financing structure but do not 
wish to provide corporate guarantees (Ye, 2008; Regan et al., 2017). The SPV assumes, 
however, the responsibility to finance the main investment (infrastructure & rolling stock) and, 
after completing the project construction, to cover the operation and maintenance costs 
stemming from the project.  
 
 
                                                   
29 This type of contract allows: 1) to distribute the impact of the capital expenditure in infrastructure on public 
accounts in the long-term, which usually implies the GPI to get involved in the financing commitments between the 
sponsor (concessionaire) and financial institutions., 2) to prevent both eventual cost overruns and delays in 
infrastructure delivery for the public sector, which can be achieve through the right schemes of risks allocation., and 
3) to ensure UPT quality service, as PPP arrangements can foresee penalties upon income when private operators 
are not complying with the agreed or if they are not able to achieve certain targets, usually related to the number of 
users served. Further, a PPP with the right incentives might contribute to increase demand, even if the private 
partner has very limited leeway on tariffs.  
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Only a part of the funds delivered by the SPV for Capex comes from the shareholders’ share 
capital30 (equity). Traditionally, IFIs and commercial banks provide the bigger part of the funds 
needed by the SPV for project development (Regan et al., 2017). These loans, although finally 
secured by the commitment of the GPI to fund the SPV, are bound by higher interest rates than 
the direct loans to the GPI because the SPV will require some compensation for this task 
(financing intermediation) and the risks borne. This additional cost may only be justified by the 
reduced risk of cost overruns of the SPV and, more arguably, by the lower immediate impact on 
public deficit and debt. 
Figure VI-3. Outline of contracts and financing cash-flows in a DBFMO agreement 
 
Source: Author 
As already mentioned, the user revenues of a UPT project are, in general, in contrast with other 
types of public concessions such as toll motorways, insufficient to cover even the O&M costs 
and it is common that new investments entail an increase in the deficit of the UPT system. The 
GPI will thus have to establish additional compensations (fees) for the SPV based on availability 
or other supply considerations. They represent a continuous public support during the whole 
lifecycle of UPT projects that must be incorporated in the design of any envisaged PPP. Such 
support must end up compensating the private partner both for her investment and for the 
foreseen gap between the user payments (through a pre-specified mechanism, particularly 
complex when there exists an integrated tariff system) and the expected O&M costs. Here again 
the use of a PPP arrangement should be justified by the lower costs, at least in terms of 
resources, of the operation by a privately managed SPV.  
 
                                                   
30 A common relation between equity from shareholders and debt is 25:75 (equity:debt). 
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Private actors will require compensation for both their financing intermediation and the project 
risks they assume. For the first aspect, the interest rate adopted in the case studies for private 
actors has been increased in 200 basic points31 to the rate applied to the public sector in the TIP 
scenario. In addition, with the aim of taking into account the eventual increase in efficiency 
required to the private participation with regard to the TIP scenario, it also includes a 25%32 cost 
reduction in both infrastructure construction and UPT services provision (cf. Table VI-7). 
Besides, the financing formula also includes a 5% raise in revenues from UPT users33.  
Table VI-7. PPP scenario: Financing formulae referred to the GPI (values referred to the concession period) 
CASE STUDY FUNDING SOURCES CONCESSION DATA 
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31 24.6% 0.0% 30.8% 28.4% 16.3% 30 9 10.9% 14.7 
11/008-01 35 4.1% 0.0% 12.7% 57.7% 25.4% 30 4 10.8% 10.8 
09/009-01 38 0.1% 0.0% 5.2% 65.5% 29.2% 30 7 10.6% 12.2 
10/100-02 38 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 67.7% 26.7% 30 7 10.7% 12.0 
11/007-01 35 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 76.4% 21.4% 20 3 10.9% 9.3 
12/008-01 34 0.5% 0.0% 1.8% 74.5% 23.2% 20 4 10.8% 10.1 
13/007-01 26 15.6% 0.0% 20.6% 47.2% 16.6% 20 2 10.7% 9.4 
14/100-02 31 22.0% 0.0% 4.3% 54.6% 19.2% 20 3 10.9% 9.6 
16/009-01 35 1.5% 0.0% 8.7% 63.7% 26.1% 20 5 10.8% 10.6 
(*) The financial rate or return (FRR) corresponds to the project’s overall profitability for the private investors. 
Source: Author 
After the concession period, the SPV delivers the assets (metro or tramway infrastructure, and 
rolling stock) to the corresponding GPI ensuring optimal conditions of use, but without the right 
to any compensation. From that moment, the GPI may opt between another concession contract 
to manage these assets or contracting-out such services, which is the option chosen for this 
exercise, where, in addition, exploitation conditions remain without changes after the concession 
period. On the other hand, yearly public subsidies to Opex have been calculated for the different 
financing formulae seeking to both ensure the financial sustainability of the project and offer a 
market-rate-of-return for private investors, as the expected (financial) returns are key for the 
concessionaire to obtain financing from the banks. It is assumed that private investors will only 
participate in UPT financing if the project shows a good financial pay-off and they have 
sufficient guarantees of repayment. Such guarantees will end up coming from the commitment of 
payment, in various forms (e.g. credit guarantees) given by the GPI. In this sense the 
                                                   
31 Input obtained taking into account the financial hypothesis for senior debt of a number of DBFMO contracts of 
the Government of Andalusia. 
32 At least in the EU, there is a lack of evidence suggesting that PPPs have succeed delivering transport 
infrastructure projects more efficiently than the public sector through conventional procurement mechanisms. 
Indeed, authors agree that the public sector can manage the project’s risks efficiently and effectively, in similar 
conditions to the private sector, if it counts on both sufficient expertise and resources, which is an acceptable 
premise, particularly for developed countries with highly qualified public officials. Nonetheless, for the exclusive 
purpose of this exercise, it has been used this percentage of cost reduction, which responds to the average drop in 
award prices with regard to tendering prices for infrastructure construction through traditional public procurement. 
Our estimate has been obtained in the report “El Sector de la Construcció Catalunya 2016. Previsions 2017”, 
published online by the Cambra Oficial Contractistes d’Obres de Catalunya. 
33 In general, additional income with regards to the TIP scenario might come from a raise in demand, from increased 
fees for services to users (Eurodad, 2018) or both. Nonetheless, this raise in revenues does not have an impact in the 
analysis of intergenerational impact because, in the UPT sector, usually, there is a financial gap that, if not covered 
with additional revenues from users, it will have to be compensated by the taxpayer through public subsidies. 
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concessionaire acts as financial intermediary34 to obtain the money for construction, which 
means an additional step in the guarantees scheme.  
The socioeconomic and financial time-profiles obtained for the project with code “13/007-01” 
may be considered representative of the PPP scenario (cf. Figure VI-4). The financing structure 
envisaged replicates, with small variations, the solution previously described. It incorporates the 
same amount of EU grant money and assumes that private financing35 is channelled through a 
concession contract limited to 20 years, which explains the abrupt change in the financing 
impact profile from year 21. 
Figure VI-4. Socioeconomic and financial time-profiles of the project with code “13/007-01” (PPP scenario) 
 
Source: Author 
During the concession period, the GPI pays annually a pre-established amount36 to the SPV in 
form of availability payments that would encompass investment repayment and other financial 
compensations to the concessionaire for its role in project management and financing. This 
solution would allow the GPI to spread the investment burden over a long period (cf. Figure VI-
5). Compared with the TIP scenario, the intergenerational redistribution is even of lesser value 
(IRESI= 0.03), while the project intergenerational performance is even more positive for the 
concerned  generations (T&S= +34.6g). Moreover, as will be seen, ∆𝐺𝐴𝑃 ≈ 0, meaning that in 
this particular case the increase in public expenditure is unimportant for the many generations 
affected. Thus, it could be argued that the Value for Money component related to 
intergenerational redistribution would be greater when the GPI, instead of managing the UPT 
infrastructure through the traditional procurement system, uses this particular delivery option 
(DBFMO contract). This should not be taken, however, as a general conclusion, because it is 
based on estimates that are considered adequate, but not necessarily real. 
                                                   
34 For the analysis of intergenerational impact, credits from IFIs and commercial lenders to concessionaires are not 
directly accounted but indirectly, including an equity return for private agents, as the financing structure is referred 
to the public promoter (GPI). 
35 A main assumption is that the projects of the sample, as defined here, are “bankable”, meaning that the SPV will 
be able to find sufficient funds to carry out the main investment from IFIs and/or commercial banks and equity 
investors. In this sense, in general, the financial model of the PPP scenario is leveraged at 70%, with financing 
coming from miniperm (bridge loans for the construction period) and senior debt (loans from both IFIs and 
commercial banks in 50% proportion) with 17 years maturity from project commissioning in this particular case.  
36 The financial model used for the PPP scenario includes estimation on the additional expenditure to be borne by 
the private partner. This expenditure has been calculated for the SPV taking into account: 1) financial needs for SPV 
establishment (e.g., initial treasury of the SPV, legal reserves, guarantees, etc.), estimated at 1% of the investment 
during the first year; 2) initial costs of the SPV (structure costs, facilities and equipment, etc.), estimated at 2-3% of 
the capital annual expenditure during the construction period; and 3) operating costs of the SPV from project 
commissioning, estimated at 10% of the yearly operating income. Such estimations are based on information 
included in contract dossiers that have been obtained for this research, including those from the Government of 
Andalusia previously mentioned.  
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Figure VI-5. Time profile of the generational redistributive impact of the project with code “13/007-01” (PPP scenario) 
 
Source: Author 
Table VI-8 shows the results of the statistical analysis of the intergenerational impact for the PPP 
scenario for the two sets of projects. The evolution over time of the projects effects on the 
concerned generations is soundly positive for both samples (T&Saverage between 50 and 86g), 
which means that the PPP financing formula distributes smoothly the impact of the capital 
expenditure in the long-term. On the other hand, the intergenerational redistributive effects 
remain low (IRESIaverage between 0.08 and 0.15). Nonetheless, a significant number of the annual 
generations end up adversely affected under this financing mechanism in both sub-samples, with 
most37 projects with GUI between 40 and 50%. Thus, overall, the projects’ intergenerational 
impact under the PPP scenario should be labelled as positive but unfair (UF+). 
Table VI-8. IREM’s outcomes by type of project (PPP scenario) 
Type of 
infrastructure 
GUI Trend & Slope (T&S) IRESI 
average (*) sd (*) average sd average sd 
Total sample  46.7% 6.3 +65.8g 29.5 0.12 0.09 
Metro  50.0% 2.3 +85.5g 15.5 0.08 0.01 
Tramway  44.2% 7.6 +50.1g 29.4 0.15 0.11 
(*) Atypical values (statistical outliers) have not been included in this analysis. 
Source: Author 
 
4.3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The analyses of the intergenerational impact performed have provided insights concerning the 
overall performance of the two alternative financing mechanisms, here named as TPI and PPP 
respectively.  
 
 
 
                                                   
37 As shown in Table VI-9, the projects with code “04/008-01” and “13/007-01” offer atypical values in terms of 
intergenerational utility (GUI=0%) with regards to the rest of the projects in the sample, even though private 
participation implies in both cases a meaningful increase in the expenditure linked to the project, especially from its 
commissioning. This is due to the importance of the estimated socioeconomic benefits stemming from these 
projects, of high economic efficiency (ERR>11%). These high benefits ensure that no annual generational has a 
negative gap. As a consequence, the values of GUI obtained for these two projects have been considered outliers 
and excluded from the statistical analysis. 
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At first glance, the one based on traditional infrastructure procurement, i.e. publicly financed, 
appears as more convenient for the successive generations concerned than the one based on 
private participation in project financing and management through long-term concessions, 
mainly because PPPs are a more expensive method of financing. As can be observed, in the TIP 
scenario there are few generations enduring negative gaps in both sub-samples (GUIaverage=7.7%, 
excluded the outlier value of the GUI obtained for the project with code “11/007-01). Besides, 
there are not intergenerational redistribution issues (IRESIaverage=0.11) and the financing formula 
results fairly progressive (T&S = +54.9g). Nonetheless, the traditional financing mechanism 
may also lead to controversial38 outcomes in term of project intergenerational impact, as shown 
by the IREM’s outputs obtained for the project with code “11/007-01” (cf. Table VI-9). 
Moreover, the collected evidence actually suggests that such intergenerational performance will 
be better under the alternative financing formula based on PPP agreements. 
Table VI-9. Comparative analysis of the IREM’s outputs from TIP and PPP scenarios 
Project 
code 
Type of 
infrastructure 
TIP Scenario PPP Scenario ∆GAP 𝐺𝐴𝑃 GUI T&S IRESI 𝐺𝐴𝑃 GUI T&S IRESI 
04/008-01 
Metro 
473.8 M€ 0.0% +91.0g 0.01 397.9 M€ 0.0% +93.4g 0.09 < 0 
11/008-01 31.1 M€ 0.0% +45.5g 0.01 13.9 M€ 52.3% +62.6g 0.08 < 0 
09/009-01 105.6 M€ 20.5% +88.1g 0.01 70.2 M€ 50.0% +90.0g 0.09 < 0 
10/100-02 270.5 M€ 27.3% +95.5g 0.01 188.9 M€ 47.7% +96.1g 0.07 < 0 
11/007-01 
Tramway 
−0.10 M€ 48.6% +22.7g 0.10 −3.90 M€ 54.1% +38.4g 0.14 < 0 
12/008-01 18.5 M€ 13.6% +52.2g 0.14 1.4 M€ 45.5% +72.7g 0.14 < 0 
13/007-01 22.5 M€ 0.0% +18.4g 0.06 21.2 M€ 0.0% +34.6g 0.03 < 0 
14/100-02 5.2 M€ 0.0% +4.1g 0.63 2.2 M€ 36.4% +16.7g 0.33 < 0 
16/009-01 79.1 M€ 0.0% +76.9g 0.04 53.2 M€ 40.9% +88.1g 0.11 < 0 
Source: Author 
Indeed, a more detailed analysis of the IREM’s outputs shown above shows that private 
participation, under the envisaged conditions, may succeed in enhancing the project’s 
performance from the intergenerational perspective. This is due to the continuity in the 
distribution of the financial charges that is a logical set up in a PPP scenario. In this sense, PPP 
arrangements appear as more convenient to ensure equity for future individuals in comparison 
with the TPI scenario (T&Saverage=+65.8g vs. +54.9g, respectively), but at the expense of an 
increase in the number of generations enduring negative gaps ( ∆ GUIaverage=+24.1%). 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, ex ante, this “collateral issue” of PPPs will not have a 
meaningful impact in terms of intergenerational utility for projects of high socioeconomic 
profitability.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
38 The project’s financial structure may be controversial if GUI is high while the evolution over time of the project’s 
effects on the concerned generations is fairly progressive and redistribution issues may be disregarded (high T&S 
and low IRESI respectively). In these situations, analysts should first look closely at the value of the 𝐺𝐴𝑃, which is a 
key indicator on the project’s intergenerational utility. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper shows that decision makers on major infrastructure projects, besides the usual 
concerns about efficiency and specific policies on redistribution that are not addressed in CBA, 
should take into account the effects of the project on the successive generations of individuals 
affected.  
The most common financing formulae used for infrastructure projects unfolding over long 
timespans often misalign the financial provisions linked to the investment in relation to the 
distribution of the project related benefits that the society “of each moment” experiences. As a 
consequence, even efficient investments could entail severe redistributive effects among 
generations. To analyse these effects, the net benefits for specific generations must be compared 
with the corresponding money paid by the users of the infrastructure and by the taxpayers for the 
part that users do not cover. The taxpayers’ contribution is channelled through public budgets 
and, in general, major projects developed through traditional public procurement mechanisms 
are financed through loans or other debt instruments, including public debt issues, that postpone 
such contribution. The actual amounts to be paid by taxpayers on specific years depend, 
therefore, on the financing structure adopted. When the project is conveyed through a private 
entity, its funding is irrelevant in intergenerational terms, as what matters is only what users and 
public administrations pay to compensate it for its financial contribution to the investment and 
the operation and maintenance. The annual financial flows to be compared to the annual net 
socioeconomic benefits of the project are what is actually paid as tolls, fees, etc. and what the 
public sector must disburse to the private partner or to the financial entities having contributed to 
fund the commitments to the project of the involved administrations.   
The former analysis can be performed using the Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model 
(IREM). The model has actually been applied to a sample of investments in urban public 
transport (UPT) infrastructure formed by greenfield projects of tramway and metro executed in 
recent decades with the aim of developing the UPT network of different metropolitan areas. The 
purpose of this effort has been to gain knowledge on the added value that could be obtained 
potentially from private participation in project financing and management with regards to UPT 
publicly managed infrastructure-solutions, developed through conventional public procurement.  
In the practical exercise carried out in this paper, a main hypothesis is that private participation 
can deliver infrastructure and offer services at least equivalent in quality to those provided by the 
public sector through traditional infrastructure procurement, but with better outcomes in terms of 
both project costs, at least in terms of resources, and intergenerational effects. In this sense, the 
pattern found in terms of intergenerational performance confirms that, if private actors get 
involved in project management and financing, the evolution over time of the project’s 
socioeconomic effects with regards to the financial charges to be borne by the future generations 
entail a more equitable situation than certain financial formulae used for purely public projects. 
In short, the IREM results show that public-private partnerships, although often entailing a 
substantial increase of the public expenditure linked to these projects compared to conventional 
procurement mechanisms, are typically better in terms of intergenerational fairness. This 
conclusion cannot be extended to all PPPs, as it depends on the alternative public sector funding, 
but it is a strong argument in favour of including in the Value for Money analysis of PPPs, 
besides the standard efficiency and financial considerations, an analysis of the intergenerational 
effects of the different procurement options and to compare these effects with those of the purely 
public financing alternative.   
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1.  BACKGROUND 
This thesis addresses the following particular issues: 
(1). Firstly, it identifies and classifies “redistribution effects”, which play an important role in 
investment decision-making, though rarely in an evident/transparent manner. Public 
investment projects analysts have tried to identify such effects both to create awareness 
of their weight in the decisions adopted by the different governments and to quantify and 
value redistribution in order to incorporate it in project appraisal in a rigorously way. 
(2). Second, it deals with “intergenerational redistribution”. This is actually a major subject of 
research that has been addressed notably in relation to externalities (e.g. climate change) 
and macroeconomic effects (i.e. of public debt). The thesis focuses, in particular, on the 
intergenerational effects stemming from the financial model adopted for major 
investments in transport infrastructure (public budget, loans, PPPs with user payment, 
etc.). This focus is relevant because the long-term effects of the financing formula finally 
adopted for infrastructure development projects have been disregarded until now in the 
decision-making process in spite of its potentially strong implications for the welfare of 
the successive generations affected by major projects. 
(3). Finally, this thesis describes and develops the architecture of the “Intergenerational 
Redistributive Effects Model” (IREM), a microeconomic tool specifically developed to 
deal with the above-mentioned effects. This model provides a set of indicators to evaluate 
the financing formula adopted in major transport infrastructure projects in terms of 
fairness for future generations. The knowledge gained through the assessment of the 
intergenerational impact of different financing formulas under different (public) 
procurement scenarios has allowed developing an “intergenerational project rating scale”, 
which is central to establish the convenience and fairness, in the long run, of the 
financing formula finally adopted for infrastructure delivery to establish its practicality 
and utility. 
In sum, this thesis has allowed to place the redistributive effects of major transport infrastructure 
in a wider policy debate. Indeed, its main objective is to generate a broad discussion about the 
importance of enhancing the existing framework for project appraisal through the consideration 
of redistribution effects, with a particular focus on the analysis of intergenerational ones. The 
incorporation of such effects in project appraisal and, in particular, of the indicators of the 
intergenerational impact produced by the application of the IREM model complement and finally 
improve the conventional project assessment that is based on socioeconomic and financial 
analyses carried out with a simple “global” view of society and from the sole perspective of the 
current generation. The ideas developed in this thesis, which take a broader evaluation approach, 
should hopefully contribute to better decision-making processes for major investments in 
transport infrastructure. 
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2. IMPORTANCE OF THE ANALYSIS OF REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS; AN 
OVERVIEW 
There is a need for an appraisal framework ensuring that all relevant impacts are captured. The 
decision to build major projects of transport infrastructure is usually based on their ability to 
increase the resources available for the whole of society, which is usually evaluated through a 
conventional cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA focuses on the project’s utility for users of the 
transportation system (efficiency benefits), despite the fact that such investments typically entail 
impacts of social, environmental and territorial nature over and above users-benefits. The 
differential (i.e. redistribution) effects of transport infrastructure development, which should be 
considered alongside the socioeconomic and financial assessments of a project, are seldom 
reflected in a systematic way in the decisions on major infrastructure investments.  
The identification and classification of redistributive effects is actually a major contribution of 
this thesis. Efficiency benefits are unevenly distributed among the project’s stakeholders and, in 
practice, transport infrastructure investment entails a diversity of redistributive effects that are 
relevant in the decision-making process. Most public policies defend indeed a bias in favour of a 
certain area, social group or specific agents. Even so, if the redistribution effects are strong, they 
may generate serious opposition by those sectors/groups negatively affected. How to incorporate 
redistributive effects in the decision-making process is actually an open question. In this sense, 
the typologies defined in Section II of this doctoral thesis are expected to cover most of the 
redistributive effects generated by transport investments that could be openly considered by 
decision-makers.  
There is a need for putting in perspective the biases that redistributive effects introduce in favour 
or against an investment decision. Those of territorial, social and environmental nature have to 
be identified by means of a thorough analysis of redistribution effects. The comparison of the 
redistribution effects with the net economic value of the project, in money terms, produced by 
the CBA should provide the decision-maker with a solid indicator of its real interest. Besides, the 
Stakeholders/Effects Matrix (S/E Matrix) has proven over the years to be useful in providing 
insights on the political and social connotations that, in particular in the transport sector, are 
critical for the investment decision. The analysis of the redistributive effects among project’s 
stakeholders is actually used to identify, among the various agents involved, who benefits from 
the project and who is negatively affected by it.    
The intergenerational redistributive effects arising as a consequence of the misallocation 
between the project’s socioeconomic net benefits and its financial provisions had not been 
identified until now. Traditional discounting brings the project outcomes that can be monetised, 
both socioeconomic effects and financial flows, to the extant generation’s perspective. But 
transport infrastructure typically unfolds over decades and this implies that they potentially 
affect the well-being of individuals that are young today, even unborn, and thus cannot directly 
participate in the decision-making process and whose future costs and benefits are minored by 
the CBA discounting procedure. On the other hand, due to indivisibilities and economies of 
scale, transport infrastructure projects are often too large and too expensive, to be exclusively 
financed by the public budgets of the generation in which the decision is taken. It seems fair, in 
any case, to distribute the financial burden of the investment over the lifecycle of the project. 
The point is that this will have an impact on the successive generations, as the forthcoming users 
and/or taxpayers will end up enduring much of the actual payments in relation to the investment. 
Within this framework, it is logical to compare the gaps between benefits and costs generation 
by generation. 
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Section III presents the architecture of the “Intergenerational Redistributive Effects Model” 
(IREM), which is actually the most significant contribution of this doctoral thesis to academia. 
IREM has been developed from an overlapping generations approach to allow comparing the 
distribution of the expected socioeconomic net benefits with the flows of obligations (in terms of 
payments) that will be borne by the successive generations affected throughout the project’s 
lifespan. The core idea underlying IREM is that well-conceived projects from a socioeconomic 
and financing point of view should be fair to future generations (i.e. the trend of the relation 
between net benefits and actual payments is positive towards the generations to come), and not 
entail significant differences among the various overlapping generations affected by the project. 
There are, of course, a number of issues arising from the application of this new and disruptive 
microeconomic tool that had to be resolved before applying the model to actual case studies. 
Section IV is actually devoted to the resolution of practical problems arising from the 
application of the model to real projects.  
A major conclusion obtained from the knowledge gained from the practical application of IREM 
has been that it may be used to enhance decision-making processes in major infrastructure 
projects: Section V shows that the IREM indicators offer valuable insights to identify those 
projects that would represent a clearly unfair treatment of future generations (white elephants), in 
spite of showing an acceptable socioeconomic return for the current society. The procedure 
developed in this section encompasses both traditional economic approaches and the analysis of 
redistribution effects, with a special focus on the intergenerational ones. On the other hand, 
Section VI shows that besides the standard efficiency and financial considerations, an analysis 
of the intergenerational effects of the different procurement options and to compare these effects 
with those of the purely public financing alternative may provide added value to the traditional 
view on the Value for Money analysis of public-private partnerships (PPPs). In the practical 
exercise carried out in this section a main hypothesis is that private participation can deliver 
infrastructure and offer services at least equivalent in quality to those provided by the public 
sector through traditional infrastructure procurement, but with better outcomes in terms of both 
project costs, at least in terms of resources, and intergenerational effects. 
 
3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
This epigraph summarises the most important conclusions derived from the different sections of 
this thesis. More detailed results and particular conclusions can be found in the last epigraph of 
each section. Thesis conclusions: 
I. The efficiency of major transport projects in terms of resources should always be a 
critical factor in decision-making. However, efficiency benefits are unevenly distributed 
among the project’s stakeholders and, in practice, transport infrastructure investment 
entails a diversity of redistributive effects that are actually relevant in the decision-
making process. Thus, there is a need to look closely to redistribution issues (social, 
territorial, environmental, etc.) stemming from the project. If redistributive effects are 
strong, the sensitivity to unfair treatment of specific sectors/groups, which is increasing 
with the development of social networks, can be expected to lead to blockages of those 
investments that neither address public participation adequately nor incorporate 
measures to balance unfairness. 
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II. By their magnitude and their long lifecycle, major projects of transport infrastructure 
will affect many overlapping generations, so costs (in terms of actual payments) and 
benefits should be balanced to avoid distant generations to unfairly pay for investment 
adopted by the extant ones. The case of intergenerational redistributive effects diverges 
from the other redistributive effects because, by definition, future generations cannot 
participate in the decision. It is, however, their capacity to comply with future 
commitments what establishes whether or not an investment should be deemed to be 
efficient, financially sustainable and fair from an intergenerational perspective. 
III. Traditional discounting models are inadequate to incorporate the perspective of the 
successive generations on investments unfolding over large time-spans because these 
conventional models pay insufficient attention to their actual welfare, which will be 
severely affected by the implications of the financial model adopted. 
IV. There are two basic questions for the assessment of the fairness of a project financing 
formula on successive generations: on the one hand, to determine both what is the most 
appropriate method to group the affected individuals over the years in “generations” and, 
on the other hand, how the actual payments in relation with the main investment may 
affect the perceived utility of the project for the individuals concerned. In this thesis, an 
ad-hoc methodological approach, supported by a survey carried out specifically for this 
research, has been used to define the most suited timespan for a standard “annual 
generation”, a critical element of the IREM and to establish the concomitant weighting 
curve that must reflect the sensitivity of society to the effects of major transport 
infrastructures.  
V. IREM has been applied to a set of projects of different typologies under multiple 
financing and management options with the aim of gaining knowledge about the model’s 
performance. The outcomes obtained stress that even efficient investments could entail 
severe redistributive effects among generations. It is in this sense that the financing 
formula is key for analysing intergenerational fairness measured in terms of payments 
and net benefits allocation over time. When the financial burden falls on future 
generations, as could be politically very convenient at the moment of making the 
decision to build, the financial structure adopted could entail that the project becomes a 
white elephant if, for instance, distant generations of users and/or taxpayers end up 
footing the bill stemming of the main investment while obtaining poor benefits from the 
project.  
VI. The analysis of intergenerational impact that can be carried out with IREM has also 
proven to be useful to complement the traditional view on the Value for Money (VfM) of 
private participation in project financing and management, through some type of public-
private partnership. Current methods of project appraisal, in particular cost-benefit 
analysis, look at actions from the point of view of today’s society. Besides, decision 
makers usually determine the financing formula after the decision to build has been 
adopted. This could severely affect some of the objectives that were included in the 
initial considerations for the project construction. In this sense, the knowledge gained 
from the application of the IREM model to a number of case studies shows that the 
analysis of the project’s intergenerational impact may provide valuable insights on the 
long-term added value that could be obtained potentially from private participation in 
project financing and management with regards to publicly managed infrastructure-
solutions. 
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To sum-up, when redistribution issues are not properly taken into account and correctly 
managed, a project easily ends up with blockages that unavoidably affect its efficiency. In this 
sense, pursuing fairer investments from an intergenerational perspective may help public 
managers to both prove that the investment strategy, i.e. the combination of project’s effects and 
its financial package, is useful to sustain the well-being of future generations, and adopt 
financing formulae that represent suitable redistributive effects among the successive generations 
involved in long-term investments. 
 
4. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This doctoral thesis is expected to cover most of the redistribution effects stemming from major 
projects of transport infrastructure. It has focused in their identification and classification and 
developed the concept and quantification of intergenerational effects. However, a better 
understanding of the actual redistribution effects of transport infrastructure remains a major 
challenge for those trying to foresee the economic and social development impacts of such 
investments. On the other hand, the consideration of redistribution effects alongside efficiency in 
decision-making can be challenging in practice. The creation of a solid evaluation methodology 
and a procedure to adequately present them in the citizen participation process and finally to the 
responsible of the decision still requires additional research. This could eventually lead to a 
formalised and systematic way to complement the traditional CBA with the incorporation of 
proper indicators of the accomplishment of the political goals behind redistribution. 
It is also necessary to be aware that certain effects of transport infrastructure projects (e.g., 
development of urban conurbations around metropolises) might trigger redistribution impacts of 
second order. While most of these secondary effects have already been identified in the first 
count, their actual consequences on the territory and on different social groups would require 
additional research, in particular about their interactions, in order to prevent double counting. For 
instance, the environmental externalities resulting from the expected activity generated by the 
project may bring redistribution issues in the long run, as they will affect differently many 
generations. Also, some territorial and social impacts (e.g., segregation phenomena between 
income groups) may happen beyond the target area envisaged for the project. Incorporate this 
type of issues in the decision-making process is not easy. Within the redistribution framework, it 
seems necessary to carry out studies seeking to define clear indicators, notably on the expected 
effects of transport infrastructure on long-term economic and social development. Reducing the 
subjectivity of politically-oriented redistribution should improve the quality and fairness of the 
decisional process. 
The Stakeholders/Effects Matrix 1  represented a significant methodological advance in the 
identification of the transfers amongst the various agents participating in a major project. In 
projects of certain complexity in which the distribution of the costs and benefits among the 
agents involved is critical, the redistributive effects among project-linked stakeholders may have 
strong political and social connotations. In this sense there is a need of studies to bring light on 
the distribution of financial and economic flows among stakeholders. They are particularly 
required to analyse the fairness of projects in which the private sector or other hybrid2 
                                                   
1 Turró, M., 2004. RAILPAG. Railway Project Appraisal Guidelines. ed. European Commission and European 
Investment Bank (http://www.eib.org/projects/publications/ railpag-railway-project-appraisal-guidelines.htm). 
2 Organisations with ownerships rights distributed between a government and either other governments or, more 
commonly, private actors. More details in: Vining, A.R. & Weimer, D.L., (2016). The challenges of fractionalised 
property rights in public-private hybrid organisations: The god, the bad, and the ugly. Regulation & Governance, 
10(2), pp.161-178.  
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organisations are assigned major responsibilities in project financing and management, as 
existing experience is inconclusive. 
The main contribution of the thesis is related to intergenerational effects. Major infrastructure 
projects can generate strong differential effects among overlapping generations during the 
project lifecycle. Indeed, this research has shown that, in particular, projects showing a 
combination of modest usefulness from a socioeconomic point of view –in terms of CBA 
outputs– and inappropriate financing formulae may result in redistribution effects that are very 
unfair, even regressive, for generations to come. Might unfair treatment of future generations be 
a generalised phenomenon? Why the analysis of the intergenerational fairness related to the 
financing formula of the project should be relevant for decision makers? To respond to both 
questions, further research is necessary. The issue of intergenerational redistribution at 
microeconomic level has seldom been theoretically addressed and never targeted until now, in 
part because there was not a solid approach to do it. On the other hand, academics and 
researchers have traditionally focused their effort on the analysis of the macroeconomic 
redistribution issues stemming from a particular fiscal policy or pension system rather than in the 
redistribution issues of a particular investment portfolio or project, perhaps because there is a 
generalised conviction that today’s investments will benefit future generations forever. But the 
point of concern is that, while the government promoting the investment may set up transfers to 
quickly correct unfair treatment between, for instance, social groups, future generations cannot 
ask previous generations to pay more for the project. They will inherit, therefore, a financial 
burden that either they will support themselves, as originally expected, and probably postpone, 
as a consequence, other investments that might be potentially important for them, or to pass the 
burden to future generations through refinancing. In any case, both alternatives mean an 
opportunity cost that should be put into perspective.  
A question that also deserves some research is to what extent some of the budgetary constraints 
that society face today are due to investments that have been used for the exclusive benefit of 
past generations or if they are mostly fair for the generations that were unable to participate in 
the global decision-making set up. An ex-post analysis of a representative sample of major 
projects developed in former decades by EU member countries could provide an answer to this 
question. As this exercise is politically sensitive, in particular under the present situation of 
public debt control, it would be probably easier to concentrate on projects supported either with 
EU funds (grants) or with soft loans from the European Investment Bank to check if they should 
be labelled as fair or as unfair/regressive for the intergenerational perspective. The application of 
IREM within the ex-post evaluations that, in the past few years, have been carried out by 
European Commission would already provide an interesting view of the issue. 
The political interest of this exercise should not be disregarded. If the results of the ex-post 
evaluation indicates that most EU-supported investments would be deemed productive, 
financially sustainable and intergenerationally fair because they have been effectively delivering 
over the years economic, social and environmental benefits higher than its costs and their 
financial burden is well distributed, European policy-makers should be bound to reconsider the 
rationale of the EU rules for deficit/debt public accounting –European Systems of Accounts 
(ESA, 2010). For well-planned and identified investment priorities that may be central for 
economic growth and sustainable development requiring massive long-term financing, 
independently if they are conveyed through public agencies, hybrid vehicles or private investors, 
an exclusion from the deficit/debt figures should be considered when they are properly 
appraised3. In a first step, EU-supported projects, which require a CBA analysis that could easily 
incorporate an intergenerational assessment, could benefit from this waver from ESA. On the 
                                                   
3 The white elephants paper (Turró & Penyalver, 2019) provides some guidelines in this regard. 
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other hand, the fact that projects get substantial grants from the EU budget and thus from the EU 
taxpayer, introduces an intergenerational impact that deserves a specific analysis of its effects on 
the IREM indicators.  
It must be recognised that the IREM model offers a solid basis for the analysis of project fairness 
across the generations affected, but its practical application is relatively complex. The 
availability of adequate information, in some cases due to confidentiality issues is a major 
handicap. Besides, in order to determine to what extent intergenerational unfairness may be 
avoided/limited through improved financial packages or having recourse to alternative financing 
mechanisms, there is a need for additional research with larger samples of case studies. A model 
requires systematic application and progressive adaptation to become a reference for 
practitioners. For IREM to play a central role in project appraisal, additional research is needed, 
especially to enhance the precision of its outputs. The following lines of research appear as the 
most relevant for this purpose: 
- Assets and maintenance and replacement costs. The impact in the model of the years when 
heavy maintenance costs should take place or when the replacement of assets representing 
substantial expenditure, such as rolling stock, is programmed deserves some analysis. The 
research should consider how these investments are financed in practice. The impact on the 
IREM outputs of detaching them, and even routine maintenance, from the optimal moment 
and their double effects in terms of both negative socioeconomic effects and financing 
flows should be analysed. The corresponding evolution of asset valuation over the lifecycle 
of the infrastructure and the use in the model of depreciation and residual values also 
deserves further research. 
 
- Extrapolation of the project performance. The generational analysis ends up a number of 
years after the period of analysis adopted in CBA, 10 years according to the “future 
branch” of the weighting curve that defines the standard-annual generation for the IREM 
model. In this additional period, the time-profile of the net socioeconomic benefits is 
extrapolated according to the trend shown after the ramp-up period. However, major 
projects of transport infrastructure, especially those of urban nature (tramway, metro, etc.), 
may be under-dimensioned at the end of their economic lifecycle, with a clear (negative) 
impact on the estimates of socioeconomic benefits in the last years of the project cycle. 
They are not affecting very much the results of the CBA due to discounting, but they may 
have substantial intergenerational effects. Future research should deepen in what is the 
most adequate extrapolation approach to the actual performance of the different types of 
transport infrastructure projects. 
 
- Annual generation concept. There is space for more research on the definition of the 
weighting curve linked to the concept of annual generation. Both different types of 
transport infrastructure projects and different contexts of the project implementation could 
require ad hoc weighting curves. Future research should focus on to what extent the IREM 
outputs may vary according to deviations in the estimates of the weights linked to the 
concept of annual generation.  
 
- Sensitivity analysis for the IREM outputs. As a result of the different scenarios that can be 
envisaged for a project performance in the short (construction phase) and the long run 
(project performance), there is a need to define a proper procedure for sensitivity analysis. 
This analysis should focus, on the one hand, on the implications of the envisaged 
deviations in terms of cost overruns, delays in project commissioning and revenues 
estimates for the financial needs, which necessarily affect the financial package linked to 
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project development. Besides, the sensitivity analysis should take into consideration 
possible deviations of the expected socioeconomic benefits as a direct consequence of an 
enlarged construction phase as well as on project underperformance. 
 
- The intergenerational impact of project-related taxes: the government promoting the 
investment pays and receives taxes, mainly VAT, during the project construction and after 
its implementation. Other taxes may be also levied on additional fuel consumption of 
induced traffic, which should be reduced from the taxpayers’ contribution. Taxes on 
stakeholders who are not final users (i.e. corporate taxes) or on certain components of the 
project (i.e. local taxes) have their own timing and affect the financing of the project. The 
moment in which the payment of taxes occurs has, in principle, a minor impact on IREM 
indicators, but it is still necessary to pay attention to this issue, in particular when projects 
are structured as PPPs because it is implicit in the project finance mechanism the financing 
of certain taxes, such as VAT, through short- or mid-term (miniperm) loans. 
 
- Fiscal policy. Public subsidies, either in form of direct financial support to users of the 
transport sector or in form of indirect support to companies or their shareholders through 
fiscal deductions have clear effects in the design of the financial package for infrastructure 
development. If subsidies are strong, the private sector is traditionally more willing to 
provide financing through PPPs, which has in turns an impact on the overall expenditure 
linked to the project. Besides, in the case of PPPs, taxes on the concessionaire are typically 
charged on operators, on transportation users and/or taxpayers. In other words, the 
financing mechanism is linked, to certain extent, to the overarching fiscal scheme. It is in 
this sense that there is a need of additional research to establish how fiscal policy may have 
an influence in the positive intergenerational pattern found for PPPs.  
 
- Inflation. Financial cash flows are typically incorporating inflation forecasts, particularly 
relevant when loans are subject to fixed interest. In the IREM model the comparison 
between socioeconomic net benefits and the financial burden on specific years must be 
consistent and it is, therefore, carried in constant terms. Inflation estimates may thus be 
important in the results of the model. The influence of inflation discounting on the 
assessment of intergenerational effects should be analysed in depth. 
 
- Finally, as there could be multiple institutions applying IREM from CBAs of different 
quality (and bias), it is necessary to raise the question of what standards have to be used for 
CBA (e.g., unlike UK Treasury, the EC guide states that the economic impact of project’ 
spillovers will not be taken into account in the efficiency analysis) and whether there exist 
common patterns to value time savings, GHG emission reduction, etc. In this case, shadow 
prices could entail significant differences for CBA’s outcomes. 
This doctoral thesis opens up a number of exciting research lines for future practitioners. The 
most challenging ones are those related to the potential of IREM to enhance the decision-making 
process of major public investments. There are, however, many areas of knowledge, from the 
detailed level of definition of the model to its potential use in the more abstract, but socially and 
politically relevant, fields of ethics and democratic representation that are also in quest of more 
extensive research. 
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